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ABSTRACT 
 
Unrestricted Mexican exports of sugar into the U.S. is considered the most pressing issue 
facing the U.S. sugar industry.  The goal of this dissertation is to analyze the trade of 
sugar between Mexico and the U.S. as well as analyze additional primary issues 
confronting the U.S. sugar industry.   
Chapters 1 and 2 provide an introduction to the U.S. sugar industry.  Chapters 3 
through 6 develop trade models which analyze sugar trade between Mexico and the U.S.  
The trade models estimate how NAFTA, USDA sugar forecast errors and Mexican 
ownership of twenty percent of the Mexican sugar industry each impact U.S. producer 
surplus and Mexican welfare.  Results validate that U.S. producer surplus and in some 
instances Mexican welfare were decreased by full implementation of NAFTA.  U.S. 
producer surplus and Mexican welfare were decreased due to USDA sugar production 
forecasting errors. U.S. producer surplus would be increased if the Mexican government 
did not own twenty percent of Mexican sugar production.   
Using an online choice experiment, Chapter 7 assesses U.S. consumers’ 
preferences and willingness to pay (WTP) for imported and genetically modified (GM) 
labeled sugar and sugar in soft drinks.  Results indicate that consumers prefer bags of 
sugar and soft drinks labeled as “Not GM”.  Furthermore, consumers prefer sugar from 
Canada and the U.S. over sugar from Mexico, Brazil and the Philippines.  Evidence is 
also provided that participants are more likely to choose actual products in the choice set 
rather than the “none of these” options when controlling for hypothetical bias by using 
consequentiality techniques.  
 ii 
 
 A non-hypothetical experimental auction was used in Chapter 8 to determine 
consumers’ WTP for soft drinks labeled with sweetener and calorie information and 
analyzed the role of taste panels in an experimental auction.  Results indicate that sugar is 
consumers’ most preferred sweetener and calorie labeling is ineffective at influencing 
consumers to choose healthier soft drinks.  Including taste in an experimental auction 
caused significant reductions in consumers’ WTP for all soft drinks. 
 Chapter 9 concludes by summarizing the results of this dissertation and discussing 
the future challenges facing the U.S. sugar industry. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Nearly $20 billion of economic activity is generated in the U.S. annually by the U.S. 
sugar industry (American Sugar Alliance, 2014a).  Over 142,000 jobs in twenty-two 
different states are created by the U.S. sugar industry (American Sugar Alliance, 2014a).  
According to U.S. sugar industry experts (e.g., Wiesemeyer, 2014; Markwart, 2014a), the 
most pressing issues facing the U.S. sugar industry are imports of sugar from Mexico, 
future trade agreements between the U.S. and other sugar producing countries, the 
increasing amount of sugar substitutes available to consumers, and mandatory genetically 
modified labeling initiatives.  The research objective of this dissertation is to 
comprehensively analyze these primary issues which are currently confronting the U.S. 
sugar industry.   
Mexican exports of sugar into the U.S. is by far the most pressing issue facing the 
U.S. sugar industry (Wiesemeyer, 2014; Marwkart, 2014a; American Sugar Alliance 
2013a).  Since full implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), which took place on January, 1 2008, Mexico has been allowed to export 
unrestricted, tariff free amounts of sugar into the U.S. which has resulted in depressed 
U.S. sugar prices (Markwart, 2013; American Sugar Alliance, 2013a; Wexler, 2013a).  
The objective of Chapters 3 through 6 of this dissertation is to create theoretical partial 
equilibrium models of trade between the U.S., Mexico and the other countries which 
export sugar into the U.S.  These models will then be empirically estimated to analyze 
three main research questions.  First, the impact of full NAFTA implementation on U.S. 
producer surplus and Mexican welfare will be estimated.  Next, extending previous work 
by Lewis and Manfredo (2012), the impact USDA sugar forecasting errors on U.S. 
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producer surplus and Mexican welfare will be determined.  Finally, the impact of 
Mexican government ownership of twenty percent of the sugar production in Mexico on 
U.S. producer surplus and Mexican welfare will be estimated.  
 Chapter 7 will further analyze critical U.S. sugar industry concerns regarding U.S. 
sugar imports and the possibility of mandatory genetically modified labeling.  A 
controversial subject regarding 2014 Farm Bill negotiations was whether to continue 
current 2008 Farm Bill sugar program provisions which regulate foreign imports of sugar 
into the U.S. (e.g., Coalition for Sugar Reform, 2013a; Nixon, 2013; Farm Futures, 2013; 
USDA Economic Research Service, 2013a).  In defense of U.S. sugar policy, as outlined 
in the 2008 Farm Bill, sugar lobbyist groups attest that U.S. consumers prefer sugar 
produced in the U.S. (American Sugar Alliance, 2013b).  Therefore, Chapter 7 
determines what consumers are willing to pay for sugar produced from the U.S. and from 
foreign countries (e.g., Mexico, Canada, and the Philippines) which currently export 
sugar into the U.S.   
Chapter 7 also investigates what consumers are willing to pay for sugar produced 
from genetically modified (GM) seeds versus non-GM seeds if GM labeling were to 
become mandatory. Currently sugar produced in the U.S. originates from non-GM 
sugarcane seeds and GM sugarbeet seeds (USDA Economic Research Service, 2013b; 
USDA Economic Research Service, 2013c).  Mandatory GM labeling laws (if passed) 
have potentially large consequences for sugarbeet growers in the U.S. given nearly 100% 
of sugarbeets grown in the U.S. are GM. (USDA Economic Research Service, 2013b).  
To analyze the impact of mandatory GM labels on consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) 
for sugar as well as consumers’ WTP for sugar from the U.S. and foreign countries, an 
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online choice experiment is utilized.  To control for possible hypothetical bias in the 
online choice experiment, the concept of consequentiality is explored. 
Chapter 8 focuses attention on the assertion that sugar potentially contributes to 
the obesity epidemic in the U.S. (e.g., Lustig, Schmidt, & Brandis, 2012) while also 
determining consumers’ preferences for sugar and sugar substitutes.  In an effort to 
analyze how policy measures such as improved product labeling can help consumers 
make healthier market place decisions, Chapter 8 evaluates results of a non-hypothetical 
experimental auction used to elicit consumers’ WTP for soft drinks labeled with different 
sweetener and calorie information.  Chapter 8 also determines how the inclusion of taste 
panels in an experimental auction impacts consumers’ WTP for soft drinks labeled with 
different sweetener and calorie information.  Little research has directly quantified how 
the inclusion of taste panels in an experimental auction impacts consumers’ bidding 
behavior.  Chapter 8 also allows a comparison to be made between which sweetener 
ingredients (e.g., sugar, high fructose corn syrup (HFCS), or aspartame) consumers prefer 
in their soft drinks. 
Chapter 9 provides a conclusion to this dissertation.  Overall results from the 
dissertation are summarized.  Future challenges facing the U.S. sugar industry are also 
discussed along with directions for future research. 
Background Information  
Certain background information is needed in order to analyze the issues outlined 
previously that currently face the U.S. sugar industry.  Thus, this section presents 
background information regarding: current U.S. sugar policy and the history of U.S. 
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sugar policy, current world sugar production and consumption, and the history of how 
sugar spread throughout the world.   
U.S. sugar policy.  Foreign exports of sugar entering into the U.S. are at the 
forefront of concerns for the U.S. sugar industry.  Current U.S. sugar policy contains 
several provisions which protect the U.S. sugar industry by regulating exports of sugar 
into the U.S.  The following section explains how current U.S. sugar policy operates.  In 
order to understand current U.S. sugar policy, including how the U.S. sugar industry is 
able to effectively regulate foreign exports of sugar into the U.S., one must investigate 
U.S. sugar policy beginning with the Tariff Act of 1789. 
History of U.S. sugar policy.  Essentially, U.S. sugar policy is nearly as old as the 
U.S.  On March 4, 1789, the Articles of Confederation were replaced with the U.S. 
Constitution (Library of Congress, 2014a).  Approximately one month later on April 8, 
1789, the Tariff Act of 1789 was passed by the First Congress of the U.S. and was their 
first major piece of legislation (Center on Congress, 2014; Benson, 2010).  Introduced by 
James Madison, the primary goal of the Tariff Act of 1789 was to provide the national 
government a source of revenue to pay down the national debt incurred from the 
Revolutionary War and to also pay for its operations (Center on Congress, 2014; Benson, 
2010).  The Tariff Act of 1789 included, among other tariffs (e.g., steel, ships, tobacco, 
salt, etc.), a tariff on foreign sugar entering into the U.S. (Miller, 1960; Alvarez & 
Polopolus, 2012b).  From 1789 through 1930, thirty different pieces of legislation dealing 
with sugar were passed, but not many modifications were made (Alvarez & Polopolus, 
2012b).  Importantly, in 1842 the purpose of the sugar tariff was extended to include a 
higher tariff on refined sugar entering into the U.S.; the goal of this tariff was to stimulate 
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a domestic sugar refining industry as well as to promote domestic raw sugar production 
(Alvarez & Polopolus, 2012b). 
 The Jones-Costigan Act of 1934, which became law on May 9, 1934, was the first 
Sugar Act in the U.S. and defined sugarbeets and sugarcane as basic commodities which 
made them eligible for inclusion in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (Alvarez 
& Polopolus, 2012b; Olsen, 2001).  The Agricultural Adjustment Administration was 
established by the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, which was part of the New Deal, 
and was designed to help restore agricultural prosperity in the U.S.  The Jones-Costigan 
Sugar Act of 1934 was opposed by sugarcane producers in Puerto Rico and Hawaii, “but 
it passed handily in Congress because of the backing of two powerful congressmen-
Representative Marvin Jones of Texas and Senator Edward Costigan of Colorado” 
(Olsen, 2001, pg. 165).  The Jones-Costigan Act contained six main sugar policy 
provisions:  
1. The determination each year of the quantity of sugar needed to supply the 
nation’s requirements at prices reasonable to consumers and fair to producers; 
2. The division of the U.S. sugar market among the domestic and foreign 
supplying areas by the use of quotas and subordinate limitations on offshore direct 
consumption of sugar; 
3. The allotment of these quotas among the various processors in each domestic 
area; 
4. The adjustment of production in each domestic area to the established quota; 
5. The levying of a tax on the processing of sugarcane and sugarbeets, the 
proceeds of which were to be used to make payments to producers and 
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compensate them for adjusting their production to marketing quotas to increase 
their income; 
6. The equitable division of sugar returns among beet and cane processors, 
growers, and farm workers. (Alvarez & Polopolus, 2012b, pg. 2) 
 The processing tax was declared unconstitutional in early 1936 and was therefore 
repealed by the U.S. Congress (Alvarez & Polopolus, 2012b).  The Jones-Costigan Act 
was adjusted by the Sugar Act of 1937 and remained in effect until December 31, 1947, 
when it expired and became superseded by the Sugar Act of 1948 (Alvarez & Polopolus, 
2012b).  The only difference between the 1948 Sugar Act and the 1937 Sugar Act was 
the addition of Cuba receiving preferential sugar quota treatment; this change was made 
because Cuba helped the U.S. during World War II by exporting sugar into the U.S. 
(Alvarez & Polopolus, 2012b).  The 1948 Sugar Act did not expire until December 31, 
1974, but was extended and amended numerous times over that twenty-six year span; 
most notably in 1960, the Sugar Act was modified when President Eisenhower eliminated 
the Cuban sugar quota (in response to strained relations with Cuba due to the Cuban 
Revolution) and Congress reallocated the Cuban quota to foreign countries (Alvarez & 
Polopolus, 2012b; Berman & Heineman, 1963).   
Due to high world sugar prices, the 1948 Sugar Act was allowed to expire on 
December 31, 1974 (Wiltgen, 2007).  In the absence of a U.S. sugar policy, extreme 
sugar price fluctuations resulted with sugar prices ranging from 65 cents per pound in 
1974 to 7.8 cents per pound in 1978 and back to 40 cents per pound in 1979 (American 
Sugar Alliance, 2014c; Alvarez & Polopolus, 2012b).  In response to the fluctuating price 
of sugar in the U.S., a non-recourse loan program for sugar was established by the 1977 
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Agricultural Act (1977 Farm Bill) (Wiltgen, 2007).  The inclusion of U.S. sugar policy in 
the 1977 Farm Bill officially marked the new beginning of U.S sugar policy legislation; 
since 1977, the laws governing U.S. sugar policy have always been contained in the 
nation’s Farm Bills (Wiltgen, 2007).  The loan rates for the 1977 and 1978 crops were 
13.5 and 14.73 cents per pound, raw value, respectively; if sugar processors defaulted on 
the sugar loan, they would be forced to forfeit the sugar to the Commodity Credit 
Corporation (CCC), which still holds true today under current U.S. sugar policy as 
outlined by the 2008 Farm Bill (Alvarez & Polopolus, 2012b; USDA Economic Research 
Service, 2013a).   
The Agricultural and Food Act of 1981 (1981 Farm Bill) was signed into law by 
President Ronald Reagan on December 22, 1981 (Library of Congress, 2014b).  The 1981 
Farm Bill officially re-introduced country-by-country import quotas, established loan 
rates for sugarcane at 17 cents per pound for the 1982 fiscal year, and allowed the 
Secretary of Agriculture the authority to set loan rates for sugarbeets at a level 
determined fair and reasonable in comparison to the sugarcane rate (Alvarez & 
Polopolus, 2012b; Coalition for Sugar Reform, 2013b). 
The Food Security Act of 1985 (1985 Farm Bill) continued the sugar legislation 
from the 1981 Farm Bill and also raised the sugar loan rate to no less than 18 cents per 
pound (Alvarez & Polopolus, 2012b).  The fact that the sugar program operates at no net 
cost to the federal government was especially emphasized, and this clause also remains 
intact by current U.S. sugar policy in the 2008 Farm Bill (Alvarez & Polopolus, 2012b; 
USDA Economic Research Service, 2013a).  The Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and 
Trade Act of 1990 (1990 Farm Bill), the 1996 Federal Agricultural Improvement and 
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Reform Act (1996 Farm Bill), and the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 
(2002 Farm Bill) contained various adjustments to the U.S. sugar program; it was not 
until the 2008 Farm Bill that U.S. sugar policy received significant modifications 
(Alvarez & Polopolus, 2012b; Coalition for Sugar Reform, 2013b).   
Current U.S. sugar policy.  Current U.S. sugar policy laws are contained in the 
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (2008 Farm Bill).  The 2008 Farm Bill 
retains provisions on both import quotas and loan rates, but increases the loan rate 
modestly and adds modifications to the sugar quota system (USDA Economic Research 
Service, 2013d).  The 2008 Farm bill outlines the loan rates for raw sugarcane as follows: 
18 cents/lb in fiscal year (FY) 2009, 18.25 cents/lb in FY 2010, 18.50 cents/lb in FY 
2011, 18.75 cents/lb in FY 2012-2013 and the loan rate for refined sugarbeets is 22.9 
cents/lb in FY2009 and 128.5% of the loan rate for raw sugarcane in FY 2010-2013 
(USDA Economic Research Service, 2013d).  The first modification of the 2008 Farm 
Bill made to the sugar quota system was to set the domestic allotment quantity at no less 
than 85% of estimated deliveries for food and human consumption (USDA Economic 
Research Service, 2013d).  The 2008 Farm Bill also amended legislation regarding tariff 
rate quotas (TRQs).  TRQs in the 2008 Farm Bill are set at a minimum quantity of 1.139 
million metric ton raw value (MMTRV) and issued to forty countries and allocated by the 
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USDA Economic Research Service, 2013a).  
The 2008 Farm Bill introduced new language stating that on April 1 of the fiscal year, if 
the domestic market is undersupplied the Secretary of Agriculture may increase the TRQ 
(USDA Economic Research Service, 2013d).  In order to increase the TRQ prior to April 
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of the FY, there must be an emergency situation such as a natural disaster or war (USDA 
Economic Research Service, 2013d). 
New in the 2008 Farm Bill, U.S. sugar policy requires the Secretary of 
Agriculture to collect data regarding Mexican production, consumption and trade of high 
fructose corn syrup (HFCS) and sugar and make it publicly available.  The 2008 Farm 
Bill also created a Bioenergy Feedstock clause to help maintain the operation of the U.S. 
sugar program at zero cost to the taxpayer, which states that, “if reduction in the quantity 
of production accepted to (avoid forfeitures of sugar) involves sugar beets or sugarcane 
that has already been planted, the sugar beets or sugarcane so planted may not be used for 
any commercial purpose other than as a bioenergy feedstock” (H.R. 6124-110th Congress: 
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, 2008, pgs. 139-140). 
The 2014 Farm Bill recently was signed into law by President Barak Obama on 
February 7, 2014 at Michigan State University in East Lansing, Michigan (American 
Farm Bureau, 2014).  U.S. sugar policy as outlined by the 2008 Farm Bill remains 
unchanged in the 2014 Farm Bill; thus, the 2014 Farm Bill extends previous U.S. sugar 
policy for another five years (American Sugar Alliance, 2014d).  
World sugar production and consumption.  Future trade agreements and 
increased exports of sugar into the U.S. are primary concerns facing the U.S. sugar 
industry.  Thus, it is important to conceptualize where the U.S. stands in terms of world 
sugar production and world sugar consumption.  If the 2014 Farm Bill was not signed 
into law this year, U.S. sugar policy may have expired.  Furthermore, if U.S. sugar policy 
is not extended five years from now when the current farm bill expires, it is possible that 
the U.S. sugar market would no longer be protected from sugar imports.  Therefore, it is 
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important to understand which countries would dominate the world sugar market and, 
thus, possibly dominate the U.S. sugar industry if U.S. sugar policy was changed and/or 
no longer existed in the future.   
Understanding world and domestic sugar consumption statistics is also central to 
determining the impact of increased sugar exports into the U.S.  If consumption of sugar 
were to increase in the U.S., then additional U.S. sugar imports may not be detrimental to 
the U.S. sugar industry.  Additionally, U.S. sugar industry exports consider sugar 
substitutes a long term challenge facing the U.S. sugar industry (Wiesemeyer, 2014).  
Thus, when discussing the consumption of sugar in the U.S., the numerous sugar 
substitutes available on the U.S. market are also explained.  
World sugar production.  In 2012/2013 world production of sugar was 
approximately 176 million metric tons, raw value (MMTRV) (USDA Foreign 
Agricultural Service, 2013).  Approximately 80% of the sugar in the world is produced 
from sugarcane, while 20% is derived from sugarbeets (Sucres & Denrées, 2014).  Table 
1 illustrates the world’s ten largest sugar producing countries/regions for 2012/2013 
(USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, 2013a).   
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Table 1 
2012-2013 Top Sugar Producing Countries/Regions 
World Rank Country/Region Production (MMTRV) 
1 Brazil 38.60 
2 India 27.20 
3 European Union 16.59 
4 China 14.00 
5 Thailand 10.00 
6 U.S. 8.14 
7 Mexico 7.39 
8 Russia 5.00 
9 Pakistan 4.78 
10 Australia 4.25 
 
Combined, these countries/regions represent approximately 75% of world sugar 
production (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, 2013a; Sucres & Denrées, 2014).  
Brazil is the largest producer of sugar, all of which is produced from sugarcane, and 
represents nearly 25% of world sugar production (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, 
2013a; Sucres & Denrées, 2014).  The U.S. ranks sixth in world sugar production and is 
unique because sugar in the U.S. is produced from both sugarcane and sugarbeets.  
Approximately 54% of the sugar produced in the U.S. originates from sugarbeets grown 
in the Northern U.S. while 46% of the sugar in the U.S. originates from sugarcane grown 
in the Southern U.S. (USDA Economic Research Service, 2013b)1.  In terms of world 
sugarbeet production, the European Union, the U.S., Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Iran, Japan 
and China are the main producers (Sugar Industry Biotech Council, 2014).  The primary 
                                                 
1 Sugarbeets are grown in Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, Wyoming, 
California, Idaho, Oregon and Washington (USDA Economic Research Service, 2013c).  Sugarcane is 
grown in Florida, Louisiana, Texas and Hawaii (USDA Economic Research Service, 2013b). 
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sugarcane producers in the world are Brazil, India, China, Mexico, Australia, Thailand, 
Pakistan and the U.S. (Sugar Industry Biotech Council, 2014).  
World sugar consumption.  Over the average of 2008/09 through 2012/13, the 
U.S. was the world’s fifth largest sugar consuming country/region as evidenced by Figure 
1 (American Sugar Alliance, 2014b).  During this same time frame, India, the European 
Union, China, Brazil, and the U.S. were the top five sugar consuming countries in the 
world consuming 23.8 MMTRV, 17.6MMTRV, 14.48MMTRV, 11.63MMTRV, and 
8.18MMTRV respectively. 
 
Figure 1. World sugar consumption (MMTRV), 2008/09-2012/13 average 
Table 2 illustrates the countries which have the highest per capita sugar 
consumption rates in the world for the average of 2007 through 2011 (Koo & Taylor, 
2012).  During the average of 2007 through 2011, the top five sugar consuming 
countries/regions in terms of per capita sugar consumption were Cuba, Australia, Brazil 
Mexico and the E.U. with averages of 134lbs, 132lbs, 123lbs, 110lbs and 106lbs of sugar 
23.80
17.60
14.48
11.63
8.18
5.59 4.88 4.57 4.25
2.77
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consumed respectively2.  The U.S. ranks eleventh in the world in per capita sugar 
consumption with the average American consuming approximately 71lbs of sugar a year, 
which is above the world average of 46lbs of sugar annually (Koo & Taylor, 2012). 
Table 2   
World Per Capita Sugar Consumption, Average of 2007 through 2011. 
    Net Per Capita 
Country Beet (B)/ Consumption Production Exports Consumption 
 Cane (C) --------------1,000 MTRV----------------- (pounds) 
Cuba C 677 1,272 685 134.48 
Australia C 1,250 4,461 3,213 132.28 
Brazil C 11,670 34,790 22,990 123.46 
Mexico C 5,098 5,474 752 110.23 
E.U. B 17,151 15,629 -1,357 105.82 
Canada B 1,379 88 -1,299 94.80 
Russia B/C 10,462 6,328 -4,022 81.57 
S. Africa C 1,603 2,192 639 79.37 
Algeria B 1,285 6 -1,273 74.96 
Egypt B/C 2,743 1,760 -974 74.96 
U.S. B/C 10,186 7,139 -2,492 70.55 
Thailand C 2,184 8,357 6,244 66.14 
Korea - 1,259 0 -1,343 59.52 
World B/C 154,167 157,452 51,473 46.30 
Rest of World B/C 42,146 30,395 -15,688 41.89 
Japan B/C 2,304 828 -1,460 39.68 
India C 23,730 24,033 1,262 37.48 
Indonesia C 4,760 1,964 -2,764 35.27 
China B/C 14,270 12,737 -1,508 15.43 
 
While the U.S. is not the leading per capital consumer of sugar, according to the 
USDA Economic Research Service (2014), the U.S. is the largest consumer of caloric 
sweeteners (e.g., sugar, HFCS, honey, etc.) in the world.  Throughout 2012, the average 
American consumed 129.5 pounds of caloric sweeteners (USDA Economic Research 
Service, 2013c).  Table 3 shows the breakdown of the different caloric sweeteners the 
                                                 
2 A majority of the sugar produced in Brazil is used in the production of ethanol and does not figure into the 
per capita consumption estimate (Koo and Taylor, 2012). 
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average American consumed in 2012 as well as in selected years starting with 1970 
(USDA Economic Research Service, 2013c).  In 2012, of the 129.5 pounds of caloric 
sweeteners consumed by the average American, approximately 51% came from refined 
sugar, 36% from HFCS, while the remaining 13% was from honey, dextrose, glucose 
syrup and edible syrups (USDA Economic Research Service, 2013c).  In 1970, as 
illustrated by Table 2, the primary caloric sweetener was refined sugar, comprising 
almost 100% of the caloric sweetener intake by the average American (USDA Economic 
Research Service, 2013c).  
Table 3 
Breakdown of Average Caloric Sweetener Consumption in the U.S. (Pounds) 
  Corn Sweeteners   Total 
Year Refined HFCS Glucose Dextrose Pure Edible Caloric 
 Sugar  Syrup  Honey Syrups Sweeteners 
1970 101.8 0.5 10.7 4.6 1.0 0.5 119.1 
1975 89.2 4.9 14.0 4.4 1.0 0.4 113.8 
1980 83.6 19.0 12.9 3.5 0.8 0.4 120.2 
1985 62.7 45.2 13.5 3.5 0.9 0.4 126.2 
1990 64.4 49.6 13.6 3.6 0.8 0.4 132.4 
1995 65.0 57.7 16.3 4.0 0.9 0.3 144.1 
2000 65.6 62.7 15.8 3.4 1.1 0.6 149.2 
2005 63.1 58.8 15.3 3.3 1.1 0.6 142.1 
2012 66.3 46.2 12.5 2.7 1.1 0.7 129.5 
 
Other Sweeteners in the U.S.  According to the Sugar Association (2014b), there 
are thirty-one different sweeteners in the U.S. that are either approved, or pending 
approval from the Food and Drug Administration and they are illustrated in Table 4.  
Honey and maple syrup are the original caloric sweeteners used as a sugar substitute 
(Sugar Association, 2014d).  Having been used by many cultures and regions before 
sugar was discovered, honey is considered the first known sweetener.  In the past few 
 15 
 
decades, HFCS has become one of the best known substitutes to sugar.  In 2012, HFCS 
accounted for 36% of the total sweeteners consumed in the U.S. (USDA Economic 
Research Service, 2013c).  HFCS was originally discovered in 1950 and introduced into 
the U.S. food system in 1970 (Sweet Surprise, 2014).  Artificial sweeteners are also 
common alternatives to caloric sweeteners for people who are diabetic and people 
looking for lower calorie options.  Artificial sweeteners are several times sweeter than 
sugar.  For example, neotame is 8,000 times sweeter than sugar (Sugar Association, 
2014c).  The five approved artificial sweeteners in the U.S. are acesulfame K, aspartame, 
neotame, saccharin and sucralose (Sugar Association, 2014c).  Saccharin, commonly 
known by its brand name Sweet ‘N Low, is the oldest of the artificial sweeteners and was 
discovered more than 100 years ago (Sugar Association, 2014c).     
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Table 4 
Sweeteners in the U.S. 
Type of Sweetener Name of Sweetener 
Caloric Sweetener Dextrose 
 Glucose Syrup 
 Maple Syrup 
 Crystalline Fructose 
 High Fructose Corn Syrup 
 Honey 
 Sugar 
 Fruit Juice Concentrates 
 Maltodextrin 
 Trehalose 
 Stevia (not FDA approved) 
Artificial Sweeteners Saccharin 
 Aspartame 
 Acesulfame-K 
 Sucralose 
 Neotame 
Sugar Alcohols/Polyols Sorbitol 
 Mannitol 
 Xylitol 
 Erythritol 
 D-Tagatose 
 Isomalt (Palatinat) 
 Lacititol 
 Maltitol 
 HSH Hydrogenated Starch Hydroslsates, Maltito 
 Glycerol 
 Polydextrose 
Artificial Sweeteners,  Alitame 
Not Yet Approved by Cyclamates 
the FDA Neohersperdine 
 Thaumatin 
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History of sugar.  Given the U.S. sugar industry focuses much attention on 
regulating exports of sugar into the U.S. in order to protect its domestic industry, it is of 
interest to explain how and why a U.S. sugar industry began in the first place.  Therefore, 
this section presents a history of how sugarcane and sugarbeets eventually spread to the 
U.S.  
Sugarcane.  Sugarcane is grown in tropical regions and the history of how sugar 
from sugarcane became available throughout the world is extensive, tumultuous and 
fascinating (see Abbot, 2008 or Cohen, 2013 for more information).  According to Abbot 
(2008, pg. 16), “sugarcane’s spread throughout the world was a long and meandering 
march that proceeded with the speed of the proverbial molasses in winter.”  Before the 
discovery of sugarcane, honey was the original sweetener in the world (Abbott, 2008).  
As sugarcane spread throughout the world, it eventually replaced honey as consumers’ 
sweetener of choice (Abbott, 2008).  
Sugarcane likely originated in the South Pacific and was first domesticated 
approximately 10,000 years ago in New Guinea, and possibly independently, in Indonesia 
(Cohen, 2013; Abbott, 2008).  Sugarcane spread from various islands and reached the 
Asian mainland around 1000 B.C. and by the fourth century was available in India as a 
processed powdered and was used as a medicine supposedly curing various ailments 
(Cohen, 2013).  Sugarcane spread to Persia in the sixth century and was being 
manufactured there by the early seventh century (Abbott, 2008).  Egypt began growing 
sugarcane in the mid-eighth century and was considered an important Middle Eastern 
crop by the tenth century (Abbott, 2008).  Arab conquest then spread sugarcane 
throughout the Mediterranean; Arabs perfected sugar refinement and made it into an 
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industry (Abbott, 2008; Cohen 2013).  During the European Christian crusades, which 
began in 1095, Europeans discovered sugarcane growing in Muslim territory and, “came 
home (from the Crusades) full of visions and stories and memories of sugar” (Abbott, 
2008; Cohen, 2013, pg. 86).  According to Cohen (2013, pg. 86), “the first European 
market was built on a trickle of Muslim trade, and the sugar that reached the West was 
consumed only by the nobility, so rare it was classified as a spice.”  By the end of the 
fifteenth century, Europe established sugar refineries throughout northern Europe and 
began successfully importing raw sugarcane (Abbott, 2008).  Therefore, between 1350 
and 1500, the cost of ten pounds of sugar declined from, “35 percent of an ounce of gold 
to a mere 8.7 percent (Abbott, 2008).  According to Cohen (2013, pg. 86), “In school they 
call it the age of exploration, the search for territories and islands that would send 
Europeans all around the world.  In reality it was, to no small degree, a hunt for fields 
where sugarcane would prosper.”  Thus, in 1493 Christopher Columbus planted the New 
World’s first sugarcane in Hispaniola which created the foundation for the sugarcane 
industry in the Caribbean Islands (Abbot, 2008; Cohen, 2013).  Within a few decades, 
sugarcane mills spread throughout Cuba and Jamaica (Cohen, 2013).  Importantly, the 
Portuguese spread sugarcane to Brazil, which is currently the largest producer of 
sugarcane in the world (Cohen, 2013; USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, 2013a).  
Eventually, sugarcane reached the U.S.  In 1751, Jesuit priests brought sugarcane 
to French owned Louisiana; however, “it was the planters and sugar experts fleeing the 
Haitian Revolution, and the collapse of Haiti’s sugar production, that transformed 
(Louisiana) into a sugar economy” (Abbott, 2008, pg. 280; Louisiana State University Ag 
Center, 2013).  In 1795, American-born Jean Étinne Boré created the first successful 
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sugar crop and sparked the beginning of a thriving sugar industry in Louisiana (Abbott, 
2008; Louisiana State University Ag Center, 2013).  In 1803, Louisiana was purchased 
for $15 million by the U.S. after President Thomas Jefferson negotiated a deal with 
Napolean Bonaparte (Abbott, 2008).  By the mid-1800s, approximately half of the sugar 
in the U.S. originated in Louisiana and the other half was exported into the U.S. from 
Cuba (Abbott, 2008).  Sugarcane was also grown in Hawaii in the mid-1800s; though, 
Hawaii did not become part of the U.S. until 1959 (Abbott, 2008; History, 2014).  
Sugarcane was also grown in the Colorado River area of the U.S. as early as the 1820s 
and by the mid-1800s was grown in Texas (Texas State Historical Association, 2014).  
Sugarcane was brought to the Florida area in 1565, but commercial sugarcane production 
did not begin until 1767; although, this was disrupted by the American Revolution 
(Alvarez and Polopolus, 2012a).  Therefore, the sugarcane industry in Florida was not 
established until the 1920s (Alvarez and Polopolus, 2012a).  Meanwhile, as sugarcane 
was being spread throughout the U.S., a sugarbeet industry was also being developed and 
expanded throughout the country.  
 Sugarbeets.  Domesticated beets date back to 2000 B.C. and were grown by both 
the Romans and Greeks (Harveson, 2014).  It was not until 1747 that a German chemist, 
Andreas Margraff, discovered that sucrose could be extracted from beets that was 
indistinguishable to the sucrose produced from sugarcane (Harveson, 2014; American 
Sugarbeet Growers Association, 2014).  Margraff predicted that the sugarbeets would be 
used to produce sugar, especially because they could be grown in colder climates than 
sugarcane.  It was not until fifty years later that his student, Franz Karl Achard, 
established the (sugar)beet as a profitable source of sucrose in Europe (Harveson, 2014; 
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American Sugarbeet Growers Association, 2014).  Franz Karl Achard is known as the 
father of the sugarbeet industry and he built the first sugarbeet factory in modern day 
Poland (Harveson, 2014).   
The blockade of sugarcane shipments to Europe by the British during the 
Napoleonic wars stimulated sugarbeet production in Europe (American Sugarbeet 
Growers Association, 2014).  In fact, in 1811 Napoleon issued a decree supporting a 
large increase in sugarbeet production in France (Sugar Association, 2014a).  After 
Waterloo the British blockade was lifted causing the sugarbeet industry to decline; 
however, the modern day sugarbeet was now established (American Sugarbeet Growers 
Association, 2014).  The first successful sugarbeet factory in the U.S. was in California in 
1879 and constructed by E. H. Dyer (American Sugarbeet Growers Association, 2014).  
In 1917 there were ninety-one sugarbeet factories in the U.S. throughout eighteen states 
(American Sugarbeet Growers Association, 2014).   By 2005 in the U.S., there were 
twenty-three sugarbeet factories operating in ten states processing thirty million tons of 
sugarbeets annually (American Sugarbeet Growers Association, 2014).  In fiscal year 
2013 sugarbeets in the U.S. were grown in eleven states producing approximately 4.6 
MMTRV of sugar (USDA Economic Research Service, 2013c).   
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Chapter 2 
U.S. Sugar Trade Policy 
On January 1, 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) became 
effective between the U.S., Mexico and Canada creating the world’s largest free trade 
area (U.S. Trade Representative, 2013).  While NAFTA went into effect on January 1, 
1994, unrestricted free trade of sugar between the U.S. and Mexico did not begin until 
January 1, 2008, due to a “Side Agreement on Sugar” between Mexico and the U.S. 
(Jurenas, 2006; American Sugarbeet Growers Association, 2013).  In the ten years prior 
to full NAFTA implementation, Mexico exported an annual average of 35,638 metric 
tons raw value (MTRV) of sugar into the U.S.  In the years since full implementation of 
NAFTA (i.e., fiscal years (FYs) 2008-2013), Mexico exported an annual average of 
1,180,332 MTRV of sugar into the U.S., an increase of nearly 1.15 million metric tons 
raw value (MMTRV) of sugar per year3.  Figure 2 displays the annual amount of sugar 
exported into the U.S. from Mexico for FYs 1998 through 2013 (USDA Economic 
Research Service, 2013c) 
 
 
Figure 2. Mexican Sugar Exports to the U.S. (MTRV): FYs 1998-2013. 
                                                 
3 For sugar, a fiscal year is October 1 through September 30. 
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During FYs 2008 through 2010, unrestricted, tariff-free sugar exported into the 
U.S. from Mexico did not result in depressed U.S. sugar prices partially due to mediocre 
sugarbeet and sugar cane crops in the U.S. and mediocre sugarcane crops in Mexico 
(Roney, 2012; Knutson, Westhoff, & Sherwell, 2010).   However, by FY 2013, a record 
amount of Mexican sugar exported into the U.S. drove the U.S. price of sugar below the 
U.S. sugar loan rate, causing the U.S. sugar program to incur a cost of $285 million to the 
federal government (Markwart, 2013; American Sugar Alliance, 2013a; Wexler, 2013a).  
This was the first time the U.S. sugar program operated at a cost to the government since 
FY 2001 (Markwart, 2013; American Sugar Alliance, 2013; Roney, 2012; Jurenas, 2008).  
Figure 3 displays annual U.S. raw sugar price for FYs 1998 through 2013 (USDA 
Economic Research Service, 2013a). 
 
Figure 3. U.S. Raw Sugar Price (cents per pound): FYs 1998-2013. 
Note. Prices are Contract No. 14/16, duty fee paid New York. 
 
Mexican exports of sugar into the U.S. are at the forefront of concerns for the U.S. sugar 
industry and are blamed as the main reason behind current low U.S. sugar prices (e.g., 
Markwart, 2013; American Sugar Alliance, 2013; Wexler, 2013a).  Therefore, the 
objective of Chapters 3 through 6 of this dissertation is to develop a partial equilibrium 
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sugar trade model between Mexico and the U.S. which can be used to analyze: (1) the 
impact of NAFTA on U.S. producer surplus and Mexican welfare, (2) how USDA 
forecast errors in fiscal year (FY) 2012 impacted U.S. producer surplus and Mexican 
welfare in the average of FY 2012 and FY 2013, and (3) the impact of Mexican 
ownership of twenty percent of Mexican sugar production on U.S. producer surplus and 
Mexican welfare.  
To determine the impact of NAFTA on U.S. producer surplus and Mexican 
producer and consumer surplus, U.S. producer surplus and Mexican producer and 
consumer surplus will be estimated for FY 2008 through FY 2013 (the years NAFTA has 
been fully effective) using a partial equilibrium sugar trade model.  U.S. and Mexican 
production, consumption, export and import data for FY 2008 through FY 2013 will be 
used to calibrate the model.  Next, U.S. producer surplus and Mexican producer and 
consumer surplus for FY 2008 through FY 2013 will be quantified under the scenario that 
the quantity of sugar Mexico is allowed to export into the U.S. is restricted by laws that 
existed prior to FY 2008 (before full implementation of NAFTA).  In the years prior to 
FY 2008, Mexico was restricted by the U.S. tariff-rate quota (TRQ) system and was 
allowed to export a maximum of only 250,000 MTRV of sugar into the U.S. annually.   
Thus, U.S. producer surplus and Mexican welfare will be estimated under the 
counterfactual condition that Mexico is restricted by the TRQ and can only export 
250,000 MTRV of sugar into the U.S.  Next, U.S. producer surplus and Mexican welfare 
will be compared between the two scenarios (NAFTA fully effective compared to 
Mexico restricted by the TRQ) to determine the impact of NAFTA on U.S. and Mexican 
welfare.  While previous research has investigated and predicted certain impacts of 
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NAFTA on the U.S. and Mexican sugar markets (e.g., Kennedy & Schmitz, 2009; 
Knutson, Westhoff, & Sherwell, 2010; Sano, House, & Spreen, 2004; Abler, Beghin, 
Blandford, & Elobeid, 2007), this is the first known research to directly quantify the 
realized U.S. producer surplus and Mexican welfare changes that occurred due to full 
implementation of NAFTA.   
To answer the second research question, the sugar trade model will be used to 
examine how the USDA sugar forecasts in the World Agriculture Supply and Demand 
Estimates (WASDE) impacts U.S. producer surplus and Mexican welfare.  Extending 
previous work by Lewis and Manfredo (2012) which analyzed the accuracy and 
efficiency of the USDA WASDE sugar consumption and production forecast, this analysis 
will directly quantify how the USDA sugar forecast errors in FY 2012 impacted U.S. 
producer surplus and Mexican welfare.  In doing so, this dissertation will also update 
Lewis and Manfredo (2012) and examine the accuracy and efficiency of the USDA sugar 
forecasts for FY 2012 and FY 20134.   
Finally, the partial equilibrium sugar trade model will be used to determine how 
Mexican government ownership of twenty percent of their sugar industry impacts U.S. 
producer surplus and Mexican welfare.  In a press release on September 5, 2013, the 
America Sugar Alliance stated that “to keep its own inefficient sugar business afloat, the 
Mexican government bailed out numerous mills and today owns and operates 20 percent 
of the country’s sugar industry.  That makes the government Mexico’s largest sugar 
producer and exporter.” (American Sugar Alliance, 2013, pg. 1).  This is the first known 
                                                 
4 Lewis and Manfredo (2012) was published in the Journal of Agribusiness prior to the USDA production 
and consumption forecast for FY 2012 and FY 2013; therefore, the USDA production and consumption 
forecast for FY 2012 and FY 2013 could not be included in their analysis. 
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research which estimates the impact Mexican government ownership has on U.S. 
producer surplus and Mexican welfare. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  First, an overview of 
relevant literature about sugar is provided.  Next, U.S. and Mexican sugar policies are 
explained.  To conclude Chapter 2, the theory behind producer surplus, consumer surplus 
and total welfare is explained.  Chapter 3 will parameterize the domestic sugar supply 
and demand conditions in the U.S. and Mexico as well as parameterize the U.S. excess 
demand curve and the Mexican excess supply curve.  Chapter 4 will determine the impact 
of NAFTA on U.S. producer surplus and Mexican total welfare.  Chapter 5 will estimate 
the impact of USDA forecasting errors in fiscal year 2012 on U.S. producer surplus and 
Mexican total welfare. Chapter 6 will determine the impact of Mexican ownership of 
twenty percent of domestic production on U.S. producer surplus and Mexican total 
welfare.  
Literature Review 
Previous research has examined various aspects of the U.S. sugar market and U.S. sugar 
policy (e.g., Leu, Schmitz, & Knutson, 1987; Petrolia & Kennedy, 2003; Elobeid & 
Beghin, 2006; Beghin & Elobeid, 2013; Beghin, Osta, Cherlow, & Mohanty, 2003; Koo, 
2002; Schmitz, Spreen, Messina, & Moss, 2002; Babcock & Schmitz, 1987).  This 
research ranges from examining the impact of various possible issues and policies on the 
U.S. sugar market (e.g., Leu et al., 1987; Petrolia & Kennedy, 2003; Koo, 2002; Elobeid 
& Behin, 2006; Schmitz et al., 2002; Babcock & Schmitz, 1987) to approximating the 
resulting welfare impacts of U.S. sugar policy as operated under different Farm Bills 
(e.g., Beghin & Elobeid, 2013; Beghin et al., 2003).  For example, Babcock and Schmitz 
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(1987) examined the welfare impact of the U.S. sugar program changing from a quota 
based policy to a direct payment based policy.  Babcock and Schmitz (1987) determined 
that changing U.S. sugar policy from a quota based sugar system to a direct payment 
based policy would save U.S. society over a billion dollars in economic losses.   
Meanwhile, Beghin and Elobeid (2013) analyzed the impact of the current U.S. sugar 
program on U.S. consumer welfare.  Beghin and Elobeid (2013) estimated current U.S. 
sugar policy costs U.S. consumers $2.9 to $3.5 billion annually. 
Full implementation of NAFTA only became effective a few years ago; hence, 
relatively few previous research articles have focused attention on investigating the 
impact of NAFTA on the U.S. sugar market (e.g., Kennedy & Schmitz, 2009; Knutson et 
al., 2010; Sano et al., 2004; Abler et al., 2007).  This research will extend the limited field 
of existing literature regarding the impact of NAFTA on U.S. sugar industry.  
Kennedy and Schmitz (2009) examined the impact of U.S. production control 
policies in response to increased exports of sugar entering into the U.S. due to NAFTA.  
Using data from FY 2005, they first examined how increased sugar import quotas in the 
U.S. would impact U.S. consumer and producer surplus levels. Next, they examined how 
increased sugar import quotas in the U.S. would impact U.S. consumer and producer 
surplus levels if U.S. producers utilized supply management practices.  Kennedy and 
Schmitz (2009) concluded by stating that U.S. production control policies can lessen the 
impact of increased sugar imports into the U.S. to a certain extent; however, eventually 
U.S. supply management fails to compensate for increased sugar import quotas.   
 In an effort to analyze the potential impact of NAFTA on the U.S. and Mexican 
sweetener industries, Knutson et al. (2010) utilized the Food and Agriculture Policy 
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Research Institute (FAPRI) U.S. and Mexican sweetener baseline models to project sugar 
and high-fructose corn syrup (HFCS) supply and demand conditions in the U.S. and 
Mexico for FYs 2010 through 2019.  Knutson et al. (2010) concludes by stating that their 
model projections indicate that NAFTA will not negatively impact the U.S. sugar 
industry as anticipated and that “dire predictions of U.S. producer interests would not 
materialize” (Knutson et al., 2010, pg. 1).  Knutson et al. (2010) predictions were not 
completely accurate, especially in regards to FY 2013 when the U.S. raw price of sugar 
collapsed below the U.S. sugar loan rate.  Figure 4 illustrates Knutson et al.’s (2010) 
predictions of U.S. raw sugar prices for FYs 2010 through 2013 compared to realized 
U.S. raw sugar prices for those years and Figure 5 illustrates Knutson et al.’s (2010) 
predictions of Mexican exports of sugar into the U.S. compared to realized Mexican 
exports of sugar into the U.S. for FYs 2010 through 2013. 
 
 
Figure 4. Raw Sugar Price (cents per pound): Knutson et al.’s (2010) Prediction Versus 
Realized. 
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Figure 5. Mexican Sugar Exports to the U.S. (MTRV): Knutson et al.’s (2010) Prediction 
Versus Realized. 
 
Sano et al. (2004) created a model which forecasted four possible scenarios of the 
volume of U.S. sugar imports for FYs 2002 through 2015.  Sano et al. (2004) concluded 
by saying, “The Mexican sugar industry benefited little in the past ten years of NAFTA 
regime and may not expect much in the future either” (Sana et al., 2004, pg. 18).  Similar 
to Knutson et al. (2010), Sano et al.’s (2004) predictions regarding the volume of sugar 
imports into the U.S. were not completely realized. 
Abler et al. (2007) used the Center for Agricultural and Rural Development 
(CARD) international sugar model at Iowa State University to make projections 
regarding the impact of full NAFTA implementation on U.S. sugar market conditions.  
Abler et al.’s (2007) model projected that the average U.S. raw price of sugar for FYs 
2008 through 2015 would be lower than the U.S. sugar loan rate in many scenarios which 
would make it very unlikely that U.S. sugar policy could continue to operate at no cost to 
taxpayers.  Therefore, based on fears that unrestricted, tariff free sugar exported from 
Mexico into the U.S. would cause the existing U.S. sugar policy to no longer operate at 
“no net cost” to taxpayers, Abler et al. (2007) proposed and examined a new U.S. sugar 
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policy.  The impact of their proposed new U.S. sugar policy, which is based on standard 
commodity programs found in the 2002 Farm Bill such as direct payments, is then 
simulated for the average of FYs 2008 through 2015.  Abler et al. (2007) concluded by 
stating that, “The replacement of the current sugar program by a standard commodity 
program would increase the costs of the program for the U.S. taxpayers but would lower 
costs for the U.S. sugar users,” (Abler et al., 2007, pg. 100). 
 While Kennedy & Schmitz (2009), Knutson et al. (2010), Sano et al. (2004) and 
Abler et al. (2007) all examine the potential impact of full implementation of NAFTA, 
their analyses never directly quantify realized U.S. and Mexico producer surplus losses 
and gains.  The articles also do not examine how Mexican government ownership of 
twenty percent of the Mexican sugar industry impacts U.S. and Mexican producer 
surplus. Furthermore, this is the first known research quantifying how the USDA sugar 
production and consumption forecasts impact the U.S. and Mexican sugar industries, 
which extends previous work done by Lewis and Manfredo (2012). 
Overview of U.S. and Mexican Sugar Policy 
Data and policy pertaining to both U.S. and Mexican sugar markets must be described in 
order to develop a partial equilibrium model of trade between the two countries in 
Chapter 3.  Both Mexican and U.S. sugar policies involve government intervention which 
helps support domestic sugar prices. 
U.S. sugar policy.  The laws governing current U.S. sugar policy are contained in 
the 2013 Farm Bill.  The 2013 Farm Bill extends the sugar policies contained in the 2008 
Farm Bill (Markwart, 2013).  As outlined by the 2008 Farm Bill, current U.S. sugar 
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policy has three main features: (1) flexible marketing allotments, (2) domestic price 
supports, and (3) tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) (USDA Economic Research Service, 2013a).   
The flexible marketing allotments control domestic production of sugar through 
the overall allotment quantity (OAQ) which is divided between refined beet sugar and 
raw sugar cane.  The OAQ states that 54.35 percent of overall sugar production in the 
U.S. must originate from refined beet sugar and that 45.65 percent of overall sugar 
production in the U.S. must come from raw sugar cane (USDA Economic Research 
Service, 2013d).  As written in the 2008 Farm Bill, the OAQ must be equal to at least 85 
percent of estimated domestic sugar consumption for the FY and the goal of the OAQ is 
to maintain domestic sugar prices above the U.S. loan rate (i.e., domestic price support) 
(USDA Economic Research Service, 2013a). 
The domestic price support component of U.S. sugar policy is a government loan 
rate.  The FY 2013 loan rate for raw sugar cane is 18.75 cents per pound and 24.1 cents 
per pound for refined beet sugar (USDA Economic Research Service, 2013a).   The loans 
are nonrecourse and operated by the USDA Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC).  
When the U.S. price of sugar falls below the government loan rate, sugar processors 
become eligible for loans from the USDA CCC. 
TRQs are announced prior to the FY by the Secretary of Agriculture and under 
the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, the U.S. must import a minimum quantity 
of 1.117 MMTRV under the TRQ5 (USDA Farm Service Agency, 2014).  TRQs are 
issued to 40 countries and allocated by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative 
(USDA Economic Research Service, 2013a).  If the domestic sugar market is 
                                                 
5 TRQ is defined as the raw sugar cane TRQ. 
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undersupplied, on April 1 of the FY, the Secretary of Agriculture may increase the TRQ 
(USDA Economic Research Service, 2013d).  Prior to full implementation of NAFTA in 
FY 2008, Mexican exports of sugar into the U.S. were also allocated through the TRQ.  
Legislation in the 2002 Farm Bill allowed Mexico to export a maximum of 250,000 
MTRV of sugar into the U.S. annually under the TRQ through FY 2007 (Jurenas, 2008; 
American Sugarbeet Growers Association, 2013).  Since full implementation of NAFTA 
in FY 2008, Mexico is allowed to export an unrestricted, tariff-free amount of sugar into 
the U.S. (USDA Economic Research Service, 2013a).  There is also an over-quota tariff 
of 15.36 cents per pound for raw sugar that is exported into the U.S. outside of the TRQ; 
however, in FYs 2008 through 2013, no countries exported raw sugar into the U.S. using 
the over-quota tariff (USDA Economic Research Service, 2013c; USDA Economic 
Research Service, 2013a).   
Table 5 illustrates the top exporters of raw sugar into the U.S. for FY2008 through 
FY 2013 (USDA Economic Research Service, 2013c).  Since FY 2008 Mexico has been 
the top exporter of sugar into the U.S. followed by Brazil, the Philippines, the Dominican 
Republic, Australia and Guatemala.  Together these six countries export a majority of the 
raw sugar into the U.S. ranging from approximately 67% of the total sugar exported into 
the U.S. in FY2008 to 82% of the total sugar exported into the U.S. in FY 2013.  Brazil 
consistently is among the world’s least-cost producers of sugarcane with production costs 
below the world price on several occasions (Haley, 2013).  
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Table 5 
Top Exporters of Sugar into the U.S. (1,000 MTRV), FY2008 through FY 2013 
Country FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 
Unrestricted under NAFTA       
     Mexico 629 1,272 732 1,547 972 1,927 
TRQ       
     Brazil 152 150 249 252 237 147 
     Philippines 138 141 177 222 190 56 
     Dominican Republic 185 177 254 205 218 95 
     Australia 87 87 142 143 133 29 
     Guatemala 51 51 82 79 78 37 
Total TRQ 1,228 1,243 1,682 1,562 1,709 868 
Top Six % of Total Exports 66.88% 74.67% 67.77% 78.73% 68.18% 81.97% 
 
Mexican sugar policy.  Similar to U.S. sugar policy, Mexican sugar policy also 
has a TRQ in place which restricts foreign exports of sugar into Mexico (Knutson et al., 
2010; Herrera 2013; Campos-Ortiz & Oviedo-Pacheco, 2012).  Additionally, twenty-
percent of Mexican sugar production is government owned (American Sugar Alliance, 
2013).  The legal framework for Mexican sugar policy is found in the 2005 Ley 
Desarrollo Rural Sustentable para la Caña de Azúcar (i.e., Sustainable Rural 
Development Law for Sugar Cane) which also establishes the Comité Nacional Para El 
Desarrollo Sustentable De La Caña De Azúcar (i.e., National Committee for Sugar Cane 
Sustainable Development) executive committee (Herrera, 2013; CONADESUCA, 
2013a).  The objective of the National Committee for Sugar Cane Sustainable 
Development is “to carry out and coordinate all activities related to the sugar cane 
industry, for example, in matters of budget decisions, along with the Mexican Secretariat 
of Agriculture, Livestock farming, and Fisheries, formulate financial support programs 
directed towards the sugar cane industry in Mexico; as well as the operation regulations 
for such programs” (CONADESUCA, 2013b, pg. 3). 
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Producer Surplus, Consumer Surplus and Total Welfare 
Throughout the next four chapters, the concepts of producer surplus, consumer surplus 
and total welfare will be utilized to estimate the impact of (1) NAFTA, (2) USDA sugar 
forecasting errors, and (3) Mexican subsidies.  The concepts of producer surplus, 
consumer surplus and total welfare are commonly used by economists to determine the 
impact of policy changes (Just, Hueth, & Schmitz 2004; Schmitz, Moss, Schmitz, Furtan, 
& Schmitz, 2010).  Furthermore, models using consumer surplus, producer surplus and 
total welfare are extensively used for policy purposes because they can be estimated 
using real world data (Schmitz et al., 2010).  
 Producer surplus, consumer surplus and total welfare are shown graphically in 
Figure 6.  Producer surplus is defined as “the difference between the price that sellers 
could receive and the market price that they actually receive” (Koo and Kennedy, 2005, 
pg. 81).  Graphically, producer surplus is the area below the market price, P1 and above 
the supply curve S (area B, Figure 6).  Consumer surplus is defined as “the difference 
between what consumers are willing to pay and the market price that they actually pay” 
(Koo and Kennedy, 2005, pg. 80).  Consumer surplus is illustrated as the area above the 
market price, P1 and below the demand curve D (area A, Figure 6).  Total welfare is the 
entire economy’s surplus.  Thus, total welfare is producer surplus and consumer surplus 
added together (area AB, Figure 6).     
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Figure 6. Producer Surplus, Consumer Surplus and Total Welfare.
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Chapter 3 
U.S. and Mexico Supply and Demand Parameterization 
Chapter 2 explained the importance of analyzing the trade of sugar between Mexico and 
the U.S., provided background information regarding U.S. and Mexican sugar policy and 
defined producer surplus, consumer surplus and total welfare.  Chapter 2 also provided an 
overview of previous literature which analyzed U.S. sugar policy and international trade 
of sugar.  The goal of this chapter is to parameterize a model of trade between Mexico, 
the U.S. and the tariff rate quota (TRQ) countries which export sugar into the U.S.  Once 
established, counterfactual models will be developed in order to quantify the impact of 
(1) NAFTA on U.S. producer surplus and Mexican welfare (Chapter 4), (2) USDA 
forecast errors in FY 2012 on U.S. producer surplus and Mexican welfare (Chapter 5), 
and (3) partial Mexican government ownership of sugar production on U.S. producer 
surplus and Mexican welfare (Chapter 6).  In this chapter, the domestic supply and 
demand conditions in the U.S. and Mexico are first parameterized along with the U.S. 
excess demand curve and the Mexican excess supply curve. 
U.S. and Mexico Parameterization 
 U.S. domestic model.  The U.S. is a net importer of sugar and has an excess 
demand curve facing the countries which export sugar into the U.S.  Figure 7 illustrates 
the domestic U.S. supply and demand curve, denoted by SUS and DUS respectively, as well 
as the U.S. excess demand curve, EDUS.   P1 is the price that would exist in the U.S. under 
autarky (i.e., no trade) and domestic production would be equal to point Q1.  If free trade 
of sugar existed in the U.S., then sugar would be exported into the U.S. from foreign 
countries because the world price of sugar would be lower than the U.S. price of sugar.  
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Under free trade conditions, P3 would be the price that exists for sugar in the U.S., 
domestic production would be equal to point Q2, total production would be equal to Q3, 
and foreign imports would be X2 and equal to the quantity (Q3-Q2).  However, as 
explained in the previous section, a TRQ is enforced in the U.S. which restricts the 
quantity of raw sugar exported into the U.S.  Under current sugar policy, P2 is the price of 
sugar in the U.S., Q′2 is the quantity of sugar produced domestically, Q′3 is the quantity of 
sugar consumed in the U.S. and the quantity (Q′3- Q′2) is the quantity of raw sugar 
exported into the U.S.  The excess demand curve for the U.S. begins at the point (0, P1) 
because at the price P1, no sugar is exported into the U.S. from foreign countries and the 
price that exists in the autarky condition, P1, is observed.  Under current U.S. sugar 
policy, foreign sugar is exported into the U.S., at a quantity of X1 which is equal to the 
quantity (Q′3- Q′2).  Therefore, (X1, P2) is another point on the excess demand curve and 
the price P2 is the actual price observed in the U.S.  
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Figure 7.  U.S. Model of Sugar Trade  
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Mexico domestic model.  Mexico is a net exporter of sugar so they have an excess 
supply curve facing the U.S.  Figure 8 displays Mexico’s supply curve, SMX, demand 
curve, DMX, and the excess supply curve, ESMX.  Under autarky, P1 would be the price of 
sugar in Mexico and Q1 would be the quantity of raw sugar supplied in Mexico.  
Currently Mexico can export unrestricted amounts of sugar into the U.S.  In fact, the U.S. 
is essentially the only country which receives Mexican sugar exports6.  Therefore, P2 is 
the price of raw sugar in Mexico and is also the price of sugar in the U.S.  The quantity 
Q2 is the quantity of sugar consumed in Mexico and Q3 is the quantity of sugar produced 
in Mexico. The quantity (Q3-Q2) is the quantity of raw sugar Mexico exports to the U.S. 
and is also equal to the quantity X1.  The excess supply curve contains points (0, P1) 
because when there is no raw sugar exported into the U.S., the price is equal to P1 which 
is the autarky price.  When Mexico exports its raw sugar into the U.S., this results in the 
price P2 being observed in Mexico and the U.S. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 From fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2013 Mexico primarily exported sugar only to the U.S.  
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Figure 8.  Mexico Model of Sugar Trade 
 
 
Data.  In order to create the model to analyze the three objectives of this research 
outlined previously, data was compiled from the USDA Economic Research Service 
(2013a) on U.S. and Mexican sugar prices, production, consumption, imports and exports 
for FYs 2008 through 2013 and appears in Table 6.  Using the data in Table 6, the supply 
and demand curves in Figure 7 and Figure 8 can be estimated and will be derived in the 
next section. 
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Table 6 
U.S. and Mexican Data 1,000 MTRV 
 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 
U.S. price 468.92 486.56 754.70 847.93 717.20 462.97 
Mexican estandar price  504.86 524.48 864.87 891.77 829.60 576.29 
Mexico sugar price1  429.11 447.62 768.75 794.12 735.47 496.50 
U.S. production 7,396 6,832 7,224 7,104 7,700 8,143 
U.S. imports2 1,858 2,515 2,414 3,111 2,680 2,791 
    TRQ 1,228 1,243 1,682 1,562 1,709 868 
    Mexico 630 1,272 732 1,549 972 1,923 
U.S. consumption3 9,710 9,623 10,117 10,362 10,263 10,684 
   Re-export program 128 109 183 178 127 73 
   Polyhydric alcohol/feed 56 42 31 30 30 168 
   Food/ beverage use 9,527 9,472 9,903 10,154 10,107 10,444 
Mexico production  5,852 5,260 5,115 5,495 5,351 7,393 
Mexico imports 226 159 861 307 505 230 
Mexican exports  677 1,378 751 1,558 985 2,091 
     U.S.  629 1,272 732 1,547 972 1,927 
    Other 47 106 19 11 13 164 
Mexican consumption4 5114 5392 4875 4411 4653 5077 
   Human consumption 5,090 5,293 4,615 4,187 4,384 4,544 
Note:  Prices are in $/MTRV and were converted from cents per pound to dollars per MT by the following conversion: 1,000 pounds= 
0.4535924 MTRV.  
1 Uses following conversion: Mexican Estandar Price (US$/MTRV-50)/1.06.   
2U.S. imports are assumed to be TRQ+Mexico for this model.  
3For the model, U.S. Consumption=U.S. Production+U.S. Imports.  
4 Includes other consumption and miscellaneous adjustments; for the model, Mexican Consumption=Mexican Imports+Mexican 
Production-Mexican Exports. 
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In addition to data found in Table 6, elasticity data for supply and demand also must be 
utilized and is found in Table 7 and was obtained using the FAPRI sugar baseline model7.  
Models will be generated using both short-run and long-run elasticity estimates found in 
Table 78.  For the following discussion, short-run elasticities are used for illustrative 
purposes. 
Table 7 
FAPRI Supply and Demand Elasticities for U.S. and Mexican Sugar, MTRV 
 Short-run Long-run 
U.S. Sugar   
    Production 0.25 0.62 
    Consumption -0.12 -0.33 
   
Mexican Sugar   
    Production 0.15 0.23 
    Consumption -0.13 -0.369 
 
Parameterization.  The parameterization of Figure 7 for FY 2008 through FY 
2013 allows U.S. autarky price (𝑃𝐴
𝑈𝑆), U.S. autarky quantity (𝑄𝐴
𝑈𝑆), U.S. supply (SUS), 
U.S. demand (DUS) and U.S. excess demand (EDUS) to be calculated.  Utilizing Figure 8 
for FY 2008 through FY 2013 allows Mexican autarky price (𝑃𝐴
𝑀𝑋), Mexican autarky 
quantity (𝑄𝐴
𝑀𝑋), Mexican supply (SMX), Mexican demand (DMX) and Mexican excess 
demand (EDMX) to be parameterized.  Parameterization of Figure 7 and Figure 8 will be 
illustrated for FY 2008 using data in Table 6 and the short-run elasticities in Table 7.  The 
calculations for FY 2009 through FY 2013 were made following similar procedures, but 
                                                 
7 Elasticity estimates were obtained upon request from FAPRI. 
8 This allows for a sensitivity analysis to be made regarding how sensitive the models are to the chosen 
elasticities. 
9 The long-run Mexican demand curves were not obtained from FAPRI but were approximated by 
increasing the Mexican consumption elasticities by the same percentage that the U.S. consumption 
elasticity increased from short to long-run.   
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are not illustrated in this chapter to save space.  Calculations were also made using the 
long-run elasticities in Table 7 for FY 2008 through FY 2013 but were also omitted to 
save space. 
Figure 7 Parameterization: U.S. autarky equilibrium.  Elasticity of demand for 
the U.S. is given by the following: 
                                        𝐸𝑑
𝑈𝑆 =
𝑃𝑑
𝑈𝑆
𝑄𝑑
𝑈𝑆 ×
𝜕𝑄𝑑
𝑈𝑆
𝜕𝑃𝑈𝑆
                                                       (1) 
where PUS is the U.S. price of raw sugar, 𝑄𝑑
𝑈𝑆 is the quantity demanded of sugar in the 
U.S. and ∂𝑄𝑑
𝑈𝑆/∂𝑃𝑑
𝑈𝑆 is the change in quantity demanded divided by the change in the 
price for raw sugar.  Under the assumption of linearity, ∂𝑄𝑑
𝑈𝑆/∂𝑃𝑑
𝑈𝑆 is equal to the inverse 
slope of the demand curve (𝑚𝑑
𝑈𝑆), equation (1) can be re-written as the following10: 
                                                      𝐸𝑑
𝑈𝑆 =
𝑃𝑑
𝑈𝑆
𝑄𝑑
𝑈𝑆 ×
1
𝑚𝑑
𝑈𝑆.                                                     (2) 
Rearranging equation (2), equation (3) becomes the following: 
                                                       𝑚𝑑
𝑈𝑆 =
𝑃𝑑
𝑈𝑆
𝑄𝑑
𝑈𝑆∗𝐸𝑑
𝑈𝑆.                                                       (3) 
In order to solve for the slope of the U.S. demand curve, actual price and quantity data for 
the U.S. is utilized along with the elasticity of demand for raw sugar in the U.S. which is 
estimated to be -0.12 (Table 7) for the short-run elasticity of demand for raw sugar.  The 
FY 2008 price of raw sugar in the U.S. is 468.92 $/MTRV (Table 6).  The quantity of raw 
sugar consumed in the U.S. is set equal to U.S. imports plus the quantity of sugar 
produced in the U.S. which is equal to 9,253,526 MTRV.  This quantity is approximately 
                                                 
10 Linear supply and demand curves are used as first order Tayler Series approximations to the actual 
supply and demand curves. 
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equal to the amount of sugar consumed in the U.S.11  The resulting slope of the U.S. 
demand curve is: 
                                               𝑚𝑑
𝑈𝑆 =
468.92
(−0.12∗9,253,526)
= −0.0004223.                         (4) 
and the inverse demand curve is: 
                                                           𝑃𝑑
𝑈𝑆 = 𝑎𝑑
𝑈𝑆 + 𝑚𝑑
𝑈𝑆 ∗ 𝑄𝑑
𝑈𝑆                                     (5) 
where 𝑎𝑑
𝑈𝑆 is the intercept of the demand curve.  Solving for ad yields: 
          𝑎𝑑
𝑈𝑆 = 𝑃𝑑
𝑈𝑆 − 𝑚𝑑
𝑈𝑆 ∗ 𝑄𝑑
𝑈𝑆 = 468.92 + 0.0004223 ∗ 9,253,526 = 4,376.62     (6) 
The U.S. demand curve can now be specified using equation (3) and equation (6) as the 
following: 
                                                   𝑃𝑑
𝑈𝑆 = 4,376.62 − 0.00042𝑄𝑑
𝑈𝑆                                 (7) 
Similar steps were followed to estimate the U.S. supply curve as demonstrated by the 
following equations: 
                                                         𝑚𝑠
𝑈𝑆 =
𝑃𝑠
𝑈𝑆
𝑄𝑠
𝑈𝑆∗𝐸𝑑
𝑈𝑆                                                      (8) 
where 𝑄𝑠
𝑈𝑆 is equal to total U.S. production which is 7,396,000 and 𝑃𝑠
𝑈𝑆 is once again 
price in the U.S. and equal to 468.92 $/MTRV (Table 6).  The elasticity of supply is 0.25 
(Table 7).  This results in the following: 
                                                 𝑚𝑠
𝑈𝑆 =
468.92
7,396,000∗0.25
 =0.0002536.                                  (9) 
Next, solving for the intercept similar to equation (5) above: 
     𝑎𝑠
𝑈𝑆 = 𝑃𝑠
𝑈𝑆 −  𝑚𝑠
𝑈𝑆 ∗ 𝑄𝑠
𝑈𝑆 = 468.92 − 0.0002536 ∗ 7,396,000 = −1406.77     (10) 
                                                 
11 This number is not exactly equal to the quantity of sugar consumed in the U.S. due to the sugar re-export 
program and beginning and ending stocks of sugar. 
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By using the slope from equation (8) and the intercept from equation (9), the inverse 
supply curve becomes the following: 
                                        𝑃𝑠
𝑈𝑆 = −1406.77 + 0.0002536𝑄𝑠
𝑈𝑆.                                   (11) 
Next, by setting the supply curve, equation (10) equal to the demand curve, equation (6), 
the autarky equilibrium price and quantity for the U.S. can be calculated as the following: 
                        −1406.77 + 0.0002536𝑄𝑠
𝑈𝑆 = 4,376.62 − 0.00042𝑄𝑑
𝑈𝑆.                 (12) 
Hence, in autarky, the U.S. quantity (𝑄𝐴
𝑈𝑆) would be 8,556,552.39 MTRV of raw sugar 
and the U.S. price (𝑃𝐴
𝑈𝑆) would be 763.25 $/MTRV. 
 U.S. excess demand.  As explained previously as shown in Figure 7, the U.S. 
consumes more sugar than it produces so the U.S. has an excess demand function.  To 
calculate the excess demand curve, using data from Table 6, two points on the excess 
demand curve in Figure 7 are calculated.  The first point is (0, P1) where P1 is the autarky 
price.  Therefore, this point is (0, 763.25).  The next point is (Q4, P2), where P2 is the 
actual observed price in the U.S. and Q4 is the quantity of U.S. raw sugar imports.  The 
observed price of raw sugar in the U.S. is 468.92 $/MTRV and the quantity of U.S. raw 
sugar imports is 1,857,526 MTRV causing point (Q4, P2) to equal (1,857,526; 468.92).  
Using these two points, the slope of the U.S. excess demand (𝑚𝐸𝐷
𝑈𝑆) curve can be 
determined by the following: 
                                                             𝑚𝑒𝑑
𝑈𝑆 =
(𝑦2−𝑦1)
(𝑥1−𝑥2)
.                                                  (13) 
Substituting in the two points found above: 
                                          𝑚𝑒𝑑
𝑈𝑆 =
(468.92−763.25)
(1,857,526−0)
= −0.000158                                  (14) 
Thus yielding the U.S. excess demand curve: 
                                                   𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑆 = 763.25 − 0.000158𝐼                                   (15) 
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Figure 8 Parameterization: Mexico autarky equilibrium.  To calculate the 
Mexican autarky equilibrium conditions found in Figure 8 for FY 2008, steps similar to 
the previous section were followed.  The first step is to solve for the slope of the demand 
curve for Mexico: 
                                                      𝑚𝑑
𝑀𝑋 =
𝑃𝑑
𝑀𝑋
𝑄𝑑
𝑀𝑋∗𝐸𝑑
𝑀𝑋.                                                     (16) 
In order to solve for the slope of Mexican demand curve, data from Table 6 and Table 7 
is used.  The elasticity of Mexican demand is -0.13 (Table 7).  The price of raw sugar in 
the Mexico is 429.11 $/MTRV (Table 6).  However, the price of raw sugar in the U.S. is 
also used for the price of raw sugar in Mexico and is 468.92 $/MTRV.  The quantity of 
raw sugar consumed in Mexico is set equal to the amount of sugar produced in Mexico 
plus Mexican imports of raw sugar minus the quantity of raw sugar exported to the U.S. 
and is equal to 5,448,474 MTRV.  This quantity is approximately equal to the amount of 
sugar consumed in Mexico (Table 6)12.  Therefore, the resulting slope of the Mexican 
demand curve is: 
                                        𝑚𝑑
𝑀𝑋 =
468.92
(−0.13∗5,448,474)
= −0.0006620                               (17) 
Next, the inverse demand curve is given by: 
                                                    𝑃𝑑
𝑀𝑋 = 𝑎𝑑
𝑀𝑋 + 𝑚𝑑
𝑀𝑋 ∗ 𝑄𝑑
𝑀𝑋                                       (18) 
where the variables are defined the same as equation (1) and 𝑎𝑑
𝑀𝑋 is the demand curve 
intercept.  Solving for 𝑎𝑑
𝑀𝑋provides: 
      𝑎𝑑
𝑀𝑋 = 𝑃𝑑
𝑀𝑋 − 𝑚𝑑
𝑀𝑋 ∗ 𝑄𝑑
𝑀𝑋 = 468.92 + 0.000662 ∗ 5,448,474 = 4,076.02      (19) 
                                                 
12 This number is not exactly equal to the quantity of sugar consumed in Mexico because this model 
assumes that all sugar exported from Mexico is shipped into the U.S. and also because this model does not 
account for beginning and ending stocks of sugar in Mexico. 
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The Mexican demand curve can now be specified using equation (17) and equation (19) 
as the following: 
                                            𝑃𝑑
𝑀𝑋 = 4,076.02 − 0.000662𝑄𝑑
𝑀𝑋                                   (20) 
Using similar methods to equations (8) through (12), the Mexican supply curve was 
estimated using the following equation:                                                              
                                                         𝑚𝑠
𝑀𝑋 =
𝑃𝑠
𝑀𝑋
𝑄𝑠
𝑀𝑋∗𝐸𝑠
𝑀𝑋                                                   (21) 
where 𝑄𝑠
𝑀𝑋
 is equal to total Mexican production plus Mexican imports and is equal to 
6,078,000 MTRV (Table 6), 𝑃𝑠
𝑀𝑋 is once again price in the U.S. and equal to 468.92 
$/MTRV (Table 6).  The elasticity of supply for Mexico is 0.15 (Table 7).  Using the 
same steps used to find the U.S. supply curve, the Mexican supply curve is the following: 
                                               𝑃𝑠
𝑀𝑋 = −2,657.23 +  0.000514𝑄𝑠
𝑀𝑋                            (22)       
Setting demand equal to supply yields the autarky price and quantity for Mexico: 
                         −2,657.23 +  0.000514𝑄𝑠
𝑀𝑋 = 4,076.02 − 0.000662𝑄𝑑
𝑀𝑋              (23) 
Solving equation (24) yields the Mexican equilibrium autarky price (𝑃𝐴
𝑀𝑋) of 286.70 
$/MTRV and a quantity (𝑄𝐴
𝑀𝑋) of 5,723,717.11 MTRV. 
 Mexican excess supply.  As explained by Figure 8, Mexico produces more sugar 
than it consumes so Mexico has an excess supply curve.  To calculate the excess supply 
curve, first two points on the excess demand curve in Figure 8 are determined.  The first 
point is the autarky price (𝑃𝐴
𝑀𝑋) which is equal to 286.70 $/MTRV.  The second point is 
(Q4, P2), P2 is the actual observed price in the U.S. and Q4 is the quantity of raw Mexican 
sugar exported to the U.S.  The price of raw sugar in the U.S. is 468.92 $/MTRV (Table 
6) and the quantity of Mexican exports of sugar to the U.S. is 629,526 MTRV which 
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causes point (Q4, P2) to equal (629,526, 468.92).  Using these two points, the slope of the 
Mexican excess supply (𝑚𝑒𝑠
𝑀𝑋) curve can be determined: 
                                                          𝑚𝑒𝑠
𝑀𝑋 =
(𝑦2−𝑦1)
(𝑥1−𝑥2)
                                                     (24) 
Substituting in the two points from above: 
                                       𝑚𝑒𝑠
𝑀𝑋 =
(468.92−286.70)
(629,526−0)
= 0.0002895                                     (25) 
Thus yielding the Mexican excess demand curve: 
                                             𝐸𝑆𝑀𝑋 = 286.70 + 0.0002895𝑋                                      (26) 
Table 8 summarizes the results of this section and the results from calculating this 
information for FY 2009 through FY 2013.  Table 9 summarizes the results of calculating 
this information for FY 2008 through FY 2013 using the long-run elasticities in Table 7. 
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Table 8 
Short-Run Supply and Demand Parameters for U.S. and Mexico 
FY Summary Result U.S. Mexico 
2008 Autarky Price 763.25 $/MTRV 286.70 $/MTRV 
 Autarky Quantity 8,556,552 MTRV 5,723,717 
 Demand  P=4,377-0.00042Qd P=4,076-0.00066Qd 
 Supply  P=-1,407+0.00025Qs P=-2,657+0.00051Qs 
 Excess Demand  EDUS =763.25-0.00016I  
 Excess Supply   ESMX=286.70+0.00029X 
2009 Autarky Price 919.02 $/MTRV 28.76 $/MTRV 
 Autarky Quantity 8,350,080 MTRV 4,654,025 MTRV 
 Demand  P=4,541-0.00043Qd P=4,229-0.00090Qd 
 Supply  P=-1460+0.00028Qs P=-2,757+0.00060Qs 
 Excess Demand  EDUS =919.02-0.00017I  
 Excess Supply   ESMX=28.76+0.00036X 
2010 Autarky Price 1,369.78 $/MTRV 404.57 $/MTRV 
 Autarky Quantity 8,695,406 MTRV 5,560,450 MTRV 
 Demand  P=7,044-0.00065Qd P=6,560-0.00111Qd 
 Supply  P=-2,264.09+0.00042Qs P=-4,276+0.00084Qs 
 Excess Demand  EDUS =1,369-0.00025I  
 Excess Supply   ESMX=404.57+0.00048X 
2011 Autarky Price 1,726.62 $/MTRV -75.17 $/MTRV 
 Autarky Quantity 8,944,243 MTRV 4,853,730 MTRV 
 Demand  P=7,914-0.00069Qd P=7,371-0.00153Qd 
 Supply  P=-2,544+0.00048Qs P=-4,805+0.00097Qs 
 Excess Demand  EDUS =1,726.62-0.00028I  
 Excess Supply   ESMX=-75.17+0.00060X 
2012 Autarky Price 1,323.51 $/MTRV 256.65 $/MTRV 
 Autarky Quantity 9,327,654 MTRV 5,292,237 MTRV 
 Demand  P=6,694-0.00058Qd P=6,234-0.00113Qd 
 Supply  P=-2,152+0.00037Qs P=-4,064+0.00082Qs 
 Excess Demand  EDUS =1,323.51-0.00022I  
 Excess Supply   ESMX=256.65+0.00047X 
2013 Autarky Price 848.97 $/MTRV -9.56 $/MTRV 
 Autarky Quantity 9,840,279 MTRV 6,455,660 MTRV 
 Demand  P=4,321-0.00035Qd P=4,024-0.00062Qd 
 Supply  P=-1,389+0.00023Qs P=-2,624+0.00040Qs 
 Excess Demand  EDUS =848.97-0.00014I  
 Excess Supply   ESMX=-9.56+0.00025X 
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Table 9 
Long-Run Supply and Demand Parameters for U.S. and Mexico 
FY Summary Result U.S. Mexico 
2008 Autarky Price 582.95 $/MTRV 381.05 $/MTRV 
 Autarky Quantity 5,511,004 MTRV 5,816,036 
 Demand  P=1,890-0.00015Qd P=1,771-0.00023Qd 
 Supply  P=-287+0.0001Qs P=-1,570+0.00034Qs 
 Excess Demand  EDUS =582.95-0.00061I  
 Excess Supply   ESMX=381.05+0.00014X 
2009 Autarky Price 653.72 $/MTRV 260.61 $/MTRV 
 Autarky Quantity 8,287,277 MTRV 4,840,044 MTRV 
 Demand  P=1,961-0.00016Qd P=1,838-0.00033Qd 
 Supply  P=-298+0.00011Qs P=-1,629+0.00039Qs 
 Excess Demand  EDUS =653.72-0.00007I  
 Excess Supply   ESMX=260.61+0.00018Qs 
2010 Autarky Price 990.60 $/MTRV 585.33 $/MTRV 
 Autarky Quantity 8,635,398 MTRV 5,667,856 MTRV 
 Demand  P=3,042-0.00024Qd P=2,851-0.00040Qd 
 Supply  P=-463+0.00017Qs P=-2,527+0.00055Qs 
 Excess Demand  EDUS =992.60-0.00010I  
 Excess Supply   ESMX=585.33+0.00023X 
2011 Autarky Price 1,187.16 $/MTRV 389.47 $/MTRV 
 Autarky Quantity 8,865,909 MTRV 5,079,612 MTRV 
 Demand  P=3,417-0.00025Qd P=3,203-0.00055Qd 
 Supply  P=-519+0.00019Qs P=-2,839+0.0006Qs 
 Excess Demand  EDUS =1,187.16-0.00011I  
 Excess Supply   ESMX=389.47+0.00030Qs 
2012 Autarky Price 951.65 $/MTRV 492.74 $/MTRV 
 Autarky Quantity 9,260,902 MTRV 5,434,794 MTRV 
 Demand  P=2,891-0.00021Qd P=2,709-0.00041Qd 
 Supply  P=-440+0.00015Qs P=-2,401+0.00053Qs 
 Excess Demand  EDUS =951.65-0.00009I  
 Excess Supply   ESMX=492.74+0.00023X 
2013 Autarky Price 612.24 $/MTRV 228.96 $/MTRV 
 Autarky Quantity 9,770,821.53 MTRV 6,736,511 MTRV 
 Demand  P=1,867-0.00013Qd P=1,749-0.00023Qd 
 Supply  P=-283.76+0.00009Qs P=-1,550+0.00026Qs 
 Excess Demand  EDUS =612.24-0.00005I  
 Excess Supply   ESMX=228.96+0.00012X 
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Chapter 4 
NAFTA Trade Model 
This chapter will determine the impact of NAFTA on U.S. producer surplus and Mexican 
welfare.  In particular, this chapter will determine U.S. producer surplus and Mexican 
welfare for FY 2008 through FY 2013 when NAFTA was fully implemented.  Using data 
and information from Chapters 2 and 3, this section will also determine U.S. producer 
surplus and Mexican welfare if Mexico was still bound by the TRQ and restricted to 
exporting 250,000 MTRV of sugar into the U.S. (counterfactual scenario).  The first step 
in calculating U.S. producer surplus and Mexican producer and consumer surplus is to 
develop the excess supply curve facing the U.S.  
Excess Supply Curve 
Since full implementation of NAFTA, two primary scenarios exist under which countries 
export sugar into the U.S. In Scenario 1, Mexico is allowed to export sugar in an 
unrestricted quantity to the U.S. and countries that export raw sugar into the U.S. under 
the TRQ completely fill their TRQ which makes the TRQ binding.  In Scenario 2, 
Mexico is allowed to export an unrestricted amount of sugar into the U.S. and the 
countries that export raw sugar into the U.S. under the TRQ do not completely fill their 
TRQ causing the TRQ to not be binding.  Since full implementation of NAFTA, Scenario 
1 is the most common scenario, occurring in every year except FY 2013 when the TRQ 
countries did not export their entire TRQ allocations into the U.S. (USDA Economic 
Research Service, 2013c).  This primarily occurred because the U.S. price of sugar in FY 
2013 was almost identical to the world price of sugar.   
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Scenario 1: TRQ binding; Mexico unrestricted.  Figure 9 displays the U.S. 
excess demand curve, EDUS, facing Mexico and the countries which export sugar into the 
U.S. under the TRQ.  In Figure 9, price, P3, is either the TRQ countries’ autarky price or 
Mexico’s autarky price.  It is assumed that price, P3, is typically the TRQ countries’ 
autarky price because many of the TRQ countries are the lowest cost sugar producers in 
the world (Haley, 2013). Thus, it is likely that the TRQ countries are characterized as 
being a lower cost sugar producer than Mexico.  Therefore, the quantity of TRQ exports 
follows the excess supply curve (ES) facing the U.S. prior to quantity X1.  At price P2, 
which is the Mexican autarky price, and quantity X1, Mexico also begins exporting raw 
sugar into the U.S. because the raw price of sugar is now higher than the Mexican autarky 
price13.  The ES curve from quantity X1 to quantity X2 is characterized by both Mexico 
and TRQ countries exporting sugar into the U.S.  However, at quantity X2, the TRQ 
reaches maximum capacity and TRQ countries are no longer allowed to export sugar into 
the U.S.  Hence, after quantity X2, the ES curve is characterized by only Mexican exports 
of sugar entering into the U.S. until the point (X3, P1) is reached, which is the equilibrium 
price and quantity of raw sugar exported to the U.S. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 It is possible that the Mexican autarky price of sugar is less than the TRQ countries’ autarky price, 
although it is not likely.  Thus, Figure 7 would change slightly, such that, at price, P3, Mexico would begin 
exporting sugar into the U.S. and TRQ countries would not begin exporting sugar into the U.S. until their 
autarky price of, P2, was reached. 
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Figure 9.  Scenario 1-TRQ Binding and Mexico Unrestricted 
 
Scenario 2: TRQ not binding; Mexico unrestricted.  Scenario 2 can be 
graphically explained using Figure 10.  Price, P3, is the TRQ countries’ autarky price of 
sugar and the TRQ countries begin to export sugar into the U.S. at this price.  At price, 
P2, (Mexican autarky price) Mexico also begins exporting raw sugar into the U.S. From 
X1 until X2 both Mexico and the TRQ countries export sugar into the U.S.  Eventually the 
ES intersects the U.S. excess demand curve (EDUS) because the TRQ is not binding.  This 
occurs at point (X2, P1), which is the equilibrium price and quantity of raw sugar in the 
U.S.  Quantity X3, illustrates where the TRQ would become binding and the excess 
supply (ES) curve would be characterized by only exports from Mexico entering into the 
U.S.  
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Figure 10.  Scenario 2-TRQ Not Binding and Mexico Unrestricted 
 
Realized U.S. Producer Surplus and Mexican Welfare 
The first step in estimating the impact of NAFTA on U.S. and Mexican welfare is to 
calculate realized U.S. producer surplus and Mexican welfare in the fiscal years since 
NAFTA was fully implemented.  To calculate producer surplus for the U.S. from FY 
2008 through FY 2013, area A was calculated (Figure 11) as the following: 
                                  PSUS=1/2*[(P2 –P3)*Q2]-1/2*[(0-P3)*Q1]                                         (27) 
where PSUS is U.S. producer surplus; P3, Q1 and Q2 were obtained from the U.S. supply 
curve for the short-run (Table 8) and the long-run (Table 9); and P2 is the U.S. price of 
sugar (Table 6). 
 
 53 
 
 
       p                                                                                
             
                                                               SUS                                                      
 
 
 
 
     P1 
 
     P2                                                                                                                            
                  
                 A                                   DUS                                        
 
      
 
                Q1            Q2   Q3                                    q 
     P3 
 
Figure 11.  U.S. Producer Surplus 
 
To estimate Mexican producer surplus for FY 2008 through FY 2013, area BCDEF  
 
(Figure 12) was calculated as: 
                               PSMX=1/2*[(P2-P4)*Q4]-1/2*[(0-P4)*Q1]                                 (28) 
where PSMX is Mexican producer surplus; P4, Q1 and Q4 were obtained from the Mexico 
domestic supply curve for the short-run (Table 8) and for the long-run (Table 9); and P2 
is the U.S. price of sugar (Table 6).  To calculate Mexican consumer surplus for FY 2008 
through FY 2013, area A (Figure 12) was calculated: 
CSMX=1/2*[(P1-P2)*(Q2)]                                               (29) 
where CSMX  is consumer surplus in Mexico, P1 is the intercept of the demand curve 
(Table 8 for short-run; Table 9 for longer run), P2 is the realized price of sugar in the U.S. 
(Table 6), and Q2 is found by substituting P2 into the Mexican demand curve (DMX). 
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Figure 12.  Mexico Producer and Consumer Surplus 
 
Table 10 displays U.S. producer surplus and Mexican producer and consumer surplus for 
FY 2008 through FY 2013 which were calculated from equations (27), (28) and (29) 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 55 
 
Table 10  
Estimates of Actual Welfare FY 2008 through FY 2013 (Millions of Dollars) 
FY U.S. PS Mexico PS Mexico CS 
Short-run    
2008  3,034 2,636 9,826 
2009  2,908 2,438 7,760 
2010  4,770 4,172 15,222 
2011  5,270 4,549 13,866 
2012  4,832 3,855 13,473 
2013  3,298 3,264 10,148 
   Average 4,019 3,486 11,716 
Long-run    
2008  2,393 2,522 3,548 
2009  2,293 2,333 2,802 
2010  3,761 3,991 5,496 
2011  4,156 4,353 5,007 
2012  3,810 3,717 4,865 
2013  2,601 3,123 3,664 
   Average 3,169 3,340 4,230 
 
Counterfactual Scenario: Mexico Restricted By TRQ 
 
Next, counterfactual models are developed to determine U.S. producer surplus and 
Mexican welfare under the scenario that Mexico is restricted by laws that existed prior to 
the full implementation of NAFTA.  The laws prior to FY 2008 stated that Mexico was 
part of the TRQ and their quota was allocated at 250,000 MTRV annually.   
Scenario 1: TRQ binding; Mexico restricted by TRQ.  The counterfactual 
model in Scenario 1 is illustrated by Figure 13.  In this scenario the TRQ is binding for 
all TRQ countries including Mexico, and Mexico is restricted to exporting only 250,000 
MTRV of sugar into the U.S.  At price P4, which is the TRQ countries’ autarky price, 
TRQ countries begin exporting sugar into the U.S14.  Once the Mexican autarky price 
                                                 
14 It is possible that the Mexican autarky price of sugar is less than the TRQ countries’ autarky price, 
although it is not likely.  Thus, Figure 12 would change slightly, such that, at price, P4, Mexico would 
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(P3) is reached, Mexico begins to export sugar into the U.S. along with the TRQ 
countries.  Therefore, from X1 through X2 Mexico and the TRQ countries are exporting 
sugar into the U.S. At quantity X2 the TRQ is at its maximum capacity for all countries 
besides Mexico; thus, at quantity, X2, only Mexico is exporting sugar into the U.S. until 
their quota of 250,000 MTRV of sugar is reached at quantity, X3.  This results in the U.S. 
price being P1 instead of P2. 
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Figure 13.  Scenario 1: TRQ Binding; Mexico Restricted-NAFTA Removal 
 
Scenario 2: TRQ not originally binding; Mexico restricted by TRQ.  The 
counterfactual model in Scenario 2 is illustrated in Figure 14.  In FY 2013, the TRQ was 
not originally binding (i.e., the TRQ countries did not export their total maximum TRQ 
                                                 
begin exporting sugar into the U.S. and the TRQ countries would not begin exporting sugar into the U.S. 
until their autarky price, P3, was reached. 
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allocations) and this scenario is explained previously by Figure 11.  Nonetheless, if 
Mexico was restricted to exporting 250,000 MTRV of sugar into the U.S. (counterfactual 
scenario), it is assumed that the TRQ countries would fill their total maximum TRQ 
allocations.  This is assumed to happen because in FY 2013 Mexico exported 1.923 
million metric tons, raw value (MMTRV) of sugar into the U.S. and the TRQ countries 
exported 860,000 MTRV of sugar into the U.S., which was 249,000 MTRV short of their 
maximum allocation.  If Mexico was restricted to exporting 250,000 MTRV of sugar into 
the U.S., this would be 1.673 MMTRV of sugar less than they actually exported into the 
U.S. in FY 2013.  Consequently, it is likely that the TRQ countries would export an 
additional 249,000 MTRV of sugar into the U.S. in FY 2013, thus filling their TRQ and 
making the TRQ binding.  Figure 14 displays the excess supply curve facing the U.S. 
excess demand curve where ES is the excess supply curve that would exist if Mexico 
were unconstrained by the TRQ.  ES’ is the excess supply curve that would have would 
existed under the counterfactual scenario if the TRQ would have remained unbinding.  
ES’’ is the excess supply curve that would exist if the TRQ becomes binding under the 
counterfactual scenario and is highlighted in black because this is the excess supply curve 
assumed to exist for the ensuing analysis. 
 Assuming the TRQ becomes binding under the counterfactual scenario, ES’’ 
exists.  At price, P3 (Mexico autarky price), Mexico begins to export sugar into the U.S. 
along with the TRQ countries15.  From X1 until X2 TRQ countries and Mexico are 
exporting sugar into the U.S. until the Mexican quota of 250,000 MTRV of sugar is 
                                                 
15 It is possible that the Mexican autarky price of sugar is less than the TRQ countries’ autarky price, 
although it is not probable.  Thus, Figure 14 would change slightly, such that, at price, P4, Mexico would 
begin exporting sugar into the U.S. and the TRQ countries would not begin exporting sugar into the U.S. 
until their autarky price, P3, was reached. 
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filled. The ES’’ curve is now characterized by only TRQ countries other than Mexico 
exporting sugar into the U.S. until their TRQ allocation is filled at quantity 𝑋2
′ .  This 
results in the price of sugar in the U.S. being P1 rather than the observed price of sugar of 
P2.   
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Figure 14.  Scenario 2: TRQ Not Binding; Mexico Restricted-NAFTA Removal 
 
Counterfactual U.S. Producer Surplus: Mexico Restricted by the TRQ 
 Figure 15 illustrates what U.S. producer surplus would have been in FY 2008 through 
FY 2013 if Mexico was restricted by the TRQ.  In both Figure 14 and Figure 15 the TRQ 
is assumed to become binding if Mexico was restricted to exporting 250,000 MTRV of 
sugar into the U.S. Accordingly, producer surplus can be calculated for both Scenario 1 
and Scenario 2 using the same procedure.  If Mexico was restricted by the TRQ, the U.S. 
 59 
 
price would be, 𝑃2
′, and U.S. sugar producers would supply quantity, 𝑄2
′  (Figure 15).  If 
Mexico was restricted by the TRQ and the TRQ became binding for the other countries, 
the resulting price in the U.S. would be 𝑃2
′, and the quantity 𝑄2
′  is the quantity that would 
have been supplied by U.S. sugar producers.   
In Figure 15, the resulting U.S. producer surplus is the original area A plus the 
additional area B and is calculated by: 
PSUS=1/2*[(𝑃2
′-P3)*(𝑄2
′ )]-1/2*[(0-P3)*Q1]                              (30) 
where PSUS is producer surplus in the U.S., 𝑃2
′ is the price of sugar in the U.S. and 𝑄2
′  is 
the quantity of sugar supplied by the U.S. when Mexico is restricted to exporting 250,000 
MTRV of sugar into the U.S. and P3 is the intercept of the U.S. domestic supply curve. 
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Figure 15.  FY 2008 through FY 2013: Counterfactual U.S. Producer Surplus-Mexico Restricted by the TRQ 
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In order to calculate the new U.S. producer surplus for FY 2008 through FY 2013, 𝑃2
′ 
must first be calculated from the U.S. Excess Demand (EDUS) curve in Figure 15.  To 
accomplish this, the TRQ quantity that would have existed if Mexico was restricted by 
the TRQ is first calculated and then substituted into the U.S. Excess Demand (EDUS) 
curves given in Table 8 and Table 916.  Table 11 displays the TRQ quantities that would 
have resulted if Mexico was restricted by the TRQ and also displays the resulting U.S. 
price that would have existed for FY 2008 through FY 2013. 
Table 11 
Mexico Restricted- TRQ quantities (1,000 MTRV) and Resulting U.S. Prices ($/MT) 
FY TRQ Quantity  U.S. Price 
Short-run   
2008  1,478 $529.06 
2009  1,493 $662.29 
2010  1,932 $877.60 
2011  1,812 $1214.75 
2012  1,959 $880.39 
2013  1,117 $694.50 
Long-run   
2008  1,478 $492.22 
2009  1,493 $554.29 
2010  1,932 $802.23 
2011  1,812 $989.55 
2012  1,959 $780.31 
2013  1,117 $552.51 
  
With the U.S. price data from Table 11, U.S. producer surplus if Mexico was restricted 
by the TRQ can also be calculated using equation (30) (Table 12). 
 
                                                 
16 The TRQ quantity that would have existed is the realized TRQ from Table 2 plus the additional 250,000 
MTRV quota that Mexico would have filled. Mexico is assumed to have filled their entire quota because 
under free trade they exported well over 250,000 MTRV annually into the U.S. from FY 2008 through FY 
2013. 
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Table 12 
U.S. Producer Surplus Actual and Counterfactual, FY 2008 through FY 2013 (Millions of 
Dollars) 
FY Actual1 Counterfactual2 Net Gain 
Short-run    
2008  3,035 3,487 452 
2009  2,909 4,164 1,255 
2010  4,770 5,676 906 
2011  5,271 8,017 2,747 
2012  4,832 6,125 1,292 
2013  3,299 5,302 2,003 
  Average 4,019 5,462 1,443 
Long-run    
2008  2,393 2,568 175 
2009  2,294 2,778 484 
2010  3,762 4,11 350 
2011  4,156 5,214 1,058 
2012  3,811 4,310 499 
2013  2,601 3,374 773 
  Average 3,169 3,726 557 
1Data from Table 10. 
2Counterfactual is the scenario when NAFTA is not implemented and Mexico is 
restrained by the TRQ. 
 
The estimated annual average FY 2008 through FY 2013 (realized) U.S. producer 
surplus in the short-run and long-run is $4.02 billion a $3.17 billion respectively.  If 
Mexico was restricted to exporting 250,000 MTRV U.S., the annual average producer 
surplus for FY 2008 through FY 2013 would have been $5.46 billion in the short-run and 
$3.73 billion in the long-run.  If Mexico was restricted to exporting 250,000 MTRV into 
the U.S. because NAFTA was not fully implemented, annual U.S. producer surplus 
would have increased by an average of $1.44 billion in the short-run and $560 million in 
the long-run.  For the entire time period of 2008 through 2013, if Mexico was restricted 
to exporting 250,000 MTRV into the U.S., and NAFTA was not fully implemented, U.S. 
producer surplus would have increased by $8.66 billion in the short-run and $3.34 billion 
in the long-run. 
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Counterfactual Mexican Welfare: Mexico Restricted by the TRQ   
Mexican consumer and producer surplus for FY 2008 through FY 2013, under the 
counterfactual scenario, is graphically depicted in Figure 1617.  Producer and consumer 
surplus in the years NAFTA was effective can be illustrated from this figure as well as 
producer and consumer surplus if NAFTA was not effective and Mexico was still 
restricted to their quota of 250,000 MTRV.  Mexican producer and consumer surplus 
under NAFTA being fully effective (observed scenario) is the following area: 
PS=CDEFGHIJKMNO; CS=AB and this was calculated previously (Table 10) and 
shown previously Figure 12.  The counterfactual scenario creates the following producer 
and consumer surplus: PS=HIJKMNO+LF; CS=ABCD.  The area LF is now part of 
producer surplus in Mexico because the price of sugar in the U.S. increases from P2 to  𝑃2
′ 
while the domestic price in Mexico actually drops from P2 to P3 when Mexico is 
restricted to only exporting 250,000 MTRV of sugar into the U.S.  Additionally, Mexico 
is still able to sell the 250,000 MTRV of sugar on the U.S. market at the U.S. market 
price of 𝑃2
′, hence, the area LF is equal to 250,000 MTRV * (𝑃2
′-P3).   
  
                                                 
17 In both Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 the TRQ is assumed to become binding if Mexico was restricted to 
exporting 250,000 MTRV of sugar into the U.S. Thus, Mexican welfare can be calculated for both Scenario 
1 and Scenario 2 using Figure 15. 
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Figure 16.  FY 2008 through FY 2013: Counterfactual Mexico Welfare:-Mexico Restricted by the TRQ  
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The first step in calculating producer and consumer surplus under the 
counterfactual scenario is to calculate Mexico’s new domestic price of sugar, P3.  Price, 
P3, is found when Q4-Q3=250,000 which occurs between price, P4, and price, P2.  The 
Mexican domestic price of sugar, P3, was calculated for FY 2008 through FY 2013 for the 
short-run and long-run and is found in Table 13. 
Table 13 
 
Mexican Domestic Price for FY 2008 through FY 2013 ($/MT) 
 
FY Short-run Long-run 
2008 $349.82 $457.18 
2009 $127.40 $293.65 
2010 $511.35 $644.47 
2011 $67.70 $385.09 
2012 $385.24 $537.96 
2013 $43.84 $231.00 
 
 
 To calculate consumer surplus under the counterfactual scenario (e.g., ABCD of 
Figure 16), the following equation is used: 
                 CSMX=1/2*[(P1-P3)*Q3]                  (31) 
where CSMX is Mexican consumers surplus, P1 is the Mexican domestic demand curve 
intercept, P3 is the new domestic price of sugar in Mexico and Q3 is found by substituting 
price, P3, into the Mexican domestic demand curve.  Producer surplus when Mexico is 
restricted to exporting 250,000 MTRV of sugar into the U.S. (HIJKMNO+LF) is the 
following: 
            PSMX=1/2*[(P3-P5)*Q4]-1/2*[(0-P5)*Q1]+[(Q4-Q3)*(𝑃2
′-P3)]                (32) 
where the variables are the same as in equation (31). PSMX is Mexican producer surplus, 
P5 is the intercept of the Mexican domestic supply curve, Q4 is found by substituting the 
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price, P3, into the Mexican domestic supply curve, and 𝑃2
′ is the price of sugar in the U.S. 
when Mexico is restricted to exporting 250,000 MTRV of sugar into the U.S.  Table 14 
displays the consumer and producer surplus calculated by equation (31) and (32). 
 FY 2008 through FY 2013 estimated annual average producer surplus in Mexico 
when NAFTA is fully implemented (realized) is $3.49 billion in the short-run and $3.34 
billion in the long-run.  Annual average Mexican producer surplus if Mexico was 
restricted to exporting 250,000 MTRV of sugar into the U.S. is $1.46 billion in the short-
run and $2.26 billion in the long-run.  Thus, average annual producer surplus in Mexico, 
if Mexico were to be restricted by the TRQ compared to being able to export an 
unrestricted amount of sugar into the U.S., is $2.03 billion lower in the short-run and 
$4.23 billion lower in the long-run.   
 FY 2008 through FY 2013 estimated annual average consumer surplus in Mexico 
when NAFTA is fully effective (realized) is $11.72 billion in the short-run and $4.23 
billion in the long-run.  Annual average consumer surplus if Mexico was still restrained 
by the TRQ is $13.59 billion in the short-run and $5.24 billion in the long-run; thus, if 
Mexico was still restricted by the TRQ, annual average consumer surplus in Mexico 
would increase by $1.87 billion in the short-run and $1.01 billion in the long-run. 
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Table 14 
Mexican Producer and Consumer Surplus FY 2008 through FY 2013 (Millions of Dollars) 
 PS PS Net CS CS Net  ∆ Total Welfare 
FY Actual1 Counterfactual2 Loss Actual1 Counterfactual2 Gain (∆CS+∆PS) 
Short-run        
2008  2,636 1,971 655 9,827 10,486 660 4.33 
2009  2,439 734 1,705 7,760 9,321 1,561 -143.92 
2010  4,172 2,844 1,328 15,222 16,525 1,303 -24.68 
2011  4,550 623 3,927 13,867 17,383 3,516 -411.08 
2012  3,855 2,132 1,723 13,474 15,144 1,670 -52.57 
2013  3,264 449 2,815 10,149 12,678 2,529 -285.92 
  Average 3,486 1,459 2,025 11,716 13,590 1,873 -152.31 
Long-run        
2008  2,522 2,460 62 3,548 3,613 64 1.87 
2009  2,333 1,401 932 2,802 3,659 857 -75.42 
2010  3,992 3,383 608 5,497 6,090 593 -15.00 
2011  4,353 1,988 2,365 5,007 7,169 2,161 -203.94 
2012  3,717 2,758 959 4,865 5,780 915 -44.06 
2013  3,123 1,537 1,586 3,665 5,106 1,441 -144.63 
  Average 3,340 2,255 1,085 4,230 5,236 1,005 -80.20 
1Data from Table 10.  
2Counterfactual is the scenario when NAFTA is not implemented and Mexico is restrained by the TRQ.  
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 Once producer and consumer surplus is calculated under the realized versus 
counterfactual scenario, the change in total welfare for Mexico can also be calculated and 
appears in Table 14.  From Figure 16, consumer surplus in Mexico when NAFTA is fully 
implemented is AB and consumer surplus in Mexico if Mexico was restricted by the TRQ 
is ABCD.  Thus, the change in consumer surplus is CD.  Producer surplus in Mexico 
when NAFTA is fully implemented (realized) is CDEFGHIJKMNO and producer 
surplus when Mexico is restricted by the TRQ is HIJKFLMNO.  Thus, the change in 
producer surplus is L-CDEG.  Adding the change in producer surplus to the change in 
consumer surplus yields the change in total welfare of Mexico which is L-EG.  
Therefore, it is possible in some cases that removing NAFTA could actually improve 
Mexico’s total welfare as long as L>EG.  Indeed Mexico’s welfare would have actually 
increased in FY 2008 if NAFTA was not fully implemented (Table 14). 
 In FY 2008, Mexican total welfare is greater in FY 2008 in both the long and 
short-run when Mexico is restrained by the TRQ as demonstrated by the positive change 
in total welfare (Table 14) of $4.33 million in the short-run and $1.87 million in the long-
run.  In FY 2009 through FY 2013, total welfare in Mexico is slightly decreased.  In total, 
from FY 2008 through FY 2013 total welfare in Mexico, if Mexico was still restricted by 
the TRQ, is decreased by $914 million in the short-run and $481 million in the long-run.  
Mexico’s welfare decreased on average, by $152 million annually in the short-run and by 
$80 million annually in the long-run.  
Impact of NAFTA on U.S. Producer Surplus and Mexican Welfare Conclusion 
This chapter quantified the impact of NAFTA on U.S. and Mexican welfare.  In 
particular, U.S. producer and Mexican consumer and producer surplus were estimated (1) 
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under the condition that NAFTA was fully implemented (realized) and (2) under the 
scenario that NAFTA was never fully implemented and Mexico remained restricted by 
the TRQ to exporting only 250,000 MTRV of sugar into the U.S. annually.    
Ultimately, from FY 2008 through FY 2013, when NAFTA was fully 
implemented and Mexico was allowed to export an unrestricted amount of sugar into the 
U.S., average annual U.S. producer surplus was estimated to be $4.02 billion in the short-
run and $3.17 billion in the long-run.  If Mexico was still restricted by the TRQ to 
exporting 250,000 MTRV, average annual U.S. producer surplus would have been $5.46 
billion (short-run) and $3.73 billion (long-run); thus, average annual U.S. producer 
surplus would have increased by $1.44 billion (short-run) and $560 million (long-run) if 
Mexico was still restricted by the TRQ.  For the entire time period of FY 2008 through 
FY 2013, if Mexico was restricted to exporting 250,000 MTRV into the U.S., and 
NAFTA was not fully implemented, U.S. producer surplus would have increased by 
$8.66 billion (short-run) and $3.34 billion (long-run).   
If Mexico was restricted by the TRQ, Mexican consumer surplus would have 
increased by an annual average of $1.87 billion (short-run) and $1.01 billion (long-run); 
meanwhile, Mexican producer surplus would have decreased by an annual average of 
$2.03 billion (short-run) and $1.09 billion (long-run).  Over the entire time frame from 
FY 2008 through FY 2013, Mexican total welfare would have decreased by $914 million 
(short-run) and $481 million (long-run) if Mexico was restricted by the TRQ. However, if 
Mexico was still restricted by the TRQ to exporting 250,000 MTRV of sugar into the 
U.S., Mexican total welfare would have actually increased in FY 2008 by $4.33 million 
(short-run) and $1.87 million (long-run).  Moreover, as demonstrated by Figure 16, in the 
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future it is possible under certain circumstances that Mexican welfare could be better off 
if Mexico was restricted by the TRQ as opposed to exporting an unrestricted amount of 
sugar into the U.S.  
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Chapter 5 
 
USDA Forecasting Errors Trade Model 
 
This chapter extends previous work by Lewis and Manfredo (2012) and examines how 
the sugar forecast in the USDA’s World Agriculture Supply and Demand Estimates 
(WASDE) impacts Mexican and U.S. welfare.  In particular, this section will directly 
quantify how USDA sugar forecast errors in FY 2012 impacted U.S. and Mexican 
welfare over the annual average of FY 2012 and FY 2013. 
USDA Sugar Forecasts Accuracy and Efficiency  
Lewis and Manfredo (2012) examined the accuracy and efficiency of USDA sugar 
forecasts for FY 1994 through FY 2011 and determined the USDA sugar forecasts to be 
very accurate and efficient compared to USDA forecasts for commodities such as corn 
and soybeans.  While the USDA sugar forecast was fairly accurate and efficient for FY 
1994 through FY 2011, it is possible that the forecast was not as accurate and efficient for 
FY 2012 and FY 2013.  The Lewis and Manfredo (2012) analysis did not analyze the 
WASDE sugar forecast for FY 2012 and FY 2013 because their article was published 
prior to the FY 2012 forecast being estimated.  This chapter will begin by updating work 
done by Lewis and Manfredo (2012) and analyzing the accuracy and efficiency of the 
WASDE sugar forecasts for FY 2012 and FY 2013.  Next, this chapter will estimate how 
USDA sugar forecasting errors impacted U.S. producer surplus and Mexican welfare. 
 WASDE sugar forecast.  The USDA forecasts several components of U.S. and 
Mexican sugar production and consumption in their monthly WASDE publication18.  By 
updating Lewis and Manfredo (2012), this analysis will examine the U.S. production and 
                                                 
18 The 2008 Farm Bill made it law that the USDA must begin forecasting Mexican sugar data (USDA 
Economic Research Service, 2013d). 
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consumption forecast for sugar as well as analyze the forecast of Mexican exports of 
sugar into the U.S.  Every month the USDA publishes their total fiscal year estimates for 
U.S. sugar production, U.S. sugar consumption and Mexican exports of sugar to the U.S. 
in their WASDE publication.  This creates a series of monthly forecast revisions 
throughout the year which all attempt to estimate total fiscal year sugar production and 
consumption in Mexico and the U.S.  This type of forecast can be analyzed using the 
framework outlined by Nordhaus (1987), Clements (1997) and Isengildina, Irwin and 
Good (2006) (see Lewis & Manfredo (2012) for a review of this methodology and 
literature).   
Forecast revision framework. Following Isengildina et al. (2006), the forecast of 
the terminal event (T) for month t (e.g., the forecast of U.S. production of sugar for total 
fiscal year (T) for month t) is denoted as 𝑞𝑡
𝑖 where t=1,…,T and i= FY 2012 and FY 2013.  
Thus, t=1,…,T has length equal to the number of forecast revisions the USDA makes 
regarding total FY sugar production, consumption, etc.  The monthly forecast revision at 
time t is denoted as 𝑣𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑞𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑞𝑡−1
𝑖 , where t=2,…,T and i= FY 2012 and FY 2013.  
Following Isengilidina et al. (2006), the USDA sugar forecast revision process for FY 
2012 is depicted in Figure 17.  The USDA begins estimating their FY 2012 sugar forecast 
on May 2011 and continues to revise their sugar forecast a total of 21 times (monthly) 
through January 201319. 
                                                 
19 For FY 2013, due to the government shut down, the USDA did not publish an October WASDE; thus, 
the FY 2013 forecasts only have 19 observations instead of 20. 
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Figure 17.  Forecast Revision Cycle FY 2012 
 
Following Isengildina et al. (2006), the sugar forecast revisions were estimated in  
 
log percentage form: 
 𝑣𝑡
𝑖 = 100 ∗ ln (
𝑞𝑡
𝑖
𝑞𝑡−1
𝑖 )                                         (33) 
 𝑡 = 2, … ,21; 𝑖 = 𝐹𝑌2012, 𝐹𝑌 2013 
where the forecasting cycle has a length of T=21 and the revision cycle is equal to T-
1=20 for the U.S. sugar production, U.S. sugar consumption, Mexican sugar production 
and Mexican sugar exports to the U.S. forecasts. 
Weak form forecast efficiency.  According to Nordhaus (1987), a series of 
forecast revisions is weakly efficient if it follows a random walk and is not correlated 
with previous forecast errors (i.e., revisions).  Following Nordhaus (1987) and Clements 
(1997), the following equation is used to test weak form efficiency of the respective 
forecast (e.g., U.S. sugar consumption, U.S. sugar production):  
𝑣𝑡 = 𝛼𝑣𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡   𝑡 = 3, … ,19                                      (34) 
where 𝜀𝑡 is the error term, 𝑣𝑡 is the forecast revision at time t and the number of 
observations is equal to T-2 where T is the final forecast revision for the revision forecast.   
The null hypothesis is that 𝛼=0.  If the null hypothesis is rejected, the forecast revisions 
are considered to be inefficient because the previous time period’s forecast revisions 
(𝑣𝑡−1) are correlated with the current time period’s forecast revisions (𝑣𝑡).  This makes 
the forecast revisions considered inefficient, because to be weakly efficient, the forecast 
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revisions in the previous time period (𝑣𝑡−1) must not be correlated with the current time 
period’s forecast revision (𝑣𝑡).  Instead, they must follow a random walk. 
 Weak form forecast efficiency results. Equation (31) was estimated for the 
USDA sugar forecasts and the associated 𝛼 coefficient results appear in Table 15.  The 
U.S. sugar production forecast, the U.S. sugar consumption forecast, and the Mexican 
exports to the U.S. forecast were analyzed for FY 2012 and FY 2013. 
Table 15 
Weak Form Forecast Efficiency 
 U.S. Sugar U.S. Sugar Mexico Exports 
Fiscal Year Production Consumption to U.S. 
2012 0.42** -0.26 -0.25 
2013 0.30 -0.05** 0.00 
Note: ** p<0.05. 
The only forecast that suggests positive autocorrelation and smoothing (p<0.05) is the 
U.S. sugar production forecast in FY 2012.  While the U.S. sugar consumption forecast 
coefficient is also statistically significant (p<0.05), the coefficient is negative; thus, 
Clements (1997) explained that negative autocorrelation can be consistent with weakly 
efficient behavior if no news comes available to the forecaster and white noise is present 
in the data (see Clements (1997), page 16 for more information).  Thus, only the U.S. 
sugar production fails the weak form efficiency test.  The positive autocorrelation 
associated with the 𝛼 coefficient in the U.S. sugar production forecast for FY 2012 
indicates forecast smoothing which occurs when forecasters fail to incorporate all 
possible information in their forecasts, and they instead rely too much on previous 
forecasts to create their current forecast (i.e., the current forecast does not follow a 
random walk). 
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 Forecast accuracy and increasing the TRQ.  In addition to examining weak 
form forecast efficiency, the accuracy of the USDA sugar forecasts is also examined.  
The most important forecast issued by the USDA appears in the April WASDE.  The 2008 
Farm Bill made it law that the USDA cannot increase the TRQ prior to April 1 of each 
fiscal year (USDA Economic Research Service, 2013d).  According to Markwart (2012), 
typically the USDA waits until the April WASDE is made public to make a 
determination of whether to allow more TRQ imports into the U.S., and this usually 
occurs on April 10 of each year.  Thus, April WASDE information is ultimately used to 
determine if additional TRQ imports should be allowed into the U.S.  Table 16 displays 
the USDA April forecast for U.S. sugar production, U.S. sugar consumption and Mexican 
exports of sugar into the U.S. for FY 2012 and FY2013 compared to the actual (realized) 
production, consumption and export quantities.  
Table 16 
April Sugar Forecasts versus Actual Quantities 1,000 MTRV 
 U.S. Sugar U.S. Sugar Mexico Exports 
 Production Consumption to U.S. 
FY 2012 Forecasted 7,403 10,147 662 
FY 2012 Actual 7,700 10,154 972 
Forecast Error 297 7 310 
    
FY 2013 Forecasted 8,147 10,414 1,494 
FY 2013 Actual 8,143 10,444 1,923 
Forecast Error -4 30 429 
 
In terms of forecast accuracy, the largest forecast errors occurred in the USDA’s FY 2012 
and FY 2013 Mexican exports of sugar forecast and the USDA’s FY 2012 U.S. sugar 
production forecast.  In FY 2012, the USDA forecasted total U.S. sugar production to be 
7.43 MMTRV; however, the U.S. actual sugar production for FY 2012 was 7.70 
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MMTRV.  Thus, the U.S. sugar production forecast error in FY 2012 was nearly 300,000 
MTRV of sugar.  Similarly, in FY 2012 the USDA forecasted Mexican exports of sugar 
into the U.S. to be 662,000 MTRV.  However, Mexico actually exported 972,000 MTRV 
of sugar into the U.S. in FY 2012.  Thus, the Mexican exports of sugar forecast error in 
FY 2012 was 310,000 MTRV.  Ultimately, the USDA April sugar forecasts 
underestimated the amount of sugar that would be on the U.S. market in FY 2012 by 
607,000 MTRV.   
Due to April USDA sugar forecasting errors, the USDA decided to increase the 
TRQ on April 18, 2012, by 408,233 MTRV (USDA Farm Service Agency, 2014).  Thus, 
the goal of this chapter is to estimate how increasing the TRQ by 408,233 MTRV 
impacted U.S. producer surplus and Mexican welfare. 
The Impact of Forecast Errors on U.S. Producer Surplus and Mexican Welfare   
To determine the impact of increasing the TRQ by 408,233 MTRV, this chapter 
considers the average of FY 2012 and FY 2013 in modeling U.S. producer surplus and 
Mexican welfare.  The average of FY 2012 and FY 2013 is examined because the price 
impact of the additional 408,233 MTRV of sugar was felt in both FY 2012 and FY 2013, 
with the price of sugar eventually falling below the loan rate in FY 201320.  By 
examining the average of FY 2012 and FY 2013 the average annual impact over FY 2012 
and FY 2013 of increasing the TRQ will be determined.  Table 17 displays the U.S. and 
Mexican consumption, production and export information for FY 2012 and FY 2013 and 
also the averages of this data for FY 2012 and FY 2013. 
                                                 
20 Increasing the TRQ in FY 2012 was not the only factor contributing to depressed sugar prices in FY 
2013.  Other factors such as increased U.S. sugar production and increased Mexican exports in general also 
contributed to depressed sugar prices in FY 2013. 
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Table 17 
U.S. and Mexican Data 1,000 MTRV 
   Average  
 FY2012 FY2013 FY 2012 and FY 2013 
U.S. price 717.20 462.97 590.09 
Mexican estandar price  829.60 576.29 702.95 
Mexico sugar price1  735.47 496.50 615.99 
U.S. Production 7,700 8,143 7,922 
U.S. Imports2 2,680 2,791 2,736 
    TRQ 1,709 868 1,289 
    Mexico 972 1,923 1,448 
U.S. Consumption3 10,263 10,684 10,474 
   Re-export program 127 73 100 
   Polyhydric alcohol/feed 30 168 99 
   Food/ beverage use 10,107 10,444 10,276 
Mexico Production  5,351 7,393 6,372 
Mexico Imports 505 230 368 
Mexican Exports  985 2,091 1,538 
     U.S.  972 1,927 1,450 
    Other 13 164 89 
Mexican Consumption4 4653 5077 4,865 
   Human Consumption 4,384 4,544 4,464 
1 Uses following conversion: Mexican Estandar Price (US$/MTRV-50)/1.06.   
2U.S. imports are assumed to be TRQ+Mexico for this model.  
3For the model, U.S. Consumption=U.S. Production+U.S. Imports.  
4 Includes other consumption and miscellaneous adjustments; for the model, Mexican 
Consumption=Mexican Imports+Mexican Production-Mexican Exports. 
 
Realized U.S. producer surplus and Mexican welfare.  Calculating U.S. 
producer surplus and Mexican welfare over the average of FY 2012 and FY 2013 is 
achieved using the same methods discussed previously in this chapter and follows from 
Figure 11 (U.S. producer surplus) and Figure 12 (Mexican consumer and producer 
surplus).  First, following equations (1) through (26), the U.S. domestic supply and 
demand curves and the Mexican supply and demand curves were parameterized to 
determine the U.S. and Mexican autarky price and quantities for the average of FY 2012 
and FY 2013 and they appear in Table 18.   
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Table 18 
Supply and Demand Parameters, Average of FY 2012 and FY 2013 
 Summary Result U.S. Mexico 
Short-run Autarky Price 1,085.58 $/MTRV 87.16 $/MTRV 
 Autarky Quantity 9,584,984 MTRV 5,878,339 
 Demand  P=5,507-0.00046Qd P=5,129-0.00086Qd 
 Supply  P=-1,770+0.00030Qs P=-3,344+0.00058Qs 
 Excess Demand  EDUS =1,085.58-0.00018I  
 Excess Supply   ESMX=87.16+0.00035X 
Long-run Autarky Price 781.70 $/MTRV 342.80 $/MTRV 
 Autarky Quantity 9,516,849 MTRV 6,090,367 
 Demand  P=2,378-0.00017Qd P=2,229-0.00031Qd 
 Supply  P=-362+0.00012Qs P=-1,976+0.00038Qs 
 Excess Demand  EDUS =781.70-0.00007I  
 Excess Supply   ESMX=342.80+0.00017X 
 
Using data from Table 17 and Table 18 and following from Figure 11 and Figure 12, U.S. 
producer surplus and Mexican producer and consumer surplus were calculated using 
equations (27), (28) and (29) respectively and appear in Table 19. 
Table 19 
Estimated Realized Producer and Consumer Surplus Average FY 2012 and FY 2013 
(Millions of Dollars) 
 U.S. PS Mexico PS Mexico CS 
Short-run 4,090.36 3,678.92 12,010.60 
Long-run 3,225.54 3,519.83 4,337.16 
 
Counterfactual U.S. producer surplus and Mexican welfare: If TRQ not 
increased.  Figure 18 illustrates what the excess supply curve facing the U.S. would look 
like if the TRQ was not increased by 408,233 MTRV (ES’ ) and also displays the excess 
supply curve (ES) facing the U.S. under the condition that the TRQ was increased by 
408,233 MTRV (realized).  In both of these scenarios the TRQ is filled prior to Mexico 
exporting an unrestricted quantity of sugar into the U.S.  In the average of FY 2012 and 
FY 2013, the TRQ was increased by 408,233 MTRV; therefore, the ES curve facing the 
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U.S. begins at price, P4, and the TRQ countries fill their quota allocation at quantity, X1, 
which includes the additional TRQ allocation permitted by the USDA.  At quantity, X1, 
Mexico begins to export sugar into the U.S. but not until their autarky price is reached 
which occurs at price, P3.  From X1 through X2, Mexico exports an unrestricted amount of 
sugar into the U.S. until the equilibrium price, P2, of sugar in the U.S. is reached where 
exports equal X2.  Alternatively, if the TRQ was not increased by 408,233 MTRV, the 
excess supply curve would be ES’ and the TRQ would be filled at quantity, 𝑋1
′ , and 
Mexico would begin exporting sugar into the U.S. once their autarky price, P3, was 
reached.  Mexico would then export sugar into the U.S. until the equilibrium price, 𝑃2
′, of 
sugar in the U.S. is reached with the total quantity of sugar exports into the U.S. of  𝑋2
′ . 
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Figure 18.  Average of FY 2012 and FY 2013: Excess Supply and U.S. Excess Demand.   
Counterfactual U.S. producer surplus: If TRQ not increased.  To calculate the 
U.S. price of sugar in the U.S. if the TRQ had not been increased (i.e., 𝑃2
′ from Figure 18) 
the intersection of the excess supply curve, ES’, and the U.S. excess demand curve must 
be estimated.  The slope of the Mexico excess supply curve (ES) is known for the short 
and long-run (Table 18) and is equal to the slope of the excess supply curve, ES’, because 
they are parallel.  Also, the Mexican autarky price, P3, (Table 18) is known for both the 
short and long-run.  The quantity of the TRQ, if the TRQ had not been extended,𝑋1
′ , is 
also known (it is the observed TRQ quantity, X1, minus the 408,233 MTRV).  The excess 
supply curve, ES’, can be calculated starting at 𝑋1
′  for both the short and long-run and 
appears in Table 20.  Additionally, the new equilibrium price of sugar in the U.S., 𝑃2
′, can 
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be calculated along with the new quantity of sugar exported to the U.S., 𝑋2
′ , by solving 
where the U.S. excess demand curve (Table 18) intersects the excess supply curve, ES’ 
(Table 20).  
Table 20 
Excess Supply Curve (ES’) Starting at 𝑋1
′ , Average of FY 2012 and FY 2013  
 Summary Result Calculated 
Short-run ES’ at 𝑄1
′  P=-221.11+0.00035QS 
 𝑄2
′  (Quantity exported to U.S.) 2,446,580 
 𝑃2
′ (U.S. price) $645.19 
Long-run ES’ at 𝑄1
′  P=193.07+0.00017QS 
 𝑄2
′  (Quantity exported to U.S.) 2,452,630 
 𝑃2
′ (U.S. price) $610.02 
 
Utilizing the U.S. price under the condition that the TRQ was not increased by 408,233 
MTRV (Table 20), results in a U.S. producer surplus equal to AB compared to A (Figure 
19).   
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Figure 19.  Average FY 2012 and FY 2013 U.S. Producer Surplus: TRQ Not Increased   
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To calculate AB, equation (30) was used.  U.S. producer surplus when the TRQ is 
increased (Table 19) is compared to U.S. producer surplus if the TRQ was not increased 
in Table 21. 
Table 21 
Change in U.S. Producer Surplus if TRQ was Not Increased (Millions of Dollars) 
Average     
FY 2012 & FY 2013 Actual Counterfactual* Net Gain 
Short-run 4,090.36 4,531.95 441.59 
Long-run 3,225.54 3,385.08 159.54 
*Counterfactual refers to the scenario under the assumption that the TRQ was not 
increased 
 
Annual U.S. producer surplus for the average of FY 2012 and FY 2013 when the 
TRQ was increased by 408,233 MTRV was $4.09 billion in the short-run and $3.23 
billion in the long-run.  The annual U.S. producer surplus for the average of FY 2012 and 
FY 2013 if the TRQ was not increased by 408,233 MTRV would have been $4.53 billion 
and $3.39 billion.  If the TRQ had not been expanded, the average FY 2012 and FY 2013 
U.S. producer surplus would have increased by $442 million in the short-run and $160 
million in the long-run. 
Counterfactual Mexican welfare: If TRQ not increased.  Figure 20 displays the 
consumer and producer surplus in Mexico if the TRQ had not been increased by 408,233 
MTRV as well as the original consumer and producer surplus in Mexico when the TRQ 
was increased.  The original consumer surplus in Mexico when the TRQ was increased is 
ABC and original producer surplus is DEFG.  Consumer surplus in Mexico if the TRQ 
was not increased is A and producer surplus is DEFG+BCH.   
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  Figure 20.  Average FY 2012 and FY 2013 Mexican Welfare: TRQ Not Increased 
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To calculate consumer surplus if the TRQ was not increased (A) the following 
equation is used:  
       CSMX=1/2*[(P1-𝑃2
′)*Q2]                                    (35) 
To calculate producer surplus if the TRQ was not increased (DEFG+BCH): 
         PSMX=1/2*[(𝑃2
′-P4)*Q6]-1/2*[(0-P4)*Q1]                    (36) 
Using equations (35) and (36) Mexican consumer and producer surplus if the TRQ was 
not increased was calculated (Table 22) along with Mexican consumer and producer 
surplus when the TRQ was increased which was calculated previously (Table 19).  
 Table 22 also displays the change in Mexican consumer and producer surplus as 
well as the change in total welfare for Mexico.  From Figure 20, consumer surplus in 
Mexico when the TRQ was increased is AB and consumer surplus is DEFG.  If the TRQ 
was not increased, consumer and producer surplus in Mexico would have been A and 
DEFG+BCH respectively.  Mexico’s consumer surplus would have decreased by BC 
and Mexico’s producer surplus would have increased by BCH.  Thus, Mexico’s total 
welfare would have increased by H if the TRQ was never increased.  Mexico’s total 
welfare would have increased by $84.15 million in the short-run and $30.12 million in 
the long-run if the TRQ was not expanded (Table 22). 
 If the TRQ had not been increased by 408,233 MTRV, Mexican producer surplus 
would have increased by $374 million in the short-run and $135 million in the long-run 
(Table 22).  Meanwhile, Mexican consumer surplus would have decreased by $290 
million and $105 million in the short-run and long-run respectively. 
  
 
8
6
 
Table 22 
Change in Mexican Consumer and Producer Surplus if TRQ was Not Increased (Millions of Dollars) 
Ave. FY 2012 PS PS Net CS CS Net ∆Total Welfare 
& FY 2013 Actual Counterfactual* Gain Actual Counterfactual* Loss (∆CS+∆PS) 
Short-run 3,679 4,053 374 12,011 11,721 290 84 
Long-run 3,520 3,655 135 4,337 4,232 105 30 
*Counterfactual refers to the scenario under the assumption that the TRQ was not increased 
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Impact of USDA Forecasting Errors in FY 2012 Conclusion 
This chapter examined how USDA forecasting errors in FY 2012 contributed to losses in 
U.S. and Mexican producer surplus and improvements in Mexican consumer surplus.  It 
was discovered that the FY 2012 U.S. sugar production forecast was inefficient and had 
evidence of “forecast smoothing,” which is a term indicating that forecasters rely too 
much on past forecasts when revising their forecast in each time period.  The inefficient 
FY 2012 U.S. sugar production forecast also illustrated evidence of being inaccurate; the 
April FY 2012 (the April forecast is used to determine whether to increase the TRQ or 
not) sugar production forecast was 297,000 MTRV lower than realized FY 2012 sugar 
production.  Furthermore, in FY 2012 the April forecast for Mexican exports of sugar to 
the U.S. was also 310,000 MTRV lower than the realized amount of Mexican exports of 
sugar into the U.S.  Hence, in FY 2012 the USDA forecasted 607,000 MTRV less sugar 
on the U.S. market than there actually was.  Based on their inefficient and inaccurate U.S. 
sugar production forecast, and inaccurate forecast of Mexican exports to the U.S., the 
USDA increased the TRQ by 408,233 MTRV.  This section quantified how the increase 
in TRQ impacted U.S. and Mexican welfare over the annual average of FY 2012 and FY 
2013. 
If the TRQ had not been increased, annual U.S. producer surplus over the average 
of FY 2012 and FY 2013 would have increased by $442 million (short-run) and $160 
million (long-run).  Additionally, annual Mexican producer surplus over the average of 
FY 2012 and FY 2013 would have increased by $374 million (short-run) and $135 
million (long-run).  Mexican consumer surplus would have decreased by $290 million 
and $105 million in the short-run and long-run respectively.  Thus, Mexico’s total 
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welfare would have actually increased by $84.15 million (short-run) and $30.12 million 
(long-run). 
The FY 2012 forecast errors caused U.S. and Mexican producer welfare to 
decrease and Mexican consumer surplus to increase.  FY 2012 forecasting errors also 
caused Mexico’s total welfare to decrease because Mexico’s producer surplus losses were 
greater than Mexican consumer surplus gains.  Thus, it is to Mexico’s advantage to 
provide the USDA with information regarding their expectations of the quantity of sugar 
they will export to the U.S. 
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Chapter 6 
Mexican Government Ownership Trade Model 
This chapter determines how Mexican ownership of twenty percent of their domestic 
sugar industry impacts U.S. producer surplus and Mexican producer and consumer 
surplus.  On September 5, 2013, in a press release, the America Sugar Alliance explained 
that the Mexican government owns twenty percent of the Mexico’s sugar industry, which 
makes the Mexican government the largest sugar producer and exporter in Mexico.  
Using data regarding the average of FY 2012 and FY 2013, this section will examine the 
impact Mexican government ownership has on U.S. producer surplus and Mexican 
welfare.  In particular, parameters obtained from Chapter 5 for the average of FY 2012 
and FY 2013 will be utilized to determine how a twenty percent reduction in the quantity 
of Mexican sugar produced impacts U.S. producer surplus and Mexican welfare.  From 
Chapter 5, existing U.S. producer surplus and Mexican consumer and producer surplus 
was calculated for the annual average of FY 2012 and FY 2013 (Table 19).  The next 
section determines U.S. producer surplus and Mexican welfare under the counterfactual 
scenario (Mexico’s supply of sugar is decreased by twenty percent). 
Deriving the Excess Supply Curve Facing the U.S. 
The first step in determining U.S. producer surplus and Mexican welfare is to derive the 
excess supply curve facing the U.S., ES, which is illustrated in Figure 21.  To derive the 
excess supply curve facing the U.S, first the Mexican excess supply curve must be 
derived.  The Mexican excess supply curve is constructed by subtracting the domestic 
Mexican supply curve from the domestic Mexican demand curve.  Thus,  
   ESMX=Qs-Qd=X          (37)  
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where ESMX is the Mexican excess supply curve facing the U.S., Qs is the Mexican 
domestic quantity supplied, Qd is the Mexican domestic quantity demanded and X is the 
quantity of exports to the U.S.  Let the Mexican demand and supply curve be the 
following: 
                  𝑃𝐷
𝑀𝑋=a+bQd    
                   𝑃𝑆
𝑀𝑋=c+dQs          (38) 
Now, substituting (38) into (37) and knowing that the prices must be equal yields: 
                            𝐸𝑆𝑀𝑋 =
𝑃−𝑐
𝑑
−
𝑃−𝑎
𝑏
                           (39) 
Solving for P provides: 
                𝑃 =
𝑏𝑐−𝑎𝑑
𝑏−𝑑
+
𝑏𝑑
𝑏−𝑑
𝑋                  (40) 
Equation (40) is the Mexican excess supply curve.  However, the TRQ countries also 
export sugar into the U.S., so to account for the TRQ countries exporting sugar into the 
U.S., equation (40) must be adjusted.  To account for the TRQ countries in the excess 
supply curve, first let v=
𝑏𝑐−𝑎𝑑
𝑏−𝑑
 and w=
𝑏𝑑
𝑏−𝑑
.  Now, equation (40) can be written as the 
following: 
  𝑃 = 𝑣 + 𝑤𝑋        (41) 
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  Figure 21.  Average FY 2012 and FY 2013 Mexican Welfare: Mexico Quantity Supply Reduced   
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Now, as demonstrated by Figure 21, the TRQ countries which export sugar into the U.S. 
shift the Mexican excess supply portion of the excess supply curve facing the U.S. to the 
right by the quantity of sugar they export to the U.S.  To account for this shift, equation 
(41) must be shifted to the right by the quantity of sugar the TRQ countries export to the 
U.S.  Equation (42) illustrates how to shift the Mexican excess supply curve to the right 
to account for the quantity of sugar the TRQ countries export into the U.S.: 
𝑃 = 𝑣 + 𝑤(𝑋 − 𝑋𝑇𝑅𝑄)       (42) 
where XTRQ is the quantity of sugar the TRQ countries export into the U.S.  Rearranging 
equation (42) yields the excess supply curve facing the U.S., ES, which includes both 
Mexican and TRQ exports to the U.S.: 
𝑃 = 𝑣 − 𝑤𝑋𝑇𝑅𝑄 + 𝑤𝑋       (43) 
Using equation (43), the excess supply curve facing the U.S. can be calculated by using 
the domestic Mexican supply and demand curve (Table 18) and by using the average of 
FY 2012 and FY 2013 quantity of TRQ exports (Table 17).   The excess supply curve 
facing the U.S. was estimated for the short- and long-run and is in Table 23. 
Table 23 
Excess Supply Curve, ES, Average of FY 2012 and FY 2013 
 Excess Supply 
Short-run ES=-358.83+.00035X 
Long-run ES=123.67+.00017X 
 
Counterfactual Mexican Welfare: Mexican Supply Reduced 
Figure 21 illustrates how Mexican welfare would change if the Mexican government did 
not own twenty percent of the sugar production in Mexico.  A twenty percent reduction in 
the quantity of Mexican sugar supplied would cause the Mexican supply curve, SMX, to 
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rotate about its original intercept (0, P4) and shift to the left by twenty percent at each 
quantity, thus, creating a counterfactual Mexican supply curve, 𝑆𝑀𝑋
′ .  Rotating the supply 
curve from SMX to 𝑆𝑀𝑋
′  causes the Mexican autarky price to increase from P3 to 𝑃3
′.  The 
excess supply curve facing the U.S. is now characterized by TRQ countries exporting 
sugar into the U.S. until they fill their quota, which is followed by only Mexico exporting 
sugar into the U.S. once the price of sugar reaches the Mexican autarky price which is 
now 𝑃3
′ compared to P3.  Under the counterfactual scenario, the excess supply curve 
facing the U.S. is now ES’, which intersects the U.S. excess demand curve at price 𝑃2
′.   
 Under the counterfactual scenario, welfare in Mexico changes because of the 
counterfactual domestic Mexican supply curve and the counterfactual Mexican price of 
sugar.  Consumer surplus is ABC when the U.S. and Mexican price of sugar is P2.  
However, under the counterfactual scenario, price is now 𝑃2
′; thus, consumer surplus is 
now A.  Therefore, consumer surplus is reduced by BC.  Producer surplus under the 
counterfactual scenario changes from EFGHIJKLMNOR to BCDEFGJKN.  Therefore, 
the change in producer surplus under the counterfactual scenario is BCD-HIMLOR.  
Thus, the change in total Mexican welfare under the counterfactual scenario is D-
HIMLOR.  If D>HIMLOR, then total welfare in Mexico would actually improve if the 
government no longer owns twenty percent of the sugar production in Mexico21.   
Calculating the change in Mexican welfare: Mexican supply reduced.  To 
determine what Mexican welfare would be if Mexican production of sugar was reduced 
by twenty percent, first the counterfactual Mexican supply curve, 𝑆𝑀𝑋
′ , must be estimated. 
                                                 
21 This is under the scenario that it does not cost the government of Mexico any taxpayer dollars to operate 
twenty percent of the sugar production in Mexico.  In reality this does cost taxpayers money, which would 
strengthen the case for improved Mexican welfare by removing the Mexican government ownership of the 
Mexican sugar industry. 
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Counterfactual domestic Mexican supply curve. To accommodate a twenty 
percent decline in the quantity of sugar produced in Mexico, the previous domestic 
supply curve in Mexico, SMX, must be rotated about its intercept.  To calculate the 
counterfactual supply curve, any price, P, can be chosen and substituted into the existing 
supply curve, SMX, to arrive at a quantity, Q. This quantity is then multiplied by eighty 
percent, producing a quantity, Q’ that is twenty percent less than the original quantity on 
the supply curve.  The coordinate, (P,Q’) is now a known point on the counterfactual 
supply curve 𝑆𝑀𝑋
′ .  Because the counterfactual Mexican supply curve, 𝑆𝑀𝑋
′ , is rotated 
about the original Mexican supply curve, SMX, the intercept of the original Mexican 
supply curve (i.e., (0, P4)) is also a point on the counterfactual Mexican supply curve, 
𝑆𝑀𝑋
′ .  This is graphically illustrated by Figure 21.  Therefore, two points on the 
counterfactual Mexican supply curve, 𝑆𝑀𝑋
′ , are known.  The line for 𝑆𝑀𝑋
′  can now be 
derived using the point slope formula.  Using this method, the counterfactual Mexican 
supply curve, 𝑆𝑀𝑋
′  is derived for the long- and short-run and appears in Table 2422.  Table 
24 also displays the counterfactual autarky price in Mexico which is found by setting the 
counterfactual Mexican supply curve equal to the domestic Mexican supply curve (Table 
18). 
Table 24 
Counterfactual Mexican Supply Curve, 𝑆𝑀𝑋
′  , Average of FY 2012 and FY 2013 
 Summary Result  
Short-run Supply  P=-3,344+0.000725Qs 
 Autarky Price 531.66 
Long-run Supply  P=-1,976+0.000475Qs 
 Autarky Price 568.43 
                                                 
22 The counterfactual Mexican supply curve was derived using elasticities from Table 7 and data regarding 
the Mexican domestic supply curves from Table 18. 
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Deriving the counterfactual excess supply curve facing the U.S.  The 
counterfactual excess supply curve facing the U.S., ES’, is derived following a similar 
procedure as the excess supply curve facing the U.S., ES.  The calculation begins the 
same by deriving the Mexican excess supply curve. 
   𝐸𝑆𝑀𝑋
′ =Qs-Qd=X          (44)  
where 𝐸𝑆𝑀𝑋
′  is the Mexican excess supply curve facing the U.S., Qs is the Mexican 
domestic quantity supplied, Qd is the Mexican quantity demanded and X is the quantity of 
exports to the U.S.  Mexican demand is the same as it was previously; however, the 
Mexican supply curve is now changed to the counterfactual scenario where the Mexican 
quantity supplied is reduced by twenty percent.  The inverse Mexican demand curve 
remains the same; however, the inverse Mexican supply curve is now multiplied by β, 
where β=0.8 to represent a twenty percent decline in the quantity supplied: 
                  Qd=
𝑃𝐷
𝑀𝑋−𝑎
𝑏
    
              Qs = 𝛽 ∗ [
𝑃𝑠
𝑀𝑋−𝑐
𝑑
]                           (45) 
Now, substituting (45) into (44) and knowing that the prices must be equal yields: 
                     𝐸𝑆𝑀𝑋
′ = 𝛽 ∗ (
𝑃𝑠
𝑀𝑋−𝑐
𝑑
) − (
𝑃−𝑎
𝑏
)                              (46) 
Solving for P provides: 
           𝑃 =
𝛽𝑏𝑐−𝑎𝑑
𝛽𝑏−𝑑
+
𝑏𝑑
𝛽𝑏−𝑑
𝑋                  (47) 
Equation (47) is the Mexican counterfactual excess supply curve; however, similar to the 
previous derivation, the TRQ countries also export sugar into the U.S., so equation (47) 
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must be adjusted.  Let v= 
𝛽𝑏𝑐−𝑎𝑑
𝛽𝑏−𝑑
 and w= 
𝑏𝑑
𝛽𝑏−𝑑
.  Equation (47) can be written as the 
following: 
  𝑃 = 𝑣 + 𝑤𝑋        (48) 
Similar to the pervious derivation, equation (49) illustrates how the excess supply curve 
shifts to the right to account for the quantity of sugar the TRQ countries export into the 
U.S.: 
𝑃 = 𝑣 + 𝑤(𝑋 − 𝑋𝑇𝑅𝑄)       (49) 
where XTRQ is the quantity of sugar the TRQ countries export into the U.S.  Equation (50) 
yields the counterfactual excess supply curve facing the U.S., ES’ : 
𝑃 = 𝑣 − 𝑤𝑋𝑇𝑅𝑄 + 𝑤𝑋       (50) 
Using equation (50), the counterfactual excess supply curve facing the U.S., ES’, can be 
estimated by using the domestic Mexican supply and demand curve (Table 18) and by 
using the average of FY 2012 and FY 2013 quantity of TRQ exports (Table 17).   The 
excess supply curve facing the U.S. was estimated and for the short- and long-run and is 
in Table 25. 
Table 25 
Counterfactual Excess Supply Curve, ES’, Average of FY 2012 and FY 2013 
 Summary Result  
Short-run Excess Supply  ES’=25.08+.00039X 
 U.S. & Mexican Price (𝑃2
′) $750.69 
 Exports to U.S. 1,860,530 
Long-run Excess Supply ES’=326.10+0.00019X 
 U.S. & Mexican Price (𝑃2
′) $658.09 
 Exports to U.S. 1,765,910 
 
Now that the counterfactual excess supply curve facing the U.S. is derived (Table 25), it 
is set equal to the U.S. excess demand curve (Table 18) to arrive at the U.S. and Mexican 
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price of sugar and the quantity of sugar exported into the U.S. under the counterfactual 
scenario.  Table 25 also displays the Mexican and U.S. price that would exist under the 
counterfactual scenario as well as the quantity of sugar exported to the U.S.  The actual 
amount of sugar exported into the U.S over the average of FY 2012 and FY 2013 was 
2,736,000 MTRV.  In the counterfactual scenario, over the average of FY 2012 and FY 
2013, the quantity of sugar exported into the U.S. would decrease by 875,000 MTRV 
(short-run) and by 971,000 MTRV (long-run).  
Calculating Mexican welfare.  The parameters needed to calculate Mexican 
welfare under the counterfactual scenario are derived above.  From Figure 21, Mexican 
consumer surplus under the counterfactual scenario is now area A: 
CSMX=1/2*[(P1-𝑃2
′)*Q2]                                                (51) 
Producer surplus under the counterfactual scenario is: 
  PSMX=1/2*[(𝑃2
′ − 𝑃4)*Q3]-1/2*[(0-𝑃4)*Q1]                         (52) 
The change in Mexican producer and consumer surplus appears in Table 26.
  
 
9
8
 
Table 26 
Change in Mexican Consumer and Producer Surplus (Millions of Dollars) 
Ave. FY 2012 PS  PS Net CS CS Net ∆ Total Welfare 
& FY 2013 Actual Counterfactual1 Loss Actual Counterfactual1 Loss (∆CS+∆PS) 
Short-run 3,679 1,863 1,816 12,011 11,145 866 -2,682 
Long-run 3,520 3,219 301 4,337 3,980 357 -658 
1Counterfactual refers to the scenario where the quantity of sugar Mexico produces is reduced by twenty percent.
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As displayed by Table 26, Mexican producer surplus is decreased by $1.82 billion (short-
run) and $301 million (long-run) when the Mexican quantity supplied is decreased by 
twenty percent.  Consumer surplus is decreased by $866 million (short-run) and $357 
million (long-run) when the Mexican quantity supplied is decreased by twenty percent.  
Assuming the government does not use any taxpayer money to operate twenty percent of 
the Mexican sugar industry, total Mexican welfare, over the average of FY 2012 and FY 
2013, would decrease by $2.68 billion (short-run) and $658 million (long-run) if the 
Mexican government did not own twenty percent of the Mexican sugar industry. 
Counterfactual U.S. Producer Surplus: Mexican Supply Reduced   
When Mexico’s production is reduced by twenty percent, the U.S. price of sugar 
increases from P2 to 𝑃2
′ (Figure 22).   Accordingly, U.S. producer surplus increases from 
area A to AB.  To calculate U.S. producer surplus, the previous equation (30) is used and 
the results appear in Table 27.  If the Mexican government did not own twenty percent of 
the Mexican sugar industry, U.S. producer surplus would have increased by $1.28 billion 
(short-run) and $563 million (long-run).
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Figure 22.  Average FY 2012 and FY 2013 U.S. Producer Surplus: Mexico Quantity Supplied Reduced   
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Table 27 
Change in U.S. Producer Surplus (Millions of Dollars) 
Ave. FY 2012 &   Net 
& FY 2013 Actual Counterfactual1 Increase 
Short-run 4,090 5,365 1,275 
Long-run 3,226 3,789 563 
1Counterfactual refers to the scenario where Mexican production is reduced by twenty 
percent. 
 
Impact of Mexican Subsidies Conclusion 
This chapter examined how Mexican government ownership of twenty percent of the 
sugar industry in Mexico impacts Mexican welfare and U.S. producer surplus.  Mexican 
total welfare would decrease by $2.68 billion (short-run) and $658 million (long-run) if 
the Mexican government did not own twenty percent of the Mexican sugar industry 
(assuming private sugar producers do not enter the market).  However, this analysis does 
not take into consideration how much Mexican government ownership of twenty percent 
of the Mexican sugar industry costs Mexican taxpayers.  Furthermore, it was graphically 
illustrated that scenarios can exist where Mexican welfare is decreased by the Mexican 
government owning twenty percent of the Mexican sugar industry (Figure 21).  U.S. 
producers would have gained $1.28 billion (short-run) and $568 million (long-run) if the 
Mexican government did not own twenty percent of the Mexican sugar industry. 
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Chapter 7 
 
U.S. Consumers’ Valuation of Imported and Genetically Modified Sugar: The Role 
of Consequentiality 
 
Current U.S. sugar policy, as outlined by the 2008 Farm Bill, dictates which countries are 
allowed to import sugar into the U.S. tariff free and in what quantities (USDA Economic 
Research Service, 2013a).  One of the most controversial issues in the 2013 Farm Bill, 
also known as the Federal Agriculture Reform and Risk Management Act of 2013, is 
whether to continue the 2008 Farm Bill sugar program provisions such as tariff rate 
quotes which regulate foreign imports of sugar into the U.S. (e.g., Coalition for Sugar 
Reform, 2013a; Nixon, 2013; Farm Futures, 2013).  Moreover, in defense of U.S. sugar 
policy’s role in supporting domestic sugar production by limiting foreign imports of 
sugar into the U.S., sugar lobbyist groups such as the American Sugar Alliance claim that 
consumers in the U.S. prefer domestically produced sugar (American Sugar Alliance, 
2013b).  Therefore, one objective of this research is to determine if consumers in the U.S. 
are, in fact, willing to pay more for sugar originating in the U.S.  This objective is 
achieved by determining consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for sugar produced from 
the U.S. and from foreign countries which currently export sugar into the U.S.   
The second objective of this research is to examine the impact of possible 
mandatory genetically modified (GM) labeling laws on the U.S. sugar market. Mandatory 
GM labeling has recently been proposed in several states, at the federal level of 
government, and adopted by several companies (e.g., Whole Foods, Ben and Jerry’s, 
Chipotle) (see Senauer (2013) for a review).  Examining mandatory GM labeling of sugar 
has many industry specific implications considering that sugar consumed in the U.S. 
originates from both GM sugarbeet seeds and non-GM sugarcane seeds.  In terms of 
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domestic sugar production, approximately half of U.S. sugar is produced from GM 
sugarbeet seeds and the other half is produced from non-GM sugarcane seeds (USDA 
Economic Research Service, 2013b; USDA Economic Research Service, 2013c).  
However, sugarcane is also expected to be grown using GM technology in the near future 
(GMO Compass, 2013).  In terms of foreign sugar, GM sugar consumed in the U.S. 
originates from GM sugarbeets grown in Canada while non-GM sugar consumed in the 
U.S. originates from non-GM sugarcane seeds grown in Mexico, Brazil, the Philippines, 
the Dominican Republic and other sugarcane producing countries.  If GM labeling laws 
become mandatory, it is likely that this would have a negative impact on sugar produced 
from GM sugarbeet seeds while being beneficial to sugarcane producers who currently do 
not use GM seed technology.   
This research will determine consumers’ preferences and WTP for domestic and 
imported sugar (e.g., country of origin (COO) labeled) and GM labeled sugar.  To 
thoroughly examine consumers’ preferences and WTP for COO and GM labeled sugar, 
two sugar containing products are tested: four pound bags of sugar and twenty-ounce soft 
drinks sweetened with sugar23.  This has the advantage of looking at product (bag of 
sugar) versus ingredient (sugar in soft drinks) labeling. Specifically, this research aims to: 
(1) determine consumers’ preferences and WTP for four pound bags of sugar labeled 
with different COO and GM information and (2) determine how COO and GM labeled 
sugar impacts consumers’ preferences and WTP for twenty-ounce soft drinks sweetened 
with sugar.  Given that sugar is currently not labeled in the marketplace with COO or GM 
information, GM and COO labeled sugar is essentially a nonmarket good. Therefore, a 
                                                 
23 While many soft drinks in the U.S. are sweetened with HFCS, there still are several soft drinks 
sweetened with sugar as the primary ingredient. 
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stated preference survey is used to elicit consumers’ preferences. To help control for 
possible hypothetical bias associated with stated preferences surveys, this research 
examines the role of consequentiality on consumers’ preferences and WTP for COO and 
GM labeled sugar.     
This research is of interest to policy makers, food manufacturers and the 
sweetener industry.  It is vital for policy makers to be informed about consumer 
preferences as they consider sugar legislation in the 2013 Farm Bill.  Results will provide 
a detailed assessment of consumers’ WTP for sugar from the foreign countries from 
which the U.S. currently imports sugar.  These estimates will be useful in understanding 
if U.S. consumers dislike sugar from foreign countries and prefer U.S. sugar, or are 
indifferent regarding the consumption of foreign sugar.  If consumers dislike sugar from 
foreign countries in addition to preferring U.S. sugar, this provides stronger evidence in 
support of sugar lobbyists’ claim that consumers prefer domestically produced sugar.  
Determining if consumers in the U.S. prefer domestically produced sugar is also 
important for food manufacturers and the sugar industry.  If consumers are willing to pay 
more for sugar produced in the U.S., this indicates that the U.S. sugar industry and food 
manufacturers can receive a premium for sugar containing products if they voluntarily 
label them as originating in the U.S.  
Determining consumers’ preferences and WTP for GM labeled sugar is also 
important for both food manufacturers and the sugar industry.  If consumers are willing 
to pay more for non-GM sugar, food manufacturers will prefer to use non-GM sugarcane 
produced sugar in their products instead of GM sugarbeet sugar.  Understanding how 
negatively consumers perceive GM sugar is critical for sugarbeet growers because if GM 
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labeling becomes mandatory, they may have an incentive to stop growing GM seeds and 
instead begin growing non-GM sugarbeet seeds again. Therefore, this research is also 
significant to sugarbeet seed companies and GM technology companies. 
This study also contributes to the literature by revisiting the role of 
consequentiality on consumers’ preferences in stated preference surveys to (1) control for 
hypothetical bias associated with stated preference surveys, (2) examine the robustness of 
the findings of past studies on consequentiality and (3) determine the role of 
consequentiality in consumers’ preferences for sugar containing products that are 
impacted by food policy and food labeling laws. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  The next section presents a 
review of relevant literature. Then the U.S. sugar market is discussed. This is followed by 
the methodological background.  Next the empirical results are presented and the last 
section concludes. 
Literature Review 
 
COO and GM labeling.  Several researchers have examined U.S. consumers’ 
WTP for COO labeled food products (e.g., Tonsor, Schroeder, & Lusk, 2013; Lim, Hu, 
Maynard, & Goddard, 2013; Ehmke, Lusk, & Tyner, 2008; Gao & Schroeder, 2009; 
Loureiro & Umberger, 2007; Loureiro & Umberger, 2005; Mabiso, Sterns, House, & 
Wysocki, 2005) and for GM labeled food products (e.g., Dannenberg, Scatasta, & Sturm, 
2011; Ehmke et al., 2008; Hu, Veeman, & Adamowicz, 2005; Lusk, Jamal, Kurlander, 
Roucan, & Taulman, 2005)24.   With the exception of Lim et al. (2013) and Ehmke et al. 
(2008), few COO labeling research articles have analyzed U.S. consumers’ WTP for food 
                                                 
24 Lusk et al. (2005) provides a meta-analysis of GM labeling articles. 
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products originating from countries other than the U.S. Expanding the research by Lim et 
al. (2013) and Ehmke et al. (2008), this research examines U.S. consumers’ preferences 
and WTP for sugar originating from the U.S. as well as from other developed countries 
(e.g., Canada) and developing countries (e.g., the Philippines, Mexico).  Similar to Lim et 
al. (2013), the countries included in this analysis are representative of the actual top 
exporters of sugar into the U.S.  
Previous research regarding COO labeling for food products has focused 
primarily on determining the impact of COO labeling if an entire product originates from 
a particular country (e.g., Lim et al., 2013; Menapace, Colson, Grebitus, & Facendola, 
2010; Grebitus, Menapace, & Bruhn, 2011; Gao & Schroeder, 2009; Ehmke et al., 2008; 
Loureiro & Umberger, 2007; Carter, Krissoff, & Zwane, 2006; Mabiso et al., 2005; 
Loureiro & Umberger, 2005; Alfnes & Rickertsen, 2003).  This research extends 
previous research by also examining consumers’ preferences and WTP for soft drinks 
sweetened with sugar if only sugar is labeled as originating in a particular country.  If 
ingredient COO labeling increases consumers’ utility, this is important information for 
producers and food manufacturers to utilize in order to design efficient and effective 
marketing strategies. 
In terms of GM labeling recent research has focused on consumers’ WTP for 
voluntary (e.g., “not GM”) versus mandatory (e.g., “GM”) labeling of food products 
(e.g., Liaukonyte, Streletskaya, Kaiser, & Rickard, 2013; Dannenberg et al., 2011; Hu et 
al., 2005).  For example, Hu et al. (2005) examined Canadian consumers’ WTP for 
voluntary versus mandatory GM labeling of bread.  The authors concluded that 
participants’ utility was significantly decreased if bread was labeled under the mandatory 
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GM policy while voluntary labeling of bread as “not GM” did not significantly increase 
consumers’ utility.  Thus, an asymmetric effect of gains and losses was associated with 
mandatory versus voluntary labeling policies.  According to Hu et al. (2005), this effect 
can be explained with Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory which states that 
consumers do not value gains and losses symmetrically.  
A study from Germany extended the research by Hu et al. (2005) using 
experimental auctions to analyze soybean oil and chocolate bars labeled under voluntary 
(e.g., Non-GM), mandatory (e.g., GM) as well as both voluntary and mandatory labeling 
options, the combined option allowing for mandatory labeling of “GM,” voluntary 
labeling of “Non GM” and a no label choice (Dannenberg et al., 2011).  Results regarding 
the voluntary and mandatory GM options are similar to the results of Hu et al. (2005).  
With regards to the combined GM labeling option that allows for both mandatory and 
voluntary GM labeling, the results suggest that the introduction of the voluntary “Non 
GM” label decreases consumers’ utility associated with the no label option.  Hence, 
negative externalities exist for producers who do not voluntarily label their product as 
“Non GM.”  
This research will estimate consumers’ WTP for sugar and soft drinks sweetened 
with sugar when the sugar is labeled as “GM,” “not GM,” and containing either a “GM” 
or a “not GM” label. This extends research by Hu et al. (2005) and Dannenberg et al. 
(2011) which used a Canadian and German population, respectively, by analyzing the 
effects of different GM labeling scenarios for a U.S. population. Hu et al. (2005) 
investigated how GM labels for ingredients which comprise a product impact consumers’ 
utility while Dannenberg et al. (2011) examined how labeling an entire product with a 
 108 
 
GM label impacts consumers’ utility.  Similarly, this research will analyze (1) how 
labeling a four pound bag of sugar under different GM labeling scenarios impacts 
consumers’ preferences and WTP for sugar and (2) how labeling sugar in soft drinks 
under different GM labeling scenarios impacts consumers’ WTP for soft drinks.   
Hypothetical bias – The role of consequentiality.  Stated preference surveys are 
commonly used to analyze consumers’ preferences for a wide range of items.  Most 
notably, stated preference surveys are used to elicit consumers’ preferences for 
nonmarket goods given the lack of an existing market to observe.  One disadvantage of 
stated preference surveys is the possible presence of hypothetical bias.   
Hypothetical bias is the tendency of participants in stated preference surveys to 
indicate a higher WTP than they would in a financially binding marketplace situation. Its 
existence has been demonstrated in a number of studies (for meta-analyses see List & 
Gallet, 2001; Little & Berrens, 2004; Murphy, Allen, Stevens, & Weatherhead, 2005).  
Accordingly, numerous studies have focused on determining ways to elicit survey 
participants’ true preferences by minimizing the problems (i.e., hypothetical bias) 
associated with stated preference surveys (e.g., Cummings & Taylor, 1998; Cummings & 
Taylor, 1999; Landry & List, 2007; Alfnes, Yue, & Jensen, 2010; Tonsor & Shupp, 2011; 
Silvia, Nayga, Campbell, & Park, 2011; Lusk & Norwood, 2009a; Vossler, Doyon, & 
Rondeau, 2012).  Specifically, cheap talk (e.g., Tonsor & Shupp, 2011; Silva et al., 2011; 
Landry & List, 2007; Cummings & Taylor, 1999), real talk (e.g., Alfnes et al., 2010), 
inferred valuation (Lusk & Norwood, 2009a; Lusk & Norwood, 2009b), oath taking 
(Jacquemet, Joule, Luchini, & Shogren, 2013), honesty priming (De Magistris, Gracia, & 
Nayga, 2013) and consequentiality (e.g., Bulte, Gerking, List, & De Zeeuw, 2005; 
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Landry & List, 2007; Vossler et al., 2012) are among the different approaches that have 
been shown to provide possible corrections to the biases associated with stated preference 
surveys. 
Carson and Groves (2007) stated that for a survey to be termed consequential it 
has to meet two conditions which Herriges, Kling, Liu, and Tobias (2010) termed policy 
consequentiality and payment consequentiality.  For the payment consequentiality 
condition to hold, “participants must perceive that there is some probability that they 
have to pay” (Herriges et al., 2010, pg. 67).  For the policy consequentiality condition to 
hold, participants completing the survey must believe that their survey results may impact 
an outcome they care about (Herriges et al., 2010).  This paper will focus on the role of 
policy consequentiality and its impact on stated preference surveys.   
 Given GM and COO labeling issues are very political in nature (i.e., U.S. sugar 
policy regulates foreign imports of sugar into the U.S. and GM labeling laws not fully 
enforced or mandated as of yet), it is of interest to determine consumers’ preferences and 
WTP for COO and GM labeled sugar and simultaneously examine the role policy 
consequentiality plays in these estimates25.  To examine the role of consequentiality, this 
research will include analyses similar to Bulte et al. (2005) and Vossler et al. (2012). 
Using a field experiment with three real payment treatments and one stated 
preference treatment (i.e., not financially binding), Vossler et al. (2012) determined 
consumers’ WTP for different tree row planting scenarios. Their results demonstrated 
that WTP estimates for participants who considered their responses to be consequential 
(i.e., having more than a weak chance of influencing policy) in the stated preference 
                                                 
25 Similar to Herriges et al. (2010) throughout the remainder of this paper, the term consequentiality will be 
used to refer to the idea of policy consequentiality. 
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condition were statistically the same as participants’ WTP estimates in the real payment 
treatments.  Vossler et al. (2012) determined that by restricting analysis to observations 
from participants who viewed their responses as at least weakly consequential created a 
stated preference survey with results that were representative of participants’ true 
preferences.  Vossler et al. (2012) also determined a trend of decreased WTP estimates 
for participants as they viewed their responses as more consequential.  Similar to Vossler 
et al. (2012), this research will examine how participants’ degree of consequentiality (i.e., 
how consequential they viewed their survey results to be) influences their preferences for 
COO and GM labeled sugar as well as determine consumers’ preferences and WTP for 
COO and GM labeled sugar using only participants who viewed their decisions as at least 
weakly consequential.   
Bulte et al. (2005) conducted a survey in the Netherlands to determine 
participants’ WTP to ameliorate problems with the seal population.  Bulte et al. (2005) 
included three different survey conditions to determine participants’ WTP to protect 
seals. The first treatment was a hypothetical treatment, the second treatment was 
hypothetical with a cheap talk script and the third treatment was a consequentiality 
treatment which included a script stating that results of the study would be made 
available to policy makers.  Bulte et al. (2005) found that participants stated WTP values 
using the cheap talk script and consequentiality treatment resulted in lower WTP 
estimates than in the hypothetical treatment.  Similar to Bulte et al. (2005) this research 
will compare consumers’ preferences and WTP estimates for COO and GM labeled sugar 
between a hypothetical stated preference survey (control treatment) and a hypothetical 
stated preference survey with a consequentiality treatment. 
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U.S. Sugar Market 
The U.S. is the world’s largest importer of sugar.  In 2011, about 29% of the sugar in the 
U.S. originated in foreign countries (American Sugar Alliance, 2013c; USDA Economic 
Research Service, 2013c).26  Imports of sugar are regulated by tariff-rate quotas which 
are currently issued to forty-one countries and free trade agreements (USDA Economic 
Research Service, 2013a).  As illustrated in Table 28, in 2011 the top six importers of 
sugar into the U.S. were Mexico, Brazil, the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, 
Australia and Guatemala.  Together they represented about 72% of the raw sugar that was 
imported into the U.S. in 2011 (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, 2013b).  Mexico 
alone was responsible for about 46% of the raw sugar that was imported into the U.S. in 
2011.  Annually, if there is still additional sugar needed in the U.S. by October 1, refined 
sugar may enter the market under the refined TRQ.  Canada was responsible for 
importing about 15% of the refined sugar TRQ in 2011 (USDA Foreign Agricultural 
Service, 2013b). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 Due to the U.S. Sugar Re-export Program, not all of the imported sugar is consumed domestically. 
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Table 28 
U.S. Sugar Imports in 2011 (Metric Tons) 
 
Country Sugar 
Unrestricted Raw Sugar under NAFTA  
   Mexico 1,549,045 
Unrestricted Refined Sugar under NAFTA  
   Canada 35,300 
Raw Sugar TRQ   
   Brazil 250,589 
   Philippines 221,808 
   Dominican Republic 205,099 
   Australia 143,441 
   Guatemala 82,954 
 
In terms of GM labeling, sugar consumed in the U.S. originates from both GM 
sugarbeet seeds and non-GM sugarcane seeds.  Sugar produced domestically in the U.S. 
originates from both sugarbeets and sugarcane; 54% of sugar in the U.S. originates from 
sugarbeets and 46% of sugar in the U.S. comes from sugarcane (USDA Economic 
Research Service, 2013b; USDA Economic Research Service, 2013c)27.  In 2010, in the 
U.S., 95% of the sugarbeets grown were planted using GM seed technology while U.S. 
sugarcane is currently not being grown using GM seeds (USDA Economic Research 
Service, 2013b).  However, U.S. sugarcane is expected to be grown using GM technology 
in the near future (GMO Compass, 2013).  GM sugar consumed in the U.S. also 
originates from GM sugarbeets grown in Canada.  Meanwhile, foreign originating non-
GM sugar is produced from non-GM sugarcane seeds grown in Mexico, Brazil, the 
Philippines, the Dominican Republic and other sugarcane producing countries.  
                                                 
27 Sugarbeets are mostly grown in the Northern U.S., and sugarcane is mostly grown in the Southern U.S.  
Sugarbeets are grown in Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, Wyoming, 
California, Idaho, Oregon and Washington (USDA Economic Research Service, 2013c).  Sugarcane is 
grown in Florida, Louisiana, Texas and Hawaii (USDA Economic Research Service, 2013b). 
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Methodological Background 
Experimental design.  To determine consumers’ preferences and WTP for bags 
of sugar and soft drinks made with COO and GM labeled sugar, two online experiments 
were conducted.  More details regarding the experimental design, instructions, choice 
experiments and questionnaire can be found in Appendix A.  First, participants completed 
choice experiments. Then participants had to answer a question determining their belief 
as to how consequential their answers are in the choice experiments. Similar to Vossler et 
al. (2012) the question was phrased “To what extent do you believe your answers will be 
taken into consideration by public authorities?” Answers ranged on a scale from 1=not at 
all to 6= very much. Finally, socio-demographic questions were asked.  Additionally, in 
Experiment 2, participants were provided with consequentiality information before the 
choice experiments in order to help to control for hypothetical bias.   Similarly, Bulte et 
al. (2005) provided participants with consequentiality information prior to their 
experiment regarding seal population improvement to help to control for hypothetical 
bias28.  In Experiment 2, participants received the following consequentiality 
information prior to the choice experiments: 
IMPORTANT: 
 Your responses will be used to assist policy makers in determining genetically 
modified labeling practices and in determining how much foreign sugar should 
enter into the U.S. 
 Based on your preferences, policy makers will determine whether foreign sugar 
should be able to enter into the U.S. and at what rate.  
 Your decisions will also help policy makers determine if genetically modified 
foods should be labeled. 
                                                 
28 Bulte et al.’s (2005) consequentiality information was the following, “Note: the results of this study will 
be made available to policy makers, and could serve as a guide for future decisions with respect to taxation 
for this purpose.  It is important that you think before answering the question.”  
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In the following, Experiment 1 is also referred to as the control group and Experiment 2 
is referred to as the consequentiality information group.    
Choice experiments.  In choice experiments, participants make repeated choices 
between product alternatives which have different attribute labels.  Participants are asked 
to choose which product they prefer between two products containing different attribute 
labels; additionally, participants may choose to select none of the products.  In this choice 
experiment, the two products examined in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 were: (1) four 
pound bags of sugar and (2) twenty-ounce soft drinks sweetened with sugar.  The product 
attributes labels varied by price, COO labels, and GM labels. Each participant made six 
choices for bagged sugar and six choices for soft drinks. The software NGENE was used 
to generate an efficient random parameter panel design with two blocks and six choice 
sets in each block (twelve choice sets in total) for both the bags of sugar and soft drinks 
(Street & Burgess 2007).  A block design was used to avoid possible fatigue effects that 
participants may experience from completing all twelve choice sets (Savage & Waldman 
2008).  In the survey the order of the choice sets was randomized to lessen ordering 
effects (Loureiro & Umberger, 2007).   
Table 29 illustrates the choice set attribute levels for COO labels, GM labels, and 
price.  The attribute levels for COO are no label, U.S., Canada, Mexico, Brazil and the 
Philippines.  The different countries were chosen based on the volume of sugar they 
import into the U.S. (see Table 28).  While Canada is not one of the largest exporters of 
sugar into the U.S., it is of interest in this analysis because it is a developed country.  
Hence, this allows for a comparison of WTP for sugar from developing countries (e.g., 
 115 
 
Mexico, Brazil, Philippines) versus developed countries (e.g., U.S. and Canada) in 
addition to sugar from domestic versus foreign countries.   
Table 29 
 
Bag of Sugar Attributes and Attribute Levels of the Choice Experiment 
 
 Four Pound Bag of Sugar 20 Ounce Soft Drink 
Attributes Attribute Levels Attribute Levels 
Country of Origin None None 
 U.S. U.S. 
 Canada Canada 
 Mexico Mexico 
 Brazil Brazil 
 The Philippines The Philippines 
Genetically Modified None None 
 Sugar is Genetically Modified Sugar is Genetically Modified 
 Not Genetically Modified Not Genetically Modified 
Price $2.24 $1.53 
 $2.71  $1.67 
  $3.17  $1.80 
 
Following Dannenberg et al. (2011), the attribute levels for GM are: (1) sugar is 
genetically modified, (2) not genetically modified, and (3) none.  Similar to Grebitus et 
al. (2013) price attribute levels were determined through market observation of local 
supermarkets’ actual prices for twenty ounce soft drinks and four pound bag of sugar29.  
Figure 23 provides an example of a choice set for the four pound bag of sugar and Figure 
24 provides an example of a choice set for the twenty ounce soft drink sweetened with 
                                                 
29 Prices of four pound bags of sugar and twenty-ounce soft drinks from several supermarkets were 
compiled.  These prices were then averaged to arrive at the mean sugar and soft drink price used in the 
choice experiments. Next standard deviations were taken from the price series and the high and low prices 
in the choice set were computed by adding and subtracting one standard deviation from the mean price, 
respectively. 
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sugar.30  Appendix A provides examples of the actual Qualtrics survey that participants 
completed31. 
 Four Pound Bag of 
Sugar  
 
Alternative A 
Four Pound Bag of 
Sugar  
 
Alternative B 
Alternative C 
Price  $2.71 $3.17  
None of these Country of Origin  Sugar originated in the 
Philippines 
Sugar originated in the 
U.S. 
GM label  Not genetically 
modified 
Sugar is genetically 
modified 
I would choose: A___ B___ C___ 
Figure 23.  Example of Choice Set: Four Pound Bag of Sugar 
 
 20 Ounce Soft Drink 
  
Alternative A 
20 Ounce Soft Drink 
  
Alternative B 
Alternative C 
Price  $1.53 $1.67  
None of these Country of Origin Sugar originated in the U.S. Sugar originated in Mexico 
GM label  Sugar is genetically modified None 
I would choose: A___ B___ C___ 
Figure 24.  Example of Choice Set: Twenty-Ounce Soft Drink 
Model estimation-Random parameters logit model.  A random parameters 
logit model (RPL) was used to estimate consumers’ utility and WTP for sugar and soft 
drinks labeled with different GM and COO information.  The RPL model is superior to 
the standard logit model since it allows for correlation in unobserved factors over time, 
                                                 
30 Please note again that the choice sets in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 are identical. The only 
difference in the experiments is that participants in Experiment 2 received a consequentiality information 
prior to choice set completion. 
31 Qualtrics is online software used to create surveys which can be distributed to participants online. 
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random taste variation, and unrestricted substitution patterns (Train 2003; Revelt & Train 
1998).  It is likely that unobserved heterogeneity is present in consumers’ preferences for 
sugar and soft drinks labeled with different GM and COO labeling information which 
makes estimating an RPL model appropriate.   
To determine each n participant’s utility from each sugar and soft drink 
alternative, j, within the choice situation t, a linear random utility framework was utilized.  
Each participant, n (1,…,n) faces at total of t (t=1,..,6) choice situations for sugar and t 
(t=1,..,6) choice situations for sugar in soft drinks.  Following Train (2003), the utility of 
individual n from sugar or soft drink alternative j, in the choice scenario t, is denoted by  
                                                              𝑈𝑛𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑛𝑗𝑡                                      (53) 
where 𝑥𝑛𝑗𝑡 are observed variables that relate to alternative j and decision maker n for 
choice scenario t, 𝛽𝑛 is a vector of coefficients of these variables for individual n which 
represent the individuals’ tastes and 𝜀𝑛𝑗𝑡 is a random error term that is iid extreme value.  
The coefficients vary over individuals in the population with density f (β).  The density,   
f (β), is a function of the parameters θ which represent the mean and covariance for the 
β’s in the population when β is normally distributed (Revelt & Train, 1999).  Expanding 
equation (53) to incorporate the COO and GM labeled attributes for sugar and sugar in 
soft drinks, the following represents the utility of individual n from sugar or soft drink 
alternative j in choice scenario t: 
    𝑈𝑛𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑀𝑛𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑁𝐺𝑀𝑛𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐴𝑁𝑛𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑈𝑆𝑛𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑛𝑗𝑡 + 
                                                𝛽6𝑃𝐻𝐼𝐿𝑛𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑅𝐴𝑍𝑛𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑛𝑗𝑡                                   (54) 
where p represents the price of sugar or soft drink alternative j, GM represents the 
dummy variable equal to one if sugar or soft drink alternative j was labeled as “GM” and 
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zero otherwise, NGM represents the dummy variable for “Not GM,” and the variables 
CAN, US, MEX, PHIL and BRAZ represent the dummy variables for sugar originating in 
Canada, the U.S., Mexico, the Philippines and Brazil, respectively. 
 Following from equation (53) and Train (2003), βn is unknown and the 
unconditional choice probability of individual n’s choice of alternative j in choice set t for 
both the bags of sugar and soft drinks is the following: 
                                                    𝑃𝑛𝑖 = ∫ (
𝑒
𝛽𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑗𝑡
∑ 𝑒
𝛽𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑗𝑡
𝑗
) 𝑓(𝛽)𝑑𝛽                                     (55)                                                                                                    
where j is the jth choice for respondent n in choice set t and the variables are defined the 
same as in equation (54).  Pni is the probability of the individual’s sequences of choices 
conditional on the parameters of the population distribution f (β) and is referred to as the 
mixed logit probability (Train, 2003).  The parameter estimation is obtained by 
maximizing the simulated log-likelihood function.  Following Revelt and Train (2000), 
properties of the maximum simulated likelihood estimator are given by Hajivassiliou and 
Ruud (1994). 
For all estimated models in this paper, the parameter distributions are assumed to 
be independent normal distributions. Across individuals, the price coefficient was fixed.  
The advantage of having a fixed coefficient for price is that the WTP for each non-price 
attribute has the same distribution as the attribute’s coefficient.  For this research, the 
RPL estimates were obtained using a simulated maximum likelihood using 250 Halton 
draws.  To estimate the models, the RPL code in NLogit was used.  The code is designed 
for panel data and accounts explicitly for the correlation over time in unobserved utility 
that arises when there are repeated choices by a given individual.  The panel version of 
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the RPL was used because each participant’s choices make a panel of six choices for the 
bags of sugar and soft drinks sweetened with sugar.  
From the estimated coefficients, WTP was calculated by dividing the attribute 
coefficient by the negative of the price coefficient (βk/-βp).  Next, the variance of the 
WTP estimates were calculated following Daly et al. (2012),  
                                                    (
𝛽1
𝛽2
)
2
(
𝜔11
𝛽1
2 +
𝜔22
𝛽2
2 − 2
𝜔12
𝛽1𝛽2
)                                        (56) 
where 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are the parameters of the attribute and price respectively, and 𝜔𝑖𝑗 is the 
variance  and covariance for the respective parameter estimates. 
Empirical Results  
Sample characteristics.  For both experiments, participants from the U.S. were 
recruited by a market research company and were asked to complete an online survey.  
The sample for Experiment 1 consisted of 474 participants and the sample for 
Experiment 2 consisted of 566 participants.  Table 30 provides a comparison of the socio-
demographics from participants in Experiment 1 (control group) and Experiment 2 
(consequentiality information group). There are no statistically significant differences in 
the two samples’ socio demographics.  If there are differences in participants’ preferences 
and WTP between the two samples, it is not caused by differences in the two samples’ 
socio demographics. 
The participants in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 have roughly the same male 
to female ratio as the average U.S. population.  The respondents were, on average, older 
than the U.S. sample.  Interviewees were slightly more educated than the average U.S. 
citizen.  Participants were a higher percentage white than the average of U.S. citizens and 
had a larger household size than the average U.S. household.   
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Table 30 
Socio Demographics Comparison 
 
  Control Consequentiality U.S. 
Variable Description group information group Population 
Gender % female 53.70% 50.71% 50.80%1 
  P value=0.3362 z-stat=-0.9617   
Age  54.3 53.5 37.22 
  P value=0.4245 t-stat=-0.799  
Race White 87.26% 85.94% 78.1%1 
 Hispanic 1.91% 3.20% % White 
 Native American 1.06% 0.71%  
 African American 5.94% 4.63%  
 Asian/Pacific Islander 2.76% 4.09%  
 Other 1.06% 1.42%  
  P value=0.5858 t-stat=0.5451  
Education High School  16.24% 15.55% 28.20%1  
(%) Some College 24.89% 22.97% Bachelor’s  
 Tech School Diploma 5.91% 6.01% Degree or 
 Associate's Degree 13.50% 10.25% Higher 
 Bachelor's Degree 27.00% 29.51%  
 Master's Degree 9.07% 11.66%  
 Doctoral Degree 3.16% 3.18%  
 Other 0.21% 0.88%  
  P value=0.1534 t-stat=1.4288  
Annual   Less than $10,000 5.07% 4.42% $52,762.001   
Household $10,000 to $19,000 6.55% 8.14% Average HH  
Income $20,000 to $29,999 13.11% 12.21% Income 
 $30,000 to $39,999 12.26% 12.04%  
 $40,000 to $49,999 9.51% 10.62%  
 $50,000 to $59,999 12.47% 11.15%  
 $60,000 to $69,999 9.51% 9.03%  
 $70,000 to $79,999 7.61% 9.73%  
 $80,000 to $89,999 4.65% 2.65%  
 $90,000 to $99,999 5.07% 4.25%  
 $100,000 to $149,999 10.57% 9.38%  
 $150,000 or more 3.59% 6.37%  
  P value=0.8339 t-stat=0.2098  
 1 or 2 70.89% 67.67% 2.61 
Household  3 or 4 23.42% 25.75% Average HH 
Size greater than 5 5.70% 6.93% Size 
   P value=0.2216 t-stat=-1.2501   
Note. N=474, control, N=566, consequential. 1U.S. Census Bureau, 2011 2CIA Factsheet, 2013 
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The role of consequentiality.  As described above, after completing the choice 
experiments, survey participants in both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 were questioned 
regarding their belief in consequentiality. Table 31 displays participants’ responses.  A 
one tailed t-test confirmed, participants’ mean Likert scale responses were statistically 
higher in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1.  Participants who received additional 
consequentiality information prior to choice set completion did in fact view their 
responses as significantly more likely to be consequential than the control group.  This 
suggests that providing participants with ex ante information, stating that their responses 
will be shared with policy makers, does cause participants to believe that their answers 
are more likely to be shared with public authorities. 
Table 31 
 
Belief in Consequentiality: Control versus Consequentiality Information Group 
 
 Control Group Consequentiality Information 
Likert Score* Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
1=Not at all 73 15.40 69 12.19 
2=Very Little 101 21.31 121 21.38 
3=Little 112 23.63 126 22.26 
4=Somewhat 137 28.90 176 31.10 
5=Much 36 7.59 40 7.07 
6=Very Much 15 3.16 34 6.01 
Total 474 100.00 566 100.00 
*Likert score mean of the control=3.015; Likert score of the consequentiality information 
group=3.175. Using a one-tailed t-test, the consequentiality information group mean was 
statistically significantly larger than the control group mean at the 5% level. (On a scale from 
1=not at all to 6= very much, “To what extent do you believe your answers will be taken into 
consideration by public authorities?”)   
 
Experiment 1 – Control group.  In the following section, a series of three 
models is presented which were all estimated using Experiment 1 participants. Model 1 
presents the results of the RPL model estimated for the four pound bags of sugar and 
 122 
 
twenty-ounce soft drinks.  Next, Model 2 and Model 3 are presented to determine if 
participants who viewed their responses as consequential had different utility and WTP 
estimates for COO and GM labeling of sugar and sugar in soft drinks.  Model 2 and 
Model 3 were estimated following Vossler et al. (2012).  Specifically in Model 2, the 
variable consequential is defined as participants’ responses to the question, “To what 
extent do you believe your answers will be taken into consideration by public 
authorities?”  To develop Model 2, the variable consequential was interacted with the 
COO and GM labeling.  In Model 3, only observations from those participants who 
viewed their responses as being at least somewhat consequential (i.e., Likert scores 
greater than 3 for the question “To what extent do you believe your answers will be taken 
into consideration by public authorities?”) are included. When Vossler et al. (2012) used 
only participants who viewed their choices as at least weakly consequential (Likert scores 
greater than 3) they were unable to reject equality of their stated preference survey with 
their non-hypothetical surveys.  This result indicated that hypothetical bias was not 
present in their stated preference survey when they restricted participants to only those 
who viewed their responses as at least weakly consequential.  By using only participants 
who view their decisions as at least weakly consequential, it is hypothesized that this will 
provide estimates representative of participants’ true preferences.   
Results Model I.  As illustrated by Table 32, price has a significant negative 
effect on participants’ utility for both bags of sugar and soft drinks.  For both bags of 
sugar and soft drinks, the effect of labeling sugar as “GM” had a statistically significant 
negative effect on product choice.  Meanwhile, labeling sugar as “not GM” for both the 
bags of sugar and soft drinks had a statistically significant positive effect on consumers’ 
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utility.  Labeling bags of sugar and sugar in soft drinks as originating from either the U.S. 
or Canada had positive significant effects on individuals’ utility.  Labeling sugar bags and 
sugar in soft drinks as originating from either the Philippines or Mexico resulted in 
significant negative impacts on consumers’ utility.  When sugar in soft drinks was labeled 
as originating in Brazil, this also had a significant negative effect on consumers’ utility.  
Bags of sugar labeled as originating in Brazil did not have a statistically significant 
impact on individuals’ utility.  Table 32 also displays that the standard deviation 
coefficients are significant in many cases. This suggests that there is, in fact, preference 
heterogeneity among participants for sugar and soft drinks labeled with different COO 
and GM information.  
Table 32 also shows participants’ marginal WTP estimates for COO and GM 
labeling for bags of sugar and sugar in soft drinks.  For bags of sugar and soft drinks, 
consumers’ WTP estimates were negative and statistically significant for “GM” labeled 
sugar.  For bags of sugars and soft drinks, participants’ WTP estimates were positive and 
statistically significant for sugar labeled “Not GM” and originating from the U.S.  
Consumers’ WTP estimates were significant and positive for bags of sugar labeled as 
originating from Canada. However, consumers’ WTP for soft drinks sweetened with 
sugar originating from Canada was not statistically significant.  Individuals’ marginal 
WTP estimates were negative and significant for sugar labeled as originating in Mexico 
and the Philippines.  Individuals’ WTP for sugar originating from Brazil was not 
statistically significant while consumers’ WTP for soft drinks originating from Brazil was 
negative and significant.  The most negatively perceived label was “GM” with 
consumers’ WTP being negative $1.93 for bags of sugar and negative $0.70 for soft 
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drinks.  The most positively perceived label was “U.S.,” with a premium of $1.33 for 
bags of sugar and $0.36 for soft drinks.     
Table 32 
Model 1 Results: Control Group 
 
 Bag of Bag of  Soft Drink Soft Drink 
 Sugar Sugar WTP  WTP 
Mean Estimates     
Price -1.877***  -6.793***  
GM -3.621*** -$1.93*** -4.771*** -$0.70*** 
Not GM 1.639*** $0.87*** 0.861*** $0.13*** 
Canada 1.499*** $0.80*** 0.548* $0.08 
U.S. 2.496*** $1.33*** 2.431*** $0.36*** 
Mexico -0.714** -$0.38** -1.914*** -$0.28*** 
Philippines -0.857** -$0.46*** -2.051*** -$0.30*** 
Brazil -0.239 -$0.13 -0.934*** -$0.14*** 
None -5.268***  -10.993***  
S. D. of Estimates     
GM 4.693***  4.936***  
Not GM 1.416***  1.181***  
Canada 1.324***  1.419***  
U.S. 3.610***  2.811***  
Mexico 1.611***  0.506  
Philippines 1.397***  1.980***  
Brazil 0.623  1.854***  
None 4.458***  5.583***  
Observations 2844  2844  
Log-likelihood(LL) -2146.5  -1958.40  
McFaddens’ R2 0.313  0.373  
Note.  ***, **, * = Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
 
Findings are consistent with previous GM literature that labeling products as 
“GM” results in negative impacts on consumers’ utility.  The result that labeling products 
as “Not GM” results in significant positive WTP estimates was not found by Hu et al. 
(2005).  Also similar to previous research, consumers’ WTP is significantly higher when 
sugar is labeled as originating from the U.S.  Participants also experienced increased 
utility if sugar originated from Canada (e.g., developed country).  This contrasts Lim et 
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al. (2013) and Ehmke et al. (2008) who found that consumers’ WTP for food products 
labeled as originating from foreign countries was negative.  Results are different from 
Lim et al. (2013) who found that U.S. participants’ WTP for steak was negative if the 
steak originated in Canada.  Importantly, whether sugar is the entire food product (e.g., 
bag of sugar) or an ingredient in a food product (e.g., sugar in a soft drink), participants’ 
WTP for GM and COO labels are still statistically different from the no label condition.   
Results Model 2 and Model 3.  Results for Model 2 and Model 3 are presented in 
Table 33.  In Model 2, the impact of consequentiality on participants’ utility and WTP for 
GM and COO labeling attributes is relatively minor.  For the bags of sugar, as 
participants viewed their responses as more consequential, they increasingly preferred 
sugar from the U.S. and sugar labeled as “Not GM” (p<0.10).  Meanwhile, as participants 
viewed their responses as more consequential they had decreased utility for soft drinks 
made with GM sugar (p<0.01) and decreased utility for soft drinks sweetened with 
Canadian (p<0.10) and Brazilian (p<0.01) sugar.  Results for the bags of sugar differ 
from Vossler et al. (2012) who found that participants had decreased WTP estimates for 
almost all attributes as participants viewed their survey decisions as more consequential.  
Model 2 results regarding soft drinks are somewhat similar to Vossler et al.’s (2012) 
results because as participants viewed their responses as more consequential, their utility 
decreased for certain attributes. 
Model 3 was estimated using only participants who viewed their decisions as at 
least somewhat consequential to determine consumers’ WTP for bags of sugar and soft 
drinks made with COO and GM labeled sugar.  Vossler et al. (2012) found that when 
using only the observations of participants who viewed their responses as at least 
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somewhat consequential, this created WTP estimates that were not statically significantly 
different from participants’ WTP estimates from the financially binding treatments (i.e., 
participants’ true preferences).  For bags of sugar, the results of Model 3 are different 
from results of Model 1 (entire sample) because if sugar is labeled as originating in 
Mexico or the Philippines, consumers’ utility and WTP estimates are no longer 
significantly negative.  For soft drinks, the results of Model 3 are similar to those of 
Model 1 in terms of significance.  Figure 25 demonstrates that there is no clear pattern of 
differences between Model 1 and Model 3 for the bags of sugar32.  For the bags of sugar, 
in terms of absolute value, WTP estimates were lower in Model 3 in the “Not GM,” 
“GM,” originating from Mexico and originating from the Philippines conditions which is 
similar to Vossler et al.’s (2012) results 33 34.  In terms of absolute value, if sugar 
originates in the U.S., Canada or Brazil, participants’ WTP estimates are actually higher 
if participants’ viewed their responses as being consequential, which is different from 
Vossler et al (2012).  As demonstrated by Figure 26, no clear pattern of differences 
between Model 1 and Model 3 exist for soft drinks.  In most cases WTP estimates are 
higher in absolute value terms if participants viewed their responses as consequential 
                                                 
32 Rather than interpreting the “none of these” option as WTP, this is the participants’ relative utility to 
price ratio of the “none of these” options. 
33 Vossler et al. (2012) did not report the results of estimating their stated preference survey using only 
observations of participants who viewed their survey responses as at least weakly consequential, so it is 
uncertain if the WTP estimates were lower than the WTP in the financially binding treatments.  However, it 
is assumed that they were lower because the WTP estimates were not statistically different from the WTP 
estimates of the financially binding treatments which were lower in most instances than the stated 
preference survey estimated using the full sample. 
34 To the authors’ knowledge, previous research has not examined the role of consequentiality in terms of 
the directional change of negative WTP estimates. It is assumed that consequentiality would result in lower 
absolute value WTP estimates which would be consistent with Vossler et al. (2012) and Bulte et al. (2005) 
results that consequentiality results in lower WTP estimates.   
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(e.g., GM, Not GM, U.S., Mexico, Brazil, “none of these” option), which is different than 
Vossler et al. (2012) results. 
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Table 33 
 
Model 2 and Model 3 Results: Control Group 
 
 Model 2  Model 3 
 Sugar Soft   Sugar Sugar  Soft  Soft Drink  
  Drink   WTP Drink WTP 
Mean Estimates        
Price -2.355*** -8.515***  -1.825***  -5.449***  
GM -4.376*** -2.956***  -2.668*** -$1.46*** -4.496*** -$0.83*** 
GM*Conseq. -0.036 -0.863***      
Not GM 0.623 1.478**  1.375*** $0.75*** 1.029** $0.19** 
Not GM*Conseq. 0.588*** -0.141      
Canada 0.989 1.754**  1.610*** $0.88*** 0.453 $0.08 
Canada*Conseq. 0.310 -0.448*      
U.S. 0.893 2.807***  2.679*** $1.47*** 2.027*** $0.37*** 
U.S.*Conseq. 0.830*** 0.054      
Mexico -1.112 -1.339  -0.113 -$0.06 -1.772*** -$0.33*** 
Mexico*Conseq. 0.071 -0.489      
Philippines -1.071 -1.023  -0.154 -$0.08 -2.981*** -$0.23*** 
Phil*Conseq. -0.001 -0.457      
Brazil -0.299 1.033  -0.312 -$0.17 -1.268** -$0.23*** 
Brazil* Conseq. 0.001 -0.920***      
None -6.459*** -12.167***  -4.714***  -9.577***  
None*Conseq. 0.081 -0.543      
S. D. of Estimates        
GM 4.111*** 3.770***  3.229***  4.599***  
GM*Conseq. 1.212*** 1.343***      
Not GM 1.377*** 1.439***  2.359***  0.860*  
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Table 33 (Cont’d) 
 
Model 2 and Model 3 Results: Control Group 
 
 Model 2  Model 3 
 Sugar Soft   Sugar Sugar  Soft  Soft Drink  
  Drink   WTP Drink WTP 
S. D. of Estimates        
Not GM*Conseq. 0.521*** 0.143      
Canada 1.730*** 2.247***  0.859  0.622  
Canada*Conseq. 0.488*** 0.017      
U.S. 0.026 0.501  2.627***  2.920***  
U.S.*Conseq. 1.470*** 1.332***      
Mexico 1.354** 1.237*  1.028  1.910***  
Mexico*Conseq. 0.489*** 0.679***      
Philippines 1.190*** 2.057***  0.517  2.085**  
Phil*Conseq. 0.944*** 0.637***      
Brazil 0.301 0.416  1.086*  2.167***  
Brazil* Conseq. 0.414*** 0.781***      
None 4.549*** 4.876***  3.891***  5.826***  
None*Conseq. 0.533*** 1.767***      
Observations 2844 2844  1128  1128  
Log-likelihood -2119.55 -1926.72  -890.229  -807.58  
McFaddens’ R2 0.322 0.383  0.282  0.348  
Note. ***, **, * = Significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level.  
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Figure 25.  Model 1 versus Model 3 WTP: Bags of Sugar  
 
 
Figure 26.  Model 1 versus Model 3 WTP: Soft drinks 
 
Summary of Results.  The results of Experiment 1 provide robust results 
regarding consumers’ utility and WTP for COO and GM labeled sugar.  Throughout all 
models, consumers’ utility and WTP for “GM” labeled bags of sugar and sugar in soft 
drinks is negative and significant.  Model 1 and Model 3 also provide significant positive 
utility and WTP estimates for bags of sugar and soft drinks made with sugar labeled as 
“Not GM” and originating from the U.S.   Throughout Model 1 and Model 3, bags of 
sugar originating in Canada were associated with positive and significant consumer 
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utility and WTP estimates.  Meanwhile, bags of sugar originating from Brazil were not 
statistically different from the no label option in either model.  In Model 1 and Model 3, 
soft drinks sweetened with sugar originating from Canada were not statistically different 
from the no label option; however, consumers had significant negative utility and WTP 
estimates for soft drinks sweetened with sugar originating from the Philippines, Mexico 
and Brazil in both models.  When using the entire sample (i.e., Model I) participants had 
negative and significant utility and WTP estimates for bags of sugar originating in 
Mexico and the Philippines.  When using participants who viewed their survey responses 
as at least somewhat consequential (Model 3), consumers’ utility and WTP for bags of 
sugar from Mexico and the Philippines was not statistically different from the no label 
option.  Overall, the role of consequentiality in Experiment 1 (i.e., Model 2 and Model 3) 
was not as universal as Vossler et al. (2012) results which found that participants who 
viewed their decisions as at least somewhat consequential had lower WTP estimates 
compared to when the full sample was estimated and found that as participants viewed 
their decisions as more consequential, participants had lower WTP estimates. 
Experiment 2 – Consequentiality information group.  Model 1, Model 2 and 
Model 3 of this paper were all re-estimated with data from Experiment 2 where the 
participants received the consequentiality information prior to completing the choice 
experiment.  Model 4 shows the impact of the consequentiality information on 
participants’ preferences and WTP for COO and GM labeled sugar.  This is similar to 
Bulte et al. (2005) who compared their strictly hypothetical control treatment experiment 
results to the results of their hypothetical experiment that included an ex ante 
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consequentiality treatment.  By estimating Model 5 and Model 6, the role of 
consequentiality within Experiment 2 will be examined. 
Results Model 4.  Table 34 displays participants’ preferences and WTP for COO 
and GM labeled sugar when having received consequentiality information.  Ultimately, 
the results of Model 1 (control group) and Model 4 (consequentiality information group) 
are very similar.  For bags of sugar, sugar originating from Brazil in Model 4 is now 
statistically significantly negative whereas it was not significant in Model 1.  
Additionally, in Model 4, if sugar originated in Canada, this is not statistically different 
from the no label option like it was in Model 1.  For soft drinks, Model 4 produced very 
similar results to that of Model 1 in terms of what was found to be significant.  The 
differences in WTP estimates between Model 1 and Model 4 for the bags of sugar and 
soft drinks are found in Figure 27 and Figure 28 respectively. 
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Table 34 
 
Model 4 Results: Consequentiality Information Group 
 
 Bag of Bag of Soft Drink Soft Drink 
 Sugar Sugar WTP  WTP 
Mean Estimates     
Price -2.153***  -7.731***  
GM -4.511*** -$1.91*** -3.858*** -$0.50*** 
Not GM 1.306*** $0.61*** 1.653*** $0.21*** 
Canada 0.361 $0.17 0.546* $0.07 
U.S. 1.354*** $0.63*** 1.296*** $0.17*** 
Mexico -1.892*** -$0.88*** -2.039*** -$0.26*** 
Philippines -2.208*** -$1.03*** -2.540*** -$0.33*** 
Brazil -1.204*** -$0.56*** -1.121*** -$0.15*** 
None -7.378***  -13.073***  
S. D. of Estimates     
GM 4.377***  4.248***  
Not GM 0.566  1.919***  
Canada 1.325***  1.307***  
U.S. 2.641***  3.926***  
Mexico 0.862*  1.841***  
Philippines 1.925***  1.754***  
Brazil 1.387***  1.660***  
None 4.213***  6.880***  
Observations 3396  3396  
Log-likelihood(LL) -2630.61  -2344.21  
McFaddens’ R2 0.295  0.372  
Note. ***, **, * = Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
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Figure 27.  Model 1 versus Model 4 WTP: Bags of Sugar  
 
 
 
Figure 28.  Model 1 versus Model 4 WTP: Soft Drinks 
 
 
As shown by Figure 27 and Figure 28, there is no distinctive pattern of differences 
between Model 1 and Model 4 for the bags of sugar or soft drinks.  This is different from 
Bulte et al. (2005) results where WTP estimates for the consequentiality information 
group were consistently lower.  Figure 27 illustrates that, for bags of sugar, WTP 
estimates for Model 4 attributes GM, Not GM, U.S. and Canada are all lower in absolute 
value terms than the WTP estimates in Model 1 which is consistent with Bulte et al. 
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(2005).  Conversely, for the Brazil, Philippines and Mexico attributes, the WTP estimates 
for Model 4 are all higher in absolute value terms than WTP estimates in Model 1 which 
contrasts Bulte et al. (2005) results.  Similarly, Figure 28 demonstrates that, for soft 
drinks, there is no clear pattern of differences between WTP estimates for Model 1 versus 
Model 4 similar to Bulte et al. (2005) results.   
In both Figure 27 and Figure 28 participants’ relative utility to price ratio for the 
“none of these” options was more negative in Model 4 than in Model 1.  This suggests 
that participants were more likely to choose a product in the choice sets in Experiment 2 
than they were in Experiment 1.  It is possible that the consequentiality information 
caused participants to be more likely to actively participate in product selection in the 
choice sets rather than carelessly choose the “none of these” options throughout the 
experiment.  Previous research has found the opposite impact with regards to the “none 
of these” options in choice sets.  For example, Lusk and Schroeder (2004) found that 
participants in a non-hypothetical choice experiment chose the “none of these” option 
more frequently than in the hypothetical choice experiment.  Lusk and Schroeder’s 
(2004) result is consistent with the idea that hypothetical bias causes participants to 
perhaps purchase items that they wouldn’t in a financially binding scenario and they are 
less likely to choose the “none of these” options.  It can also be argued that in terms of 
consequentiality, this impact may be reversed because participants are more likely to 
want to actively participate in the choice sets so policy makers have information to make 
informed policy decisions which wouldn’t be possible if participants only chose the 
“none of these” options. 
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Results Model 5 and Model 6.  To determine if there are impacts of 
consequentiality within Experiment 2, Model 5 and Model 6 were estimated and are 
presented in Table 3535.  The impact of consequentiality on participants’ utility and WTP 
for GM and COO labeling attributes is relatively minor.  For the bags of sugar, 
participants’ utility for sugar labeled from the U.S. is slightly increased as participants 
view their responses as more consequential (p<0.10).  This result is consistent with 
Model 2 in Experiment 1.  Also apparent from Model 5 is that as participants viewed 
their responses as more consequential, their utility for soft drinks sweetened with sugar 
from Brazil decreased (p<0.10).  As participants viewed their responses as more 
consequential, their utility was decreased for selecting the “none of these” options in the 
choice set for the soft drinks (p<0.01).  Thus, participants are more likely to select one of 
the labeling scenarios within the choice sets for the bags of sugar and soft drinks as they 
view their responses as more consequential.  This possibly suggests that as participants 
view their responses as more consequential, they are more likely to be engaged in the 
choice set decisions and chose an actual product rather than mindlessly selecting the 
“none of these” options throughout the scenarios- a result that is also discussed in the 
previous section. 
Model 6, is estimated using only the observations from the participants who 
viewed their responses as being consequential.  Results of Model 6 are very similar to 
Model 4.  This result is very important since it suggests that the consequentiality 
information group’s results provide robust findings when comparing the results for the 
                                                 
35 Similar to the previous models, preference heterogeneity is once again present as demonstrated by the 
significant standard deviation estimates.  Thus, estimating the model as a RPL was appropriate. 
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entire sample compared to just results of the sample who perceived their responses to be 
at least somewhat consequential. This result was not evident in Experiment1. 
Figure 29 and Figure 30 display the differences between Model 4 and Model 6 
WTP estimates for bags of sugar and soft drinks respectively.  Figure 29 demonstrates 
that bags of sugar WTP estimates using only participants who viewed their responses as 
at least somewhat consequential (Model 6) did have lower, in absolute value terms, WTP 
estimates in all cases except for U.S. origin, which is somewhat consistent with Vossler 
et al. (2012) results.  However, this pattern was not witnessed for the soft drinks as 
illustrated by Figure 30.  Also displayed by Figure 29 and Figure 30 is the pattern that the 
relative utility to price ratio for the “none of these” options was more negative in Model 6 
than in Model 4.  As previously described, this suggests that participants who viewed 
their decisions as more consequential were more likely to choose actual products in the 
choice set.  
  
 
1
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Table 35 
 
Model 5 and Model 6: Consequentiality Information Group  
 
 Model 5  Model 6 
  Soft   Sugar Soft Soft Drink 
 Sugar Drink  Sugar WTP Drink WTP 
Mean Estimates        
Price -2.511*** -8.850***  -2.213***  -7.755***  
GM -3.920*** -3.776***  -2.948*** -$1.33*** -3.166*** -$0.41*** 
GM*Conseq. -0.024 -0.303      
Not GM 1.678*** 1.993***  1.117*** $0.51*** 1.740*** $0.22*** 
Not GM*Conseq. 0.047 -0.044      
Canada 0.543 0.512  0.278 $0.13 0.721 $0.09 
Canada*Conseq. 0.030 -0.100      
U.S. 0.670 1.230*  1.637*** $0.74*** 2.136*** $0.28*** 
U.S.*Conseq. 0.414* 0.233      
Mexico -2.575*** -2.232**  -1.613*** -$0.73*** -2.627*** -$0.34*** 
Mexico*Conseq. 0.159 -0.298      
Philippines -2.654*** -2.203***  -1.750*** -$0.79*** -3.397*** -$0.44*** 
Phil*Conseq. 0.104 -0.285      
Brazil -1.463** -0.492  -1.059*** -$0.48*** -1.769*** -$0.23*** 
Brazil* Conseq. 0.071 -0.407*      
None -7.533*** -11.303***  -8.272***  -13.093***  
None*Conseq. -0.392 -1.614***      
S. D. of Estimates        
GM 4.881*** 3.177***  3.426***  4.510***  
GM*Conseq. 0.886*** 1.122***      
Not GM 0.636** 1.664***  0.941**  2.269***  
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Table 35 (Cont’d.) 
 
Model 5 and Model 6: Consequentiality Information Group  
 
 Model 5  Model 6 
  Soft   Sugar Soft Soft Drink 
 Sugar Drink  Sugar WTP Drink WTP 
S. D. of Estimates        
Not GM*Conseq. 0.404*** 0.401***      
Canada 1.562*** 1.043***  1.014**  0.534  
Canada*Conseq. 0.317*** 0.325***      
U.S. 2.788*** 3.449***  2.430***  4.468***  
U.S.*Conseq. 0.467*** 0.361**      
Mexico 1.472*** 2.108***  1.417***  1.948**  
Mexico*Conseq. 0.233* 0.392**      
Philippines 2.254*** 1.04***  1.838***  3.115***  
Phil*Conseq. 0.123 1.066***      
Brazil 0.848 2.082***  1.111***  1.711***  
Brazil* Conseq. 0.284*** 0.186*      
None 3.749*** 3.526***  3.912***  6.891***  
None*Conseq. 1.022*** 2.122***      
Observations 3396 3396  1500  1500  
Log-likelihood -2605.18 -2318.18  -1191.52  -1059.97  
McFaddens’ R2 0.302 0.379  0.277  0.357  
Note. ***, **, * = Significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
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Figure 29. Model 4 versus Model 6 WTP: Bags of sugar  
 
 
Figure 30. Model 4 versus Model 6 WTP: Soft drinks 
 
 
Summary of Results.  The results for Experiment 2 provide even more robust 
results regarding consumers’ utility and WTP for GM and COO labeled sugar than 
Experiment 1 results.  Throughout Model 4 and Model 6, consumers’ utility and WTP is 
negative and significant for bags of sugar and soft drinks sweetened with sugar when the 
sugar is labeled as “GM,” and as originating in Mexico, the Philippines and Brazil.  The 
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models also consistently provided significant and positive utility and WTP estimates for 
bags of sugar and sugar in soft drinks labeled as “Not GM” and from the U.S.  In Model 
4 and Model 6, when sugar originates in Canada, consumers’ utility and WTP for sugar 
and soft drinks sweetened with sugar is not statistically significantly different form the no 
label option.  The most interesting result is that participants’ relative utility to price ratio 
for the “none of these” options was more negative in Experiment 2 (consequentiality 
information group) than in Experiment 1 (control group).  This suggests that the 
consequentiality information caused participants to more actively choose a product in the 
choice experiments instead of choosing the “none of these” option. This result was also 
duplicated in Model 5 for soft drinks, illustrating that as participants viewed their survey 
results as more consequential, they had decreased utility for the “none of these” options 
in the choice set.  Evidence for this effect was also demonstrated by Figure 29 and Figure 
30. 
Conclusion 
Throughout the models in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, results suggest that 
participants’ WTP for bags of sugar and sugar in soft drinks labeled as “GM” was 
significant and negative while participants’ WTP for bags of sugar and sugar in soft 
drinks labeled as “Not GM” was significant and positive.  In all models, participants’ 
utility and WTP for bags of sugar and sugar in soft drinks labeled as originating in the 
U.S. was positive and significant.  Participants’ WTP for bags of sugar and sugar in soft 
drinks originating from Canada is significant and positive for consumers in some models.  
Significantly negative coefficients in most models were found for both bags of sugar and 
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sugar in soft drinks labeled as originating from developing countries (e.g., Brazil, 
Mexico, Philippines).   
This research also has significant implications for the U.S. sugar market.  If 
mandatory GM labeling laws are enforced, this would be detrimental to U.S. and 
Canadian sugarbeet producers who grow their sugarbeets using GM seeds.  Meanwhile, 
this would be beneficial to the sugarcane industry which does not currently use GM seeds 
to grow its sugarcane.  If GM labeling became mandatory, this research suggests that 
sugarbeet growers may have an incentive to stop using GM seeds.  This could be 
damaging to the sugarbeet industry given that they used a significant amount of resources 
fighting lawsuits aimed at making the use of GM sugarbeets illegal (Kilman & Tomson, 
2011).  Mandatory GM labeling would also be detrimental to sugarbeet seed companies 
who sell GM seeds to farmers and detrimental to companies such as Monsanto who 
produce the GM seed technology.   The result that participants have a positive WTP for 
sugar and soft drinks labeled as “Not GM” indicates that there is incentive for farmers 
and food manufacturers to voluntarily label their food products as “Not GM.” 
In terms of U.S. sugar policy, results indicate that consumers in the U.S. do prefer 
domestically produced sugar which supports sugar lobbyists’ claims.  The result that 
sugar from Mexico is negatively received by U.S. consumers is important because the 
North American Free Trade Agreement allows Mexican sugar to enter into the U.S. at an 
unlimited tariff free rate and accounts for nearly half of the foreign sugar in the U.S.  This 
research leads to the conclusion that consumers in the U.S. have negative utility 
associated with sugar from Mexico but instead prefer sugar from the U.S. 
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 Also important is the result that consumers’ WTP for food products is similarly 
impacted if an ingredient in the food product, or if the entire food product is labeled with 
GM and COO information.  This indicates that once consumers identify GM and COO 
labels on a food product, even if it is not pertaining to the entire food product, their utility 
associated with the food product is similarly impacted.  This result also has important 
policy implications as it is not entirely decided how GM labels will be mandated in terms 
of ingredients labels. 
In terms of consequentiality, the most important result of this research is that 
participants’ relative utility to price ratio for the “none of these” options was decreased in 
Experiment 2 (consequentiality information group) and evidence also suggested 
participants’ utility for the “none of these” option was decreased as participants viewed 
their responses as more consequential. This suggests that consequentiality may increase 
participants’ likelihood of choosing an actual product in the choice set compared to 
choosing the “none of these” options.  This result is different from Lusk and Schroeder’s 
(2004) result that participants in hypothetical treatments typically choose the “none of 
these” options less.  It is possible that when participants view their decisions as 
consequential they are more likely to want to actively choose a product in the choice set 
to help inform policy makers about their preferences.  Further research on 
consequentiality is needed to explore this result in more depth.  
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Chapter 8 
 
Consumers’ Valuation of Soft Drinks Labeled with Calorie and Sweetener 
Information: The Impact of Taste 
 
 
From 1995 to 2012, the percentage of obese people in the U.S. increased from 15.9% to 
27.6% which is an increase of nearly 12% (Center for Disease Control, 2013).  In 2010, 
more than one-third, nearly 38%, of U.S. adults were considered obese (Ogden, Carroll, 
Kit, & Flegal, 2012).  Although overall costs of poor nutritional habits of individuals are 
difficult to quantify, Finkelstein, Trogdon, Cohen, & Dietz (2009) estimated that the 2008 
annual healthcare cost of obesity in the U.S. was $147 billion.  Recent research has 
focused on identifying factors which contribute to the obesity epidemic in response to 
increased obesity rates and the corresponding increase in the cost of obesity in the U.S.  
The consumption of soft drinks is one factor that is often blamed for increased 
obesity rates.  Many researchers (e.g., Ludwig, Peterson, & Gortmaker, 2001; Malik, 
Schulze, & Hu, 2006; Vartanian, Schwartz, & Brownell, 2007) have examined the 
association between obesity and soft drink consumption.  Malik et al. (2006) conducted a 
meta-analysis on several research articles examining obesity and sugar-sweetened 
beverages and found that a positive association exists between increased consumption of 
sugar-sweetened beverages, weight gain and obesity in children and adults.  A meta-
analysis by Vartanian et al. (2007) also found support for association between soft drink 
consumption and increased body weight.   
Similar to the pattern of increased obesity in the U.S., the percentage of calories 
individuals in the U.S. received from beverages increased from 11.8% in 1965 to 21.0% 
in 2002 (Duffey & Popkin, 2007).  Specifically, Nielsen and Popkin (2004) discovered 
 145 
 
that energy intake from sweetened beverages increased 135% from 1977 to 2001. Ogden, 
Kit, Carroll, and Park (2011) also found that consumption of sugar drinks in the U.S. has 
increased over the past thirty years and approximately half of the U.S. population 
consumes sugar drinks every day36.   
In general, the two most commonly discussed policy measures to improve obesity 
problems are (1) excise taxes on foods which are considered to lead to increased obesity 
and (2) improved labeling of food products (e.g., see Unnevehr (2013) for a review of 
research related to these policy measures).  In line with these policy measures, there has 
been a steady stream of research investigating the impact of soft drink excise taxes on 
soft drink consumption (e.g., Fletcher, Frisvold, & Teft, 2009; Smith, Lin, & Lee, 2010; 
Zhen, Wohlgenant, Karns, & Kaufman, 2011; Zheng, McLaughlin, & Kaiser, 2013).  
Furthermore, actual policy measures requiring sin taxes to be placed on soft drinks have 
been considered.  In San Francisco, a proposed soft drink sin tax of 0.02 cents per ounce 
of soft drink will possibly appear on the November 2014 ballot (Matier, 2013).   
In relation to improving the labeling of food products, the American Beverage 
Association proactively pledged a “Clear on Calories” commitment which involves clear 
calorie labeling on the front of soft drink packages (American Beverage Association, 
2013).  Research has also investigated the impact of improved labeling of food products 
with regards to calorie labeling (e.g., Krieger & Saelens, 2013; Swartz, Braxton, & Viera, 
2011).  This research will build upon existing calorie labeling research by investigating 
the impact of calorie labeling on consumers’ soft drink preferences.  It will also 
investigate how sweetener ingredient information impacts consumers’ preferences for 
                                                 
36 Sugar drinks are defined by Ogden et al. (2011) as fruit drinks, sodas, energy drinks, sports drinks, 
sweetened bottled waters and excludes diet drinks. 
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soft drinks.  In addition to calorie information, sweetener ingredients which comprise soft 
drinks are important information consumers may utilize to form preferences about soft 
drinks.  Given the negative assertion made by some researchers that sweetener usage 
contributes to the obesity epidemic (e.g., Lustig, Schmidt, & Brandis, 2012), it is critical 
to also consider how consumers utilize sweetener ingredient information on soft drinks 
and how this information impacts consumers’ preferences of soft drinks.   
In addition to calorie and sweetener labeling having an impact on consumers’ soft 
drink preferences, previous research also suggests that certain consumer characteristics 
influence consumers’ preferences for soft drinks (e.g., Vereecken, Inchley, Subramanian, 
Hublet, & Maes, 2005; Ludwig et al., 2001; Grimm, Harnack, & Story, 2004).  Thus, this 
research also examines how the following consumer characteristics influence consumers’ 
preferences for soft drinks: socio demographics, current consumption frequency of soft 
drinks, preferences for the sweeteners which comprise soft drinks, and health attributes 
(e.g., body mass index (BMI), body attractiveness).     
Using a non-hypothetical experimental auction, the objective of this research is to 
determine consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for soft drinks labeled with different 
sweetener and calorie information.  This chapter will also determine which consumer 
characteristics (e.g., socio demographics, health attributes) are predictive of consumers’ 
WTP for soft drinks labeled with different sweetener and calorie information.  This 
chapter also aims to determine how the inclusion of soft drink taste panels (i.e., soft drink 
taste) in an experimental auction impacts consumers’ WTP for soft drinks labeled with 
different sweetener and calorie information.  Only a few research articles have examined 
the impact of product taste on consumers’ WTP in an experimental auction (e.g., Melton 
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et al., 1996a; Melton et al., 1996b; Lusk, Fox, Schroeder, Mintert, & Koohmaraie, 2001; 
Umberger et al., 2002; Feuz et al., 2004; Umberger and Feuz, 2004; Platter et al., 2005). 
This research is important to experimental auction literature because in real world 
market place settings, consumers likely are familiar with the taste of the food product 
they are about to purchase.  Allowing participants to taste the food product in an 
experimental auction before bidding on the food product creates a more realistic market 
place setting, while at the same time accounting for experienced versus expected quality.  
Determining how the inclusion of taste panels in an experimental auction impacts 
consumers’ bidding behavior is a critical extension to experimental auction literature.  If 
consumers’ bidding behavior is strongly impacted by the inclusion of taste panels in the 
experiment auction, this may suggest that previous research that did not include taste 
panels in the experimental auction may have produced WTP estimates that are biased.   
Understanding how sweetener and calorie information impacts consumers’ WTP 
for soft drinks is crucial for policy makers, food manufacturers and the sweetener 
industry.  Understanding how calorie and sweetener labeling of soft drinks impacts 
consumers’ WTP for soft drinks is important for policy makers given improved labeling 
of food products is considered an important policy tool available for influencing 
consumers to eat and drink healthier foods.  This research is also important for policy 
makers because it will help determine whether calorie and sweetener information is used 
by consumers, or instead ignored by consumers, if they are already familiar with the taste 
of the soft drinks they are purchasing.  For example, it is possible that consumers 
primarily only care about the taste of the food product they are consuming and calorie 
and sweetener labeling only has a minimal impact on consumers’ purchasing decisions.  
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The results of this analysis will also assist the sweetener industry and food manufacturers 
in understanding which sweeteners consumers perceive most positively while also giving 
them estimates for what consumers are willing to pay for soft drinks labeled with 
different sweetener and calorie information.     
Determining which consumer characteristics are predictive of consumers’ WTP 
for soft drinks is critical information for public policy initiatives aimed at curbing 
obesity.  Identifying which consumer characteristics influence consumers’ preferences for 
soft drinks will assist policy makers in targeting the consumer groups who are willing to 
pay the most for soft drinks.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.  First a review of the literature is 
presented.  Next an overview of the methods is presented followed by the empirical 
results.  The final section concludes. 
Literature Review 
Calorie and sweetener ingredient labeling.  Several previous research articles 
have examined the impact of calorie labeling on food products.  Krieger & Saelens 
(2013) provide an overview of studies from 2008 through 2012 which examine the 
impact of restaurant and cafeteria menu labeling on consumer behavior.  Krieger & 
Saelens (2013) conclude by stating, “Current evidence suggests that menu labeling 
produces modest 10 to 20 calorie-per-meal reductions in purchases when assessed among 
all customers” (Krieger & Saelens, 2013, pg. 7).  Swartz et al. (2011) also provides a 
review of several research articles examining the impact of consumer purchase decisions 
regarding the presence of calories on menus. They conclude by stating, “It appears that 
calorie menu labeling does not have the intended effect of decreasing calorie ordering 
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and consumption from quick-service restaurants” (Swartz et al., 2011, pg. 7).  Elbel, 
Gyamfi, and Kersh (2011) also found that calorie labeling did not result in any 
statistically significant difference in calories purchased.  According to Elbel et al. (2011), 
72% of adolescents stated that taste was the most important factor in their meal selection.  
In terms of beverage specific impacts on calorie labeling, Bollinger, Leslie, and Sorensen 
(2011) examined consumers’ purchase decisions in Starbucks after mandatory calorie 
posting became effective.  They found that average calories per transaction fell by six 
percent for consumers’ food choices.  They also discovered that there was no impact of 
calorie labeling on consumers’ purchase decisions regarding beverages.  Bollinger et al. 
(2011) also had survey respondents rate the importance of taste, price and calories in their 
purchase decisions.  Survey participants in both Seattle and San Francisco specified that 
taste was the most important factor in their purchase decision followed by price and 
calories.  Ultimately, previous research has determined that calorie labeling on food 
products does not have a strong impact on consumers’ purchasing decisions; however, 
previous research has discovered that consumers consider taste the most important factor 
influencing food choice. 
This research will help improve existing literature by determining how important 
product taste is in determining consumers’ WTP for soft drinks labeled with varying 
amounts of calories and sweetener information.  This research also contributes to 
previous research by examining how consumers’ WTP for soft drinks is impacted when 
presented with different sweetener information.  While a stream of literature exists 
examining the impact of calorie labeling on consumers’ food choices, to the author’s 
knowledge no known research has previously investigated how sweetener information 
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impacts consumers’ food choices.  While consumers may disregard calorie information 
when making decisions, they may have strong preferences for which types of sweeteners 
are in soft drinks especially because of recent negative attention given to sweeteners like 
high fructose corn syrup (HFCS) (e.g., Sweet Surprise, 2013). 
Taste panels in experimental auctions.  Experimental auctions, and in 
particular, second-price Vickrey auctions, have been used extensively in the literature to 
determine consumers’ WTP for several food products ranging from apples to steak and 
their methods are well established (e.g., Lusk & Shogren, 2007; Grebitus, Lusk, & 
Nayga, 2013; Garcia, Loureiro, & Nayga, 2011; Corrigan & Rousu, 2006; Lusk, 
Feldkamp, & Schroeder, 2004; Alfnes & Rickertsen, 2003; Melton, Huffman, Shogren, & 
Fox, 1996; List & Gallet, 2001; Umberger, Feuz, Calkins, & Killinger-Mann, 2002; 
Umberger & Feuz, 2004; Feuz, Umberger, Calkins, & Stiz, 2004).  Non-hypothetical 
experimental auctions are a preferred way of determining consumers’ WTP for products 
because they avoid the problem of hypothetical bias (i.e., participants overstating WTP) 
by being incentive compatible (e.g., List & Gallet, 2001; Little & Berrens, 2004; Murphy, 
Allen, Stevens, Weatherhead, 2005).  Furthermore, when informing participants of the 
demand revealing strategy of an experimental auction, which was done in this study, it 
has been shown that experimental auctions are in fact demand revealing (e.g., Table 2.3 
in Lusk and Shogren, 2007).    
Most experimental auctions determine consumers’ WTP for food products based 
on attributes such as distance the food product traveled, country of origin and welfare 
improvements in animal production, but they do not consider the impact of food product 
taste on consumers’ WTP (e.g., Grebitus et al., 2013; Garcia et al., 2011; Corrigan & 
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Rousu, 2006; Lusk et al., 2004; Alfnes & Rickertsen, 2003).  Only a few studies have 
included taste panels in their experimental auctions (e.g., Melton et al., 1996a; Melton et 
al., 1996b; Lusk et al., 2001; Umberger et al., 2002; Feuz et al., 2004; Umberger and 
Feuz, 2004; Platter et al., 2005).  This research will provides a methodological 
contribution to previous research regarding the role of taste panels in an experimental 
auction by examining how the inclusion of soft drink taste panels in an experimental 
auction impacts consumers’ bidding behavior for soft drinks labeled with sweetener and 
calorie information. 
Melton et al. (1996a) conducted an experimental auction to determine how visual 
attributes and taste attributes impact consumers’ WTP for fresh pork chops.  Participants 
bid for pork chops in three different rounds. In the first round participants were shown 
photographs of the pork chops, in the second round participants were shown the actual 
fresh pork chops and in the third round participants were allowed to taste the cooked pork 
chops.  Melton et al. (1996a) discovered that bids for each round varied depending on 
whether they were given visual (e.g., photograph and actual pork chop) or taste attribute 
information.  Melton et al. (1996b) also examined consumers’ preferences for pork chops 
which included taste tests.  In addition to bidding on the pork chops the experimental 
auction, participants also rated the taste attributes of the pork chops from strongly like to 
strongly dislike.  Melton et al. (1996b) found evidence that if consumers tasted the pork 
chops during the bidding rounds, this moderated consumers’ WTP for certain attributes 
such as pork chop marbling. 
Umberger et al. (2002) conducted an experiment to determine consumers’ WTP 
for domestic, corn-fed beef versus Argentine, grass-fed beef.  Given previous studies 
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(e.g., Huffman et al., 1996; Neely et al., 1998) had indicated flavor as one of the most 
important factors driving consumers’ beef preferences, they included taste tests in their 
auction.  Umberger et al. (2002) separated their participants according to which steak 
they liked the best and proceeded to determine the premium consumers were willing to 
pay for each beef steak.  They discovered that 62% of consumers were willing to pay an 
average of $1.61 more per pound for domestic, corn-fed beef while 23% of consumers 
were willing to pay an average of $1.36 more per pound for Argentine, grass-fed beef and 
15% of their sample were indifferent between the steaks.  Umberger and Feuz (2004) also 
examined consumers’ WTP for beef steak and included taste tests in their analysis.  They 
discovered that consumers’ relative taste test rankings between pairs of steak had a 
significant impact on consumers’ relative bids for the pairs of steak.  Lusk et al. (2001) 
conducted an experimental auction where participants were allowed to taste a tough steak 
and a tender steak.  They found that when consumers participated solely in the taste test 
and did not receive any additional information about the steaks, they were willing to pay 
a premium of $1.23/lb for a tender versus tough steak.   
Feuz et al. (2004) also examined the influence of beef steak taste in determining 
consumers’ WTP.  They had participants taste steak samples and rate them on flavor, 
juiciness, tenderness and overall acceptability.  Feuz et al. (2004) found that tenderness 
ratings had a significant impact on consumers’ WTP estimates for the steaks.  Platter et 
al. (2005) used an experimental auction to determine consumers’ WTP for beef strip loin 
steaks with differences in marbling and Warner-Bratzler shear force values.  Prior to 
consumers bidding on the different beef steaks they participated in taste panels where 
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they tasted the steaks.  Results of the experimental auction suggested that improved 
tenderness and product quality will increase consumers’ WTP for the beef. 
Ultimately, most previous experimental auctions which includes taste panels have 
focused on pork and beef steak.  This research will expand previous research regarding 
the role of taste in experimental auctions by examining how strongly taste impacts 
consumers’ WTP for soft drinks labeled with different sweetener and calorie information.  
Furthermore, while selected research has included taste panels in their analysis, to the 
author’s knowledge, no known research has definitively determined the impact of panel 
inclusion on consumers’ bidding behavior (i.e., WTP) in an experimental auction.  This 
research will isolate how the inclusion of taste panels impacts consumers’ bidding 
behavior by examining WTP estimates from an experimental auction that includes taste 
panels and by examining WTP estimates from an experimental auction that does not 
include taste panels. 
Consumer characteristics and consumers’ WTP for soft drinks.  Previous 
research has determined which consumer socio demographics and health attributes are 
predictive of soft drink consumption (e.g., Vereecken et al., 2005; Ludwig et al., 2001; 
Grimm et al., 2004).  Vereecken et al. (2005) examined a sample of European adolescents 
and determined that girls and younger students consumed soft drinks least often.  
Furthermore, Vereeecken et al. (2005) found that soft drink consumption was lower as 
adolescents’ parents had higher occupational status.   Ludwig et al. (2001) examined 
schoolchildren’s soft drink consumption behavior and found that as soft drink 
consumption increased in schoolchildren, schoolchildren’s BMI also increased.  Grimm 
et al. (2004) examined factors associated with soft drink consumption in children 
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between the ages of eight and thirteen.  Grimm et al. (2004) determined that participants 
who “strongly liked” the taste of soft drinks were most likely to consume soft drinks 
frequently.  They also determined that boys were more likely to consume soft drinks than 
girls.  While previous research (e.g., Vereecken et al., 2005; Ludwig et al., 2001; Grimm 
et al., 2004) determined which factors contribute to adolescents’ soft drink consumption, 
this research will quantify how consumer characteristics (e.g., soft drink consumption, 
socio demographics, BMI) impact adult consumers’ WTP for soft drinks.  
In terms of health attributes influencing consumers’ WTP for soft drinks, in 
addition to BMI, it is possible that individuals’ self-reported body attractiveness 
contributes to consumers’ WTP for soft drinks.  Wiederman and Hurst (1997) discovered 
that while general body size and body shape were not correlated with women’s self-
schema, women’s self-reported body attractiveness was correlated with their self-schema.  
While BMI is likely to influence consumers’ WTP for soft drinks, it is also possibly more 
likely that subjects’ self-reported body attractiveness may also be correlated with 
participants’ WTP for healthier soft drinks.  For example, it is possible that an 
individuals’ BMI classifies them as overweight; however, that individual still may 
considers themselves to have high body attractiveness and, thus, is not willing to pay 
more for healthier soft drinks.  It is also possible that a person may be of normal weight 
as judged by BMI but considers their body attractiveness to be low; thus, they are likely 
to pay more for healthier soft drinks. 
Another consumer characteristic that likely influences consumers’ WTP for soft 
drinks is consumers’ opinion of how acceptable the sweetener is which comprises the soft 
drink.  Rozin (2006) determined how U.S. participants’ judged the acceptability of food 
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and water.  Building on Rozin (2006), this research determines how participants’ 
acceptability scores for the primary sweeteners in soft drinks impacts consumers’ WTP 
for soft drinks.  It is likely sweetener acceptability ratings will have a significant 
influence on consumers’ WTP for soft drinks.  For example, consumers may know that 
diet soft drinks have zero calories, but they may feel aspartame (the primary sweetener in 
diet soft drinks) is not an acceptable sweetener they want to consume. 
Methods  
 
The following section outlines the methods used to determine consumers’ WTP for soft 
drinks labeled with different sweetener and calorie information.  Subjects participated in 
an experimental auction and after the completion of the auction completed a short 
questionnaire which can be found in Appendix B.   
Questionnaire instruments.  At the conclusion of the experimental auction, 
participants filled out socio demographic information regarding their height, weight, age, 
race, gender and income.  Participants also completed questions regarding the following 
items: consumption frequency of soft drinks, acceptability ratings of sweeteners and self-
reported body attractiveness. 
Consumption frequency of soft drinks.  At the conclusion of the experimental 
auction, participants were asked on a scale from 0=Never to 5=Daily how much they 
consume Pepsi, Pepsi Throwback, Diet Pepsi, and Pepsi Next.  These soft drinks 
corresponded to the soft drinks consumers bid on in the experimental auction37.   
                                                 
37 Participants did not know explicitly in the experimental auction that they were bidding on those 
particular soft drinks.  More information regarding the soft drinks in the experimental auction will be 
described in detail in the experimental design section. 
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Soft drink acceptability ratings.  Following Rozin (2006), at the end of the survey 
participants were asked on a scale, from zero being not acceptable under any conditions 
to 100 being completely acceptable, to rate the acceptability of aspartame, HFCS and 
sugar.  These sweeteners correspond the primary sweeteners in the soft drinks used in the 
experimental auction. 
BMI.  The questionnaire also solicited information regarding participants’ weight 
and height.  From this information BMI was calculated using the following standard 
equation for BMI (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2014): 
BMI=[weight (lb)/(height (in)2]*703                  (57) 
Self-reported body attractiveness.   Following Wiederman and Hurst (1997), to 
determine participants view of their own body attractiveness, subjects were asked after 
the completion of the auction to answer the following question, “Overall I would rate the 
attractiveness of my body as…” with one being well below average and seven being well 
above average.   
 Experienced and expected taste tests.  In the experimental auction, participants 
either completed a taste panel for the soft drinks in the auction or they rated each soft 
drink based on their expected taste of the soft drink38.  For both the experienced and 
expected taste ratings of the soft drinks, participants used the Schutz and Cardello (2001) 
labeled affective magnitude scale (LAM scale).  The LAM scale requires participants to 
rate the soft drinks on a scale from one to eleven, with one being greatest imaginable 
dislike and eleven being greatest imaginable like.   
                                                 
38 Previous research has also examined consumers’ expected taste of food products (e.g.,  Lee and Shwarz, 
2010; Hoegg and Alba, 2007). 
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Experimental Design.  To determine consumers’ WTP for soft drinks labeled 
with different calorie and sweetener information and also examine the role of taste panels 
in experimental auctions, two experiments were conducted which both utilized a non-
hypothetical second price Vickrey auction.  Details regarding the experimental design, 
instructions, and questionnaires can be found in Appendix B.  To accommodate a non-
hypothetical laboratory experiment, examining different sweetener and calorie labeling 
scenarios for soft drinks is feasible because the soft drink industry produces soft drinks 
containing various amounts of calories and different types of sweeteners.  
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2.    In both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, 
subjects participated in a soft drink auction to determine consumers’ WTP for soft drinks 
labeled with different sweetener and calorie information.  Experiment 1 included fourteen 
sessions in total; each session had seven to twelve participants.  Experiment 2 included 
ten sessions in total; each session had eight to twelve participants.  In both experiments, 
prior to participating in the soft drink auction, subjects were given examples of how the 
auction worked and information regarding why the best strategy was to bid truthfully.  In 
both experiments, prior to participating in the soft drink auction, subjects first 
participated in a second-price Vickrey auction with chocolate bars to familiarize 
themselves with the auction procedure.   
The only difference between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 is that in 
Experiment 1 subjects participated in taste panels where they actually tasted the soft 
drinks in the auction and rated them based on the LAM scale.  In Experiment 2, subjects 
did not participate in the taste panels but instead rated their expected taste of the soft 
drinks in the auction by using the LAM scale. 
 158 
 
Bidding Rounds.  Both experiments had two bidding rounds for the soft drink 
auction.  In Bidding Round 1, participants either saw only sweetener information 
regarding the soft drinks or only calorie information regarding the soft drinks.  An 
NGENE design determined which experimental sessions would include sweetener only 
information in Bidding Round 1 and which sessions would include calorie only 
information in Bidding Round 1.  Figure 31 illustrates how the experimental participants 
were divided by session into the calorie only or sweetener only section of Bidding Round 
1.  In both experiments, in Bidding Round 2 participants saw both sweetener and calorie 
information which is also illustrated by Figure 31.  The bidding rounds were designed in 
this fashion to allow a direct analysis to be made regarding (1) consumers’ WTP for soft 
drinks labeled with only calorie information, (2) consumers’ WTP for soft drinks labeled 
with only sweetener information and (3) consumers’ WTP for soft drinks labeled with 
both calorie and sweetener information. 
 
Figure 31. Experimental 1 and Experiment 2 Labels by Bidding Rounds 
 In each bidding round there were five, twenty-ounce soft drinks on which 
participants bid.  The soft drinks were all Pepsi products but the labels were removed as 
illustrated in Figure 32.  Four of the five soft drinks in each bidding round contained 
sweetener and/or calorie information which is described in Table 36.  In each bidding 
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round, in addition to the four soft drinks with sweetener and/or calorie information, one 
soft drink contained no label or information and this was referred to as the control.  The 
control soft drink was Pepsi, contained 250 calories and was sweetened with high 
fructose corn syrup (HFCS) but remained unlabeled so a direct comparison could be 
made between a completely unlabeled soft drink and labeled soft drinks.  In Experiment 
1, for the control soft drink, participants tasted regular Pepsi, which uses HFCS as the 
primary sweetener and contains 250 calories, in the taste panel.  This was chosen to be 
tasted for the control soft drink because this is the most common and familiar Pepsi 
product.  To avoid ordering effects, the order in which the bottles were presented to the 
participants was randomized between bidding rounds and sessions following an NGENE 
design.  Figure 32 exemplarily illustrates the appearance of the soft drinks for Round 2. 
Table 36 
Specific Labeling Information  
Soft Drink Number1 Product Calories Sweetener2 
1 Unlabeled (Control) Unlabeled Unlabeled 
2 Pepsi 250 HFCS 
3 Diet Pepsi 0 Aspartame 
4 Pepsi Throwback 260 Sugar 
5 Pepsi Next 100 HFCS and Aspartame 
1The order of the soft drinks was randomized between rounds and sessions following a design 
generated with the software NGENE.  2This is the primary sweetener used in the soft drink. 
HFCS=high fructose corn syrup. 
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Figure 32. Bidding Round 2 Display 
Taste panel.  In Experiment 1, prior to each bidding round, subjects in the soft 
drink panels tasted the soft drinks that corresponded to the soft drinks on which they 
eventually bid.  Participants then rated the taste of each of the soft drinks using the LAM 
scale.  The soft drinks in the taste panel did not contain any information or labels and 
were presented to participants in cups that were labeled with numbers.  Participants were 
explicitly informed that the soft drinks they were tasting corresponded to the soft drinks 
on which they would eventually bid.  The soft drinks in the taste panel and the soft drinks 
the participants bid on were labeled with numbers that corresponded to each other.     
Expected taste.  In Experiment 2, participants used the LAM scale to rate their 
expected taste of the soft drinks in the bidding rounds prior to bidding on the soft drinks.  
Participants were shown the labeled soft drinks in the bidding rounds and then told to 
complete their expected taste LAM scale ratings for the soft drinks.   
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 Auction Procedures.  Ultimately, the experimental auction procedures were as 
follows: 
Step 1  In both experiments, the rules of the auction were described and subjects were 
told why their best strategy in the auction was to bid according to what their 
maximum WTP was for the soft drinks. 
Step 2  Subjects in both experiments participated in a practice candy bar auction to 
familiarize themselves with the experimental auction procedures. 
Step 3  In Experiment 1, subjects participated in a taste panel where they tasted  
five soft drink samples labeled one through five and rated the taste of the soft 
drinks using the LAM scale.  After they completed the taste panel, they were 
introduced to the soft drinks in Bidding Round 1.  One soft drink was unlabeled 
and four soft drinks contained either only sweetener information or only calorie 
information.  In Experiment 2, participants were introduced to the soft drinks in 
Bidding Round 1.  One soft drink was unlabeled and four soft drinks contained 
either only sweetener information or only calorie information.  Participants then 
rated their expected taste of the five soft drinks using the LAM scale. 
Step 3  In both experiments, subjects then bid on the five soft drinks in Bidding Round 1.   
Participants’ bid sheets were then collected by the monitor. 
Step 4  In Experiment 1, participants tasted five soft drink samples labeled six through 
ten and rated the taste of the soft drinks according to the LAM scale.  After they 
completed the taste panel, they were introduced to the soft drinks in Bidding 
Round 2.  One soft drink was unlabeled and four soft drinks contained sweetener 
and calorie information.  In Experiment 2, participants were introduced to one 
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unlabeled soft drink and four soft drinks containing calorie and sweetener 
information.  Participants then rated their expected taste of the soft drinks using 
the LAM scale. 
Step 5  In both experiments, subjects then bid on the five soft drinks in Bidding Round 2.   
Participants’ bid sheets were then collected by the monitor. 
Step 6 In each experiment, one round was randomly selected as the binding round and 
one soft drink was randomly selected as the binding soft drink.  The individual 
who bid the highest price for the soft drink then paid the second highest price and 
received the product.  All other bidders paid nothing and received nothing other 
than their participation payment. 
Random Effects Panel Tobit.  To determine how much consumers’ are willing 
to pay for soft drinks labeled with different calorie and sweetener information, a random-
effects panel Tobit model was utilized.  Participants’ bids for the different soft drinks in 
the auction were used as the dependent variable in this analysis.  Participants had several 
zero bids for the different soft drinks in the auction as demonstrated in the empirical 
results section of this chapter.  Because there were several zero bids for the different soft 
drinks, the sample of soft drink bids is censored at zero.  Using an ordinary least squares 
regression to analyze soft drink bids would produce parameter estimates that are biased 
(Henningsen, 2010).  Thus, a random-effects panel Tobit regression was utilized to 
determine consumers’ WTP for soft drinks labeled with different calorie, sweetener and 
attribute information.  A panel Tobit was used because in both experiments, participants 
bid on five different soft drinks per bidding round which creates a panel.  The lower 
bound of the Tobit regression was set to zero to account for participant’s zero bids 
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(Green, 2003).  In the Tobit model, first proposed by Tobin (1958), the observed response 
variable is expressed in terms of the underlying latent variable: 
  𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛽0 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 +  𝑣𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡                                         (58) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  is the unobserved latent variable, 𝛽0 is the intercept term, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is a vector of 
explanatory variables and 𝛽 is a vector of unknown parameters.  The random effects, 𝑣𝑖 
are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), distributed normally with mean zero 
and variance of σ𝑣
2  (i.e., 𝑣𝑖~𝑁(0, σ𝑣
2) and the error term, 𝜇𝑖𝑡, is also i.i.d., distributed 
normally with mean zero and variance of σ𝜇
2 (i.e., 𝜇𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, σ𝜇
2)) independent of 𝑣𝑖.  The 
subscript i=1,2,…,N indicates the observation from individual i who is bidding on soft 
drinks t=1,…, 5 (there are five soft drinks each participant bids on per bidding round).  
For each bid from individual i=1,2,…,N for soft drink t: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = max (0, 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ )                   (59) 
Because the lower bound of the Tobit regression is set to zero to account for zero bids: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = {
0       𝑖𝑓  𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ ≤ 0
𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗    𝑖𝑓  𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  > 0
                         (60) 
From Wooldridge (2006), the log-likelihood function for each observation i for soft drink 
t: 
𝑙𝑖𝑡(𝛽, 𝜎) = 
      1(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 0)log [1 − Φ(𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽/𝜎)] + 1(𝑦𝑖𝑡 > 0)log {(1/𝜎)𝜙[(𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽)/𝜎]}      (61) 
where 𝜙 is the standard normal density function.  The maximum likelihood estimates of 
𝛽 and 𝜎 were obtained by maximizing the log likelihood; this was done using the xtTobit 
command in STATA.   
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Expanding equation (58) using the parameters of this research resulted in the 
following Tobit regression that was estimated in STATA for each of the bidding rounds 
in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2: 
   𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑑1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑑2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑑3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑑4𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 
                  𝛽6𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝑣𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡              (62) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is equal to individual i’s, bids, in cents, for soft drink t,  Sd1,…,Sd4 are dummy 
variables equal to one if the soft drink participants bid on was labeled with particular 
calorie and/or sweetener information, Taste is the LAM taste panel ratings (Experiment 
1) or expected taste LAM ratings (Experiment 2) participants assigned to soft drink t, 
Income is a categorical variable equal to participant’s approximate household income, 
Age is equal to participant’s age, Gender is a binary variable equal to one if the 
participant was a female and White is a binary variable equal to one if the participant was 
white. 
Empirical Results 
Sample characteristics.  Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 had 132 participants 
and 102 participants, respectively, which were recruited from the Phoenix, Arizona metro 
area via email lists, flyers and online recruitment.  Participants were recruited based on 
the fact that they were Pepsi drinkers because all products used in the auction were Pepsi 
products.  Interviewees received $30.00 as compensation for their time. Table 37 
illustrates the socio-demographics of the participants in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2.  
The sample in both experiments is characterized by an almost even share of male and 
female respondents.  Both samples are slightly younger than the U.S. population and both 
samples’ education levels are higher than that of the average U.S. American.  The income 
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is fairly comparable to that of the U.S. population.  In both samples, a lower share of the 
sample is white compared to the U.S. population.  The average household size is 2.33 and 
2.56 for the sample in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 respectively.  The samples in 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 are not statistically different from one another, except the 
average age of the sample in Experiment 1 was slightly older (33 years old) than the 
average age of the sample in Experiment 2 (28 years old). 
Table 37 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 Socio-Demographics 
Characteristics Experiment 1 Experiment 2 U.S. 
Gender (female %) 48.50% 47.06% 50.80%1 
 t-stat=0.22 p-value=0.83  
Age (years) 33.33 27.59 37.222 
 t-stat=3.43 p-value=0.00  
Household Size 2.33 2.56 2.611 
 t-stat=-1.04 p-value=0.30  
Education  45.50% 38.24% 28.20%1 
(% bachelor’s degree and above) t-stat=1.11 p-value=0.27  
Annual Household Income $47,654  $53,614 $52,7621 
 t-stat=-1.12 p-value=0.26  
Race (% white) 65.90% 58.42% 78.1%1 
 t-stat=1.16 p-value=0.25  
1U.S. Census Bureau, 2011 2CIA Factsheet 
 
 Descriptive results soft drink consumption frequency.  Table 38 displays 
participants’ soft drink consumption for Pepsi, Diet Pepsi, Pepsi Throwback and Pepsi 
Next.  Participants’ soft drink consumption of Pepsi, Pepsi Throwback and Pepsi Next 
was statistically the same in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2.  In Experiment 1, 
participants consumed statistically more Diet Pepsi.  In both experiments, participants’ 
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most commonly consumed soft drink was Pepsi while their least consumed soft drink was 
Pepsi Next.
  
 
1
6
7
 
Table 38 
 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 Participants’ Soft Drink Consumption Frequency  
 
 Pepsi Diet Pepsi* Pepsi Throwback Pepsi Next 
Consumption (level) Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
   Experiment 1         
Daily 5 3.85% 6 4.62% 1 0.77% 0 0.00% 
2-3 times a week 24 18.46% 16 12.31% 3 2.31% 3 2.31% 
Once a week 18 13.85% 8 6.15% 6 4.62% 3 2.31% 
2-3 times a month 26 20.00% 13 10.00% 9 6.92% 6 4.62% 
Once a month 28 21.54% 23 17.69% 16 12.31% 15 11.54% 
Less than once a month 29 22.31% 64 49.23% 95 73.08% 103 79.23% 
Total 130 100% 130 100% 130 100% 130 100% 
   Experiment 2         
Daily 3 2.94% 1 0.98% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
2-3 times a week 26 25.49% 6 5.88% 1 0.98% 0 0.00% 
Once a week 10 9.80% 8 7.84% 3 2.94% 6 5.88% 
2-3 times a month 14 13.73% 4 3.92% 10 9.80% 3 2.94% 
Once a month 24 23.53% 18 17.65% 17 16.67% 10 9.80% 
Less than once a month 25 24.51% 65 63.73% 71 69.61% 83 81.37% 
Total 102 100% 102 100% 102 100% 102 100% 
Note: * Experiment 1 participants consumed statistically more Diet Pepsi than Experiment 2 participants (p<0.01). 
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 Descriptive results sweetener acceptability ratings.  Figure 33 displays the 
descriptive statistics for participants’ acceptability ratings of the sweeteners HFCS, sugar 
and aspartame for Experiment 1 and Experiment 2.  HFCS is the primary sweetener in 
Pepsi; sugar is the sweetener in Pepsi Throwback; aspartame is the primary sweetener in 
Diet Pepsi; both HFCS and aspartame are used to sweeten Pepsi Next.  In Experiment 1 
and Experiment 2, participants’ acceptability ratings for sugar and aspartame were 
statistically the same as determined by t-tests.  In Experiment 2, participants’ 
acceptability ratings for HFCS were statistically significantly higher with an average 
rating of forty-nine versus an average rating of forty-one in Experiment 1 (p<0.05). In 
both experiments, on average, sugar was considered to be the most acceptable sweetener 
and aspartame was considered participants’ least acceptable sweetener. 
 
Figure 33. Sweetener Acceptability Ratings 
 
 Descriptive results BMI.  Table 4 displays the breakdown of the frequency and 
percentage of experimental participants who are underweight, normal weight, overweight 
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and obese as determined by BMI39.  Table 39 also displays the U.S. average percentage 
of people in each weight status classification.  In both experiments the percentage of 
subjects in the normal weight status classification was slightly higher than the U.S. 
average and the percentage of overweight and obese people in the experiments were 
slightly lower than the U.S. average.  Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 participants’ 
average BMI was statistically the same as determined by t-tests.   
Table 39  
 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 Participants’ BMI  
 
 Weight Experiment 1 Experiment 2 U.S. 
BMI Status Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Average1 
Below 18.5 Underweight 5 3.88% 3 2.97% 2.00% 
18.5 - 24.9 Normal 61 47.29% 51 50.50% 35.3% 
25.0 – 29.9 Overweight 34 26.36% 27 26.73% 35.5% 
30.0 & Above Obese 32 22.48% 20 19.80% 27.2% 
 Total 129 100% 101 100% 100% 
1Source: Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index (2013). 
 
Descriptive results body attractiveness.  Table 40 display participants’ self-
reported body attractiveness.  In experiment 1 and Experiment 2 participants’ body 
attractiveness ratings were statistically the same as determined by t-tests.  Participants’ 
self-reported body attractiveness ratings were normally distributed with most people 
rating themselves as having an average, or slightly above, body attractiveness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 The different weight classification follows the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (2014) criteria. 
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Table 40 
 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 Participants’ Self-reported Body Attractiveness  
 
Body Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
Attractiveness Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
1-well below average 9 6.92% 2 1.96% 
2 8 6.15% 5 4.90% 
3 10 7.69% 14 13.73% 
4-average 41 31.54% 34 33.33% 
5 36 27.69% 25 24.51% 
6 17 13.08% 16 15.69% 
7-well above average 9 6.92% 6 5.88% 
Total 129 100% 101 100% 
 
Descriptive results for experienced and expected taste.  Table 41, Table 42 and 
Table 43 illustrate the experienced and expected LAM scale ratings for the different 
bidding rounds.  Tables 41 through 43 also illustrate whether the difference in means for 
the experienced (Experiment 1) versus expected (Experiment 2) LAM taste ratings were 
statistically significant.  Furthermore, Tables 41 through 43 also show whether the 
experienced and expected tastes of the control soft drink were statistically different from 
the experienced and expected tastes of the other soft drinks.  
Table 41 displays the results of Experiment 1 participants’ taste panel LAM 
ratings (experienced taste) and Experiment 2 participants’ expected taste LAM ratings of 
the soft drinks labeled with different sweetener information.  In Experiment 1 
(experienced taste), participants’ highest rated soft drink taste was the soft drink carrying 
no label which was Pepsi.  Participants’ least preferred soft drink in Experiment 1 was the 
soft drink sweetened with aspartame which was Diet Pepsi.  In Experiment 2, 
participants’ highest rated expected taste of a soft drink was the soft drink labeled as 
sweetened with sugar (Pepsi Throwback).  Meanwhile, consumers’ least rated expected 
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taste of a soft drink was the soft drink labeled as sweetened with aspartame (Diet Pepsi).  
Interestingly, participants’ experienced taste ratings in Experiment 1 were similar to 
participants’ expected taste ratings in Experiment 2.  In fact, participants’ experienced 
and expected taste for soft drinks sweetened with HFCS was statistically the same.  The 
largest difference between experienced (Experiment 1) versus expected (Experiment 2) 
soft drink tastes were for soft drinks sweetened with sugar and for soft drinks sweetened 
with HFCS and aspartame.  
In Experiment 1, participants’ experienced taste of the unlabeled soft drink 
(Pepsi) was statistically higher than all of the other experienced soft drinks tastes.  This 
pattern was not witnessed in Experiment 2.  In Experiment 2, the soft drink sweetened 
with sugar (Pepsi Throwback) was expected to be the best tasting soft drink and was 
significantly (p<0.10) higher rated than the unlabeled control soft drink.   
Table 41 
 
Bidding Round 1 (Sweetener Information): Experienced and Expected Taste Results 
 
  Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Dif. in Means 
  (n=61) (n=51) Exp. 1 v  
  Experienced Expected Exp. 2 
Soft Drink Soft Drink Label Mean1 Mean1 p-value2 
Pepsi Unlabeled (Control) 7.08 6.43 0.049 
Pepsi HFCS  6.31** 6.06 0.247 
Diet  Aspartame  5.43*** 4.57*** 0.039 
Throwback Sugar  5.51*** 7.06* 0.000 
Next HFCS & Aspartame  6.21** 4.39*** 0.000 
1 ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 for one tailed difference of means test between the unlabeled 
(control) soft drink and the other sweetener labeled soft drinks. 2One tailed test that the taste of 
the experienced soft drink taste is greater or less than the expected taste of the soft drink. 
 
Table 42 illustrates the results of participants’ experienced taste ratings of the soft 
drinks (Experiment 1) and participants’ expected taste LAM ratings of the soft drinks 
(Experiment 2) labeled with different calorie information.  In Experiment 1, participants’ 
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highest rated soft drink taste was the soft drink labeled with 250 calories which was 
Pepsi.  Participants’ least preferred soft drink in Experiment 1 was the soft drink labeled 
with 0 calories which was Diet Pepsi.  In Experiment 2, participant’s highest rated 
expected taste of a soft drink was the soft drink labeled with 260 calories (Pepsi 
Throwback).  Meanwhile, consumers’ least rated expected taste of a soft drink was the 
soft drink labeled with 0 calories (Diet Pepsi).  The largest difference between 
experienced (Experiment 1) versus expected (Experiment 2) soft drink tastes was for the 
soft drink with 260 calories, with participants’ expected taste rating being significantly 
1.75 higher than participant’s experienced taste rating (p<0.01).   
Participants’ experienced and expected taste for the unlabeled soft drink was 
statistically the same. Meanwhile, consumers’ experienced and expected taste for the 
remaining four soft drinks were all statically different.  In Experiment 1, the 0 calorie soft 
drink (Diet Pepsi) and the 260 calorie soft drink (Pepsi Throwback) experienced taste 
was significantly lower than the control soft drink experienced taste.  In Experiment 2, all 
of the soft drinks expected tastes were significantly different from the control soft drinks 
expected taste. 
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Table 42 
 
Bidding Round 1 (Calorie Information): Experienced and Expected Taste Results 
 
  Exp. 1  Exp. 2  Dif. in Means 
  (n=71) (n=51) Exp. 1 v  
  Experienced Expected Exp. 2 
Soft Drink Soft Drink Label Mean1 Mean1 p-value2 
Pepsi Unlabeled (Control) 6.39 6.16 0.173 
Pepsi 250 Calories  6.79 7.43*** 0.097 
Diet  0 Calories  4.85*** 4.20*** 0.056 
Throwback 260 Calories  5.76** 7.51*** 0.000 
Next 100 Calories  5.96 5.51** 0.087 
1 ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 for one tailed difference of means test between the unlabeled 
(control) soft drink and the other calorie labeled soft drinks. 2One tailed test that the taste of the 
experienced soft drink taste is greater or less than the expected taste of the soft drink. 
 
Table 43 illustrates the results of Experiment 1 participants’ experienced taste 
ratings and Experiment 2 participants’ expected taste ratings of the soft drinks labeled 
with different sweetener and calorie information.  In Experiment 1, participants’ highest 
rated soft drink taste was the soft drink sweetened with HFCS and with 250 calories 
which was Pepsi.  Participants’ least preferred soft drink in Experiment 1 was the soft 
drink labeled with 0 calories and sweetened with aspartame which was Diet Pepsi.  In 
Experiment 2, participants’ highest rated expected taste of a soft drink was the soft drink 
labeled with 260 calories and sweetened with sugar (Pepsi Throwback).  Meanwhile, 
consumers’ least rated expected taste of a soft drink was the soft drink labeled with 0 
calories and sweetened with aspartame (Diet Pepsi).  The largest difference between 
experienced (Experiment 1) versus expected (Experiment 2) soft drink tastes was for the 
soft drink labeled with 260 calories and sweetened with sugar, with participants’ 
expected taste rating being significantly 1.88 higher than participants’ experienced taste 
rating (p<0.01).  The only other statistically significant difference in experienced versus 
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expected tastes was for the soft drink labeled as sweetened with HFCS and aspartame and 
100 calories (Pepsi Next). 
In both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, participants’ experienced and expected 
taste of the unlabeled soft drink was statistically the same as the soft drink labeled as 
HFCS and 250 calories (Pepsi).  However, in both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, 
participants’ expected and experienced tastes for the other soft drinks were all statistically 
different from the unlabeled soft drink. 
Table 43 
 
Bidding Round 2: Experienced and Expected Taste Results 
 
  Exp. 1  Exp. 2  Dif. in Means 
  (n=132) (n=102) Exp. 1 v 
  Experienced Expected Exp. 2 
Soft Drink Soft Drink Label Mean1 Mean1 p-value2 
Pepsi Unlabeled (Control) 6.27 6.01 0.132 
Pepsi HFCS & 250 Calories  6.54 6.20 0.140 
Diet  Aspartame & 0 Calories  4.67*** 4.57*** 0.378 
Throwback Sugar & 260 Calories  5.11*** 6.99*** 0.000 
Next HFCS & Aspartame  5.82** 5.19*** 0.024 
 & 100 Calories    
1 ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 for one tailed difference of means test between the unlabeled 
(control) soft drink and the other calorie and sweetener labeled soft drinks. 2One tailed test that 
the taste of the experienced soft drink taste is greater or less than the expected taste of the soft 
drink. 
 
Descriptive analysis for soft drink bids.  The following section analyzes the 
descriptive statistics for participants’ soft drinks bids for Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. 
Bidding Round 1 (sweetener information).  Table 44 displays the mean bids for 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, Bidding Round 1, for the participants who saw only 
sweetener information regarding the soft drinks.  Table 44 also displays the percentage of 
zero bids participants recorded when bidding on the soft drinks labeled with only 
sweetener information.  In Experiment 1, consumers bid the highest for the unlabeled 
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(control) soft drink (51 cents) and bid the least for the soft drink labeled as sweetened 
with HFCS (30 cents).  This is a very interesting result because in Experiment 1, for the 
unlabeled (Control), participants also tasted Pepsi (sweetened with HFCS).  Accordingly, 
in Experiment 1, a direct comparison can be made between soft drinks labeled as 
sweetened with HFCS compared to being unlabeled while holding taste constant. As 
demonstrated by Table 9, if a soft drink was labeled as sweetened with HFCS compared 
to carrying no label, consumers bid nearly 21 cents less for the soft drink while holding 
the taste constant.  This suggests that labeling soft drinks as being made with HFCS 
reduces consumers’ WTP drastically.   
In Experiment 2, participants bid the highest for the soft drink sweetened with 
sugar (84 cents) and bid the least for the soft drink sweetened with aspartame (57 cents).  
Most interestingly, the difference between bids in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 are 
extremely large for all soft drinks.  In fact, t-test reveal that participants bid significantly 
more for each of the soft drinks in Experiment 2 than they bid for them in Experiment 1.  
Furthermore, the percentage of zero bids is also much larger in Experiment 1 than in 
Experiment 2.  In Experiment 1, participants bid nearly 44 cents less for soft drinks 
labeled as sweetened with HFCS and also had about 20% more zero bids for soft drinks 
labeled as sweetened compared to Experiment 2.  Soft drinks labeled as sweetened with 
aspartame received the most similar bids in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2; however, 
they still differed by about 12 cents and were statistically different.  This suggests that 
conducting an experimental auction with the inclusion of taste panels (Experiment 1) 
produces much different bidding behavior than an experiment where participants only 
rate their expected taste of the soft drinks (Experiment 2).  Additionally, in Experiment 2, 
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participants do not have strong negative preferences for soft drinks labeled as sweetened 
with HFCS compared to Experiment 1. It is possible that because participants did not 
taste soft drinks in Experiment 2, they are not primed towards actual consumption of the 
soft drinks and their fear of consuming a possible harmful ingredient (HFCS) is not as 
strong as it is in Experiment 1 (Sweet Surprise, 2013). 
Table 44 also displays which soft drinks participants bid statistically significantly 
different for compared to the control, unlabeled soft drink.  In Experiment 1 participants 
bid significantly less for soft drinks labeled as sweetened with HFCS and sweetened with 
HFCS and Aspartame compared to the control soft drink.  In Experiment 2 participants 
bid significantly less for the soft drink labeled as sweetened with Aspartame compared to 
the control soft drink. 
Table 44 
 
Bidding Round 1: Sweetener Information Bids (in cents) 
 
 Experiment 1 (n=61) Experiment 2 (n=51)1 
Soft Drink Label Mean  % Zero Bids Mean  % Zero Bids 
Unlabeled (Control) 51.10 19.67% 74.92 13.73% 
HFCS  30.43** 29.51% 74.12 9.80% 
Aspartame  34.41* 24.59% 56.84* 17.65% 
Sugar  45.51 22.95% 83.76 11.76% 
HFCS and Aspartame  32.69** 24.59% 60.53 15.69% 
Note: In Experiment 1, for the Unlabeled (Control) participants tasted Pepsi (sweetened with 
HFCS). ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 for difference of means test between the unlabeled 
(control) soft drink and the other sweetener labeled soft drinks.1Participants bid significantly 
more for all of the soft drinks in Experiment 2 than they did for the soft drinks in Experiment 1. 
 
Bidding Round 1 (calorie information).  Table 45 displays the mean bids and 
percentage of zero bids for Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, when the soft drinks were 
labeled with only their calorie information.  In Experiment 1, consumers bid the highest 
for the 260 calorie soft drink (53 cents) and bid the least for the 0 calorie soft drink (46 
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cents).  Ultimately, in Experiment 1 all bids for the soft drinks were statistically the same 
suggesting calorie labeling does cause consumers’ WTP to fluctuate in a similar way that 
sweetener labeling caused consumers’ WTP to vary as illustrated by Table 44.  Calorie 
labeling did cause significant WTP fluctuations in Experiment 2.  Meanwhile, 
Experiment 2 bidding behavior for calorie labeling was not health conscious as expected.  
In fact, in Experiment 2, participants bid the highest for soft drinks labeled with 260 
calories (103 cents) and bid the least for soft drinks labeled as 0 calories (50 cents).  This 
is a very fascinating result given policy initiatives assume that improved calorie labeling 
will cause consumers to make healthier choices.  This result provides evidence that if 
taste of the product is unknown (Experiment 2), consumers still prefer the least healthy 
available option (e.g., 260 calorie soft drink) and have the strongest dislike of the 
healthiest option (e.g., 0 calorie soft drink). 
Similar to Bidding Round 1 when participants only saw sweetener information 
regarding the soft drinks (Table 44), the difference between bids in Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2 are very large and significant as determined by t-tests for all soft drinks 
except the 0 calorie soft drink.  Furthermore, the percentage of zero bids is also much 
larger in many cases in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2.  In both Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2 participants bid the most for soft drinks with 260 calories, which is the least 
healthy option.  This suggests that calorie labeling has little impact on motivating 
consumers to choose healthier foods.   
In Experiment 2, participants bid significantly more for the 250 calorie and 260 
calorie option than the unlabeled soft drink and they bid significantly less for the 0 
calorie option compared to the unlabeled soft drink.   
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Table 45 
 
Bidding Round 1: Calorie Information Bids (in cents) 
 
 Experiment 1 (n=71) Experiment 2 (n=51)1 
Soft Drink Label Mean % Zero Bids Mean  % Zero Bids 
Unlabeled (Control) 50.00 15.49% 73.84 19.61% 
250 Calories 51.68 15.49% 100.92** 5.88% 
0 Calories 45.99 18.31% 50.00** 35.29% 
260 Calories 52.87 18.31% 103.16** 5.88% 
100 Calories 51.77 12.68% 69.86 15.69% 
Note: In Experiment 1, for the Unlabeled (Control) participants tasted Pepsi (sweetened with 
HFCS).  ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 for difference of means test between the unlabeled 
(control) soft drink and the other calorie labeled soft drinks.1Participants bid significantly more 
for all of the soft drinks in Experiment 2 than they did for the soft drinks in Experiment 1 except 
for the 0 calorie beverage. 
 
 
Bidding Round 2 (sweetener and calorie information).  Table 46 displays the 
mean bids and percentage of zero bids for Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, Bidding 
Round 2, which is when the soft drinks were labeled with their sweetener and calorie 
information40.  In Experiment 1, consumers bid the highest for the unlabeled soft drink 
(48 cents) and bid the least for the soft drink sweetened with sugar and 260 calories 
calorie soft drink (41 cents).   In Experiment 2, participants bid the most for soft drinks 
sweetened with sugar and 260 calories (99 cents) and bid the least for soft drinks 
sweetened with aspartame and with 0 calories (60 cents).  Similar to previous rounds, 
consumers bid statistically significantly more in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1 for 
the soft drinks in general and also had a fewer percentage of zero bids for the soft drinks.  
In Experiment 1, participants did not statistically bid significantly different for any of the 
soft drinks compared to the unlabeled soft drink.  In Experiment 2, participants bid 
statistically more for soft drink labeled as sweetened with sugar and 260 calories than the 
                                                 
40 The samples for Bidding Round 1 (sweetener information) and Bidding Round 1 (calorie information) 
were combined to display the results.   
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unlabeled soft drink and bid significantly less for the soft drink sweetened with aspartame 
and 0 calories compared to the control soft drink. 
Table 46 
Bidding Round 2: Sweetener and Calorie Information Bids (in cents) 
 
 Experiment 1 (n=132) Experiment 2 (n=102) 
Soft Drink Label  Mean % Zero Bids Mean % Zero Bids 
Unlabeled (Control) 47.61 19.70% 72.47 17.65% 
HFCS & 250 Calories 43.45 21.97% 81.29 10.78% 
Aspartame & 0 Calories 41.56 28.79% 59.57* 23.53% 
Sugar & 260 Calories  40.60 22.73% 99.27*** 12.75% 
HFCS and Aspartame 42.27 24.24% 63.52 18.63% 
& 100 Calories     
Note: In Experiment 1, for the Unlabeled (Control) participants tasted Pepsi (sweetened with 
HFCS).  ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 for difference of means test between the unlabeled 
(control) soft drink and the other sweetener and calorie labeled soft drinks.1Participants bid 
significantly more for all of the soft drinks in Experiment 2 than they did for the soft drinks in 
Experiment 1.  
 
Tobit results.  The results presented above do not account for the fact that many 
participants bid zero for some of the soft drinks.  Therefore, the means that are reported 
above are censored means.  To address this issue, this section utilizes Tobit models which 
were explained in the methods section of this chapter.  Furthermore, the Tobit models 
also include the taste test ratings for Experiment 1 from the experienced taste panels and 
the expected taste test ratings for Experiment 2.  Additionally, socio demographic 
information is also used to help determine if individual participant characteristics 
contribute to influencing soft drink bids.   
In the first section of this analysis, the panel Tobit model is estimated for both 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2.  Once those results are presented, Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2 samples are pooled and individual soft drink Tobit models are estimated to 
determine whether consumer socio demographics are predictive of bidding behavior for 
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each specifically labeled soft drink.  The individual Tobit models also include body mass 
index (BMI), individual’s consumption of soft drinks, self-reported body attractiveness, 
and consumers’ acceptability ratings of different sweeteners to determine if they impact 
consumers’ WTP for the soft drinks labeled with different sweetener and calorie 
information.  
Bidding Round 1 (sweetener information).  Table 47 displays the random-effects 
panel Tobit model results for Bidding Round 1 (sweetener only information) for both 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 as outlined by equation (5) in the methods section.  The 
dependent variable in all models is consumers’ bids, in cents, for the soft drinks.  The 
estimated coefficients of the model reveal the marginal effect of the independent 
variables on participants’ uncensored soft drink bids.  Independent variables in the model 
included dummy variables indicating each of the labeling scenario condition and 
consumers’ socio demographic information.  The dummy variables are the different 
sweetener labels.  For example, aspartame is one of the dummy variables, which is equal 
to one if the participants bid on a soft drink labeled sweetened with aspartame, and the 
rest of the dummy variables are constructed following this procedure.  The unlabeled 
(control) dummy variable was dropped from the model due to multicollinearity; thus, all 
the dummy variables are compared to the condition of unlabeled (control) soft drink.   
In Experiment 1, participants bid nearly 17 cents less (p<0.05) for a soft drink if it 
was labeled as sweetened with HFCS compared to if it was unlabeled (control).  
Meanwhile, in Experiment 2, participants did not bid significantly different for any of the 
soft drinks if they were labeled with specific sweetener information compared to the 
unlabeled (control) soft drink.  Both experienced taste ratings of the soft drinks 
 181 
 
(Experiment 1) and expected taste ratings of the soft drinks (Experiment 2) had a positive 
and significant (p<0.01) impact on consumers’ WTP for the soft drinks. 
Table 47 
Bidding Round 1: Sweetener Information Bids (in Cents) 
 Experiment 1  Experiment 2 
Variable Coefficient (n=61) Coefficient (n=51) 
Aspartame -0.43 0.05 
HFCS and Aspartame -10.87 5.87 
Sugar  9.89 -0.10 
HFCS -16.77** 3.66 
Taste Test  11.03*** 12.35*** 
Income  -0.09 0.19 
Age  -0.43 1.69 
Gender -14.18 -13.01 
White -17.14 -7.49 
Constant 1.35 -50.52** 
Note: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. 
 
Bidding Round 1 (calorie information).  Table 48 displays the random-effects 
panel Tobit model results for Bidding Round 1 (calorie information only) for Experiment 
1 and Experiment 2 as outlined by equation (5) in the methods section.  Once again, the 
dependent variable in all models is consumers’ bids, in cents, for the soft drinks and the 
independent variables in the model included dummy variables indicating each of the 
labeling scenario condition and consumers’ socio demographic information.  The dummy 
variables are the different calorie labels.  For example, the calorie label, 0 calories, is 
equal to one if the participants bid on a soft drink labeled with 0 calories and the rest of 
the dummy variables are constructed following this procedure.  Similar to the sweetener 
model, the unlabeled (control) dummy variable was dropped from the model due to 
multicollinearity; thus, all the dummy variables are compared to the condition of 
unlabeled soft drink. 
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In Experiment 1, participants bid 14 cents more for soft drinks labeled as 0 
calories (p<0.10) as opposed to carrying no label; as participants’ income increased, they 
bid less for the soft drinks (p<0.10); as participants’ income increased, they bid more for 
the soft drinks (p<0.05); as participants liked their experienced taste of the soft drinks, 
they bid more for the soft drinks (p<0.01).   
In Experiment 2, if the soft drinks were labeled as 260 calories or 250 calories as 
opposed to being unlabeled they bid 14 cents (p<0.05) and 13 cents (p<0.10) more for the 
soft drinks.  When participants were older they bid less for the soft drinks (p<0.10) and as 
the participants expected taste ratings for the soft drinks increased, they bid more for the 
soft drinks (p<0.01).   
In comparing the results from Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, it is apparent that 
when consumers tasted the soft drinks (Experiment 1) they were more health conscious 
by bidding more for the healthy soft drink option (0 calorie option).  Meanwhile, in 
Experiment 2, when participants only rated their expected taste of the soft drinks, they 
were less health conscious and were actually willing to pay significantly more for the 
highest calorie soft drinks.  This suggests that perhaps real taste tests prime actual 
consumption in consumers and they are willing to pay more for healthier food options. 
Meanwhile, if real taste is not present in the experiment, then actual consumption is not 
primed and consumers are less health conscious. 
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Table 48 
Bidding Round 1: Calorie Information Bids (in Cents) 
 
 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
Variable Coefficient (n=71) Coefficient (n=51) 
0 Calories 13.95* -4.90 
100 Calories 8.69 5.64 
260 Calories 7.85 14.51** 
250 Calories -4.27 13.50* 
Taste Test 13.11*** 14.10*** 
Income -0.32* -0.25 
Age 0.96** -1.30* 
Gender -12.79 -7.61 
White -17.41 -4.96 
Constant -39.70** 39.55 
Note: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. 
 
Bidding Round 2 (sweetener and calorie labeling).  In Bidding Round 2, 
participants bid on soft drinks labeled with both sweetener and calorie information.  
Bidding Round 2 was the same regardless of participants saw only sweetener or only 
calorie information in Bidding Round 1; thus, the samples were pooled in this analysis.  
To account for pooling the sample, included in this model is a dummy variable indicating 
whether participants were saw only sweetener or only calorie information in Bidding 
Round 1.  The dummy variable (Sweetener Dummy) is equal to one if participants saw 
only sweetener information prior to Bidding Round 2.  Table 49 displays the results of 
the Tobit models for Experiment 1 and Experiment 2.  Similar to the sweetener model, 
the unlabeled dummy variable was dropped from the model due to multicollinearity; thus, 
all the dummy variables are compared to the condition of unlabeled (control).   
In Experiment 1, if the soft drink was labeled sweetened with aspartame and 0 
calories, consumers bid 9 cents more for the soft drink than an unlabeled soft drink 
(p<0.05) and participants bid 8 cents less for the soft drink if it was sweetened with 
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HFCS and contained 250 calories compared to an unlabeled soft drink (p<0.05).  If 
participants were white, they bid 25 cents less for all of the soft drink (p<0.01) and as 
participants liked their experienced taste of the soft drink, they bid 12 cents more for the 
soft drink (p<0.01).   
 In Experiment 2, if a soft drink was labeled as sweetened with sugar with 260 
calories participants bid nearly 13 cents more for the soft drink compared to an unlabeled 
soft drink (p<0.01) and as participants’ expected taste of the soft drinks increased, they 
bid more for the soft drinks (p<0.01).  Similar to the calorie bidding round, participants in 
Experiment 1 were more health conscious than participants in Experiment 2.  In 
Experiment 2, participants bid more for one of the most unhealthy soft drinks while 
participants in Experiment 1 bid more for the healthy soft drink (0 calories and 
aspartame) and less for an unhealthy soft drink (250 calories and HFCS).  Once again it is 
possible that having consumers taste actual products (Experiment 1) primes actual 
consumption in consumers so they become more health conscious. 
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Table 49 
Bidding Round 2: Sweetener and Calorie Information Bids (in Cents) 
 
 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
Variable Coefficient (n=132) Coefficient (n=102) 
Aspartame & 0 Calories 9.34** 3.92 
HFCS and Aspartame & 100 Calories -0.97 0.70 
Sugar & 260 Calories 3.91 12.63*** 
HFCS & 250 Calories -8.17** 6.25 
Taste Test  11.63*** 15.65*** 
Income -0.14 0.07 
Age -0.01 0.79 
Gender -7.50 -9.20 
White -25.38*** -12.89 
Sweetener Dummy1 -9.63 6.19 
Constant -1.50 -42.59** 
1Equal to 1 if participants saw only sweetener information in Bidding Round 1 compared to seeing 
only calorie information in Bidding Round 1. Note: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. 
 
Pooled Bidding Round 1 (sweetener information): By individual soft drink.  
Table 50 displays the results of individually estimating Tobit models for consumers’ bids 
for each individually labeled soft drink for Bidding Round 1 (sweetener only 
information).  The dependent variable in the Tobits are participants’ Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2 pooled soft drink bids for each individual soft drink label.  For example, for 
in the HFCS Tobit model the participants’ bids in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 for the 
soft drink labeled as sweetened with HFCS are combined to create the dependent 
variable.  The dummy variable, Experiment 1 Dummy, is equal to 1 if participants were 
in Experiment 1 (experienced taste) and 0 if participants were in Experiment 2 (expected 
taste).  
Similar to the previous models, the socio demographic variables are the same.  
However, the participants’ body mass index (BMI) is used in the model along with 
participants’ consumption frequency of the soft drinks.  For example, the soft drink 
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sweetened with HFCS corresponds to Pepsi; therefore, participants’ consumption 
frequency of Pepsi was included as an independent variable.  Also included as 
independent variables were the acceptability of the particular sweeteners.  For example, 
for the soft drink sweetened with HFCS condition, participants’ acceptability ratings of 
HFCS was included as an independent variable. 
As demonstrated by Table 50, across all of the soft drinks labeled with different 
sweetener information, including the unlabeled control condition, participants bid 
significantly less for the soft drinks in Experiment 1 compared to Experiment 2 which 
also confirms that when consumers actually tasted the soft drinks in Experiment 1, they 
were more likely to bid less for the soft drinks in the auction.  Throughout all models, as 
previously witnessed, as consumers increased their ratings of the soft drinks’ taste 
(expected and experienced), they were likely to bid more for the soft drinks.  In the 
unlabeled control condition, as participants were older, they were more likely to bid more 
on the unlabeled soft drink (p<0.05).  If participants were female, they bid 33 cents less 
for the unlabeled soft drink (p<0.05) and if a participant was white they bid 28 cents less 
for the unlabeled soft drink (p<0.05).  
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Table 50 
Pooled Data, Bidding Round 1: Sweetener Information by Soft Drink (n=108)  
 HFCS Sugar Aspartame Aspartame and HFCS Control 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Experiment 1 Dummy1 -55.23*** -27.47* -35.49*** -41.47*** -47.47*** 
Taste Test 10.89*** 13.76*** 5.67** 7.16*** 16.46*** 
Income  0.16 0.04 0.06 -0.02 -0.04 
Age  0.13 0.05 0.42 0.13 1.34** 
Gender 2.08 -4.70 -7.00 -15.84 -32.89** 
White -9.55 -17.39 0.66 -11.95 -27.62** 
BMI 0.33 1.48 0.33 1.40 -0.41 
Cons. Throwback  8.36    
Cons. Pepsi 5.65     
Cons. Diet Pepsi   -1.76   
Cons. Next    4.09  
Acceptability Sugar2  0.28    
Acceptability HFCS 5.65   0.14  
Acceptability Aspartame   0.27 -0.15  
Constant -33.86 -71.21 1.74 -5.24 -29.92 
1Equal to 1 if the data was from Experiment 1 (real taste test).2The following scale, from 0=not acceptable under any conditions to 
100=completely acceptable.  Note: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. 
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Pooled Bidding Round 1 (calorie information): By individual soft drink.  Table 
51 displays the results of individually estimating Tobit models for consumers’ bids for 
each individually labeled soft drink for Bidding Round 1 (calorie only information).  The 
variables in the model are similar to the individual Tobits for the sweetener labeling 
model; however, acceptability ratings were not included given consumers were not given 
any sweetener information in this round.  Also, the independent variable, Body 
Attractiveness, was added as an independent variable to this model because consumers 
may have different preferences for calorie content of soft drinks based on their self-
reported body attractiveness.   
 Table 51 once again displays that consumers bids were significantly lower in 
Experiment 1 compared to Experiment 2 for all soft drinks.  Furthermore, as participants 
rated their expected and experienced tastes for the soft drinks higher, they were more 
likely to bid more for the soft drinks.  Participants with higher incomes tended to bid less 
for soft drinks with 250 calories, 100 calories and the unlabeled soft drink.  Participants 
who were white bid significantly less for soft drinks with 250 calories, 260 calories and 
the unlabeled soft drink.  As participants rated their body attractiveness higher, they were 
more likely to bid more for the 250 calorie soft drink and the unlabeled soft drink. This 
possibly suggests that participants who rated their body attractiveness higher did not 
consider themselves in need of consuming lower calorie soft drinks.  As participants’ 
consumption of Pepsi increased, they bid more for the 250 calorie soft drink option which 
corresponds to Pepsi. 
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Table 51 
Pooled Data, Bidding Round 1: Calorie Information by Soft Drink (n=118)  
 250 Calories 260 Calories 0 Calories 100 Calories Control 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Experiment 1 Dummy1 -56.51*** -28.32* -13.96 -30.10*** -30.96*** 
Taste Test 10.72*** 18.27*** 12.97*** 9.23*** 12.41*** 
Income -0.41*** -0.16 -0.12 -0.37*** -0.27* 
Age 0.18 0.29 0.84 0.72 0.69 
Gender 0.07 -7.58 -4.78 -2.27 1.93 
White -30.62*** -30.83** 13.81 -20.61 -24.76** 
BMI -0.21 1.22 -0.66 0.90 -0.28 
Body Attractiveness2 9.19** 9.21 1.99 7.26 11.24*** 
Cons. Throwback  8.52    
Cons. Pepsi 7.10**     
Cons. Diet Pepsi   4.71   
Cons. Next    4.95  
Constant 10.64 -88.57 -40.14 -27.05 -40.62 
1Equal to 1 if the data was from Experiment 1 (real taste test).  2 The following scale, “Overall I would rate the attractiveness of my body 
as…” 1= well below average and 7= well above average. Note: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. 
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Pooled Bidding Round 2 (sweetener and calorie information): By individual 
soft drink.  Table 52 displays the results of individually estimating Tobit models for 
consumers’ bids for each individually labeled soft drink.  The included variables are a 
combination of the variables used in the sweetener only and calorie only individual soft 
drink models because this bidding round included both sweetener and calorie 
information.  Additionally, because Bidding Round 1 data was pooled, the dummy 
variable, Sweetener Dummy, was also included in analysis to determine if there was a 
difference in bids between participants who only saw sweetener information in Bidding 
Round 1 versus participants who saw only calorie information in Bidding Round 1. 
 Similar to the previous models, participants in Experiment 1 bid significantly less 
for the soft drinks than participants in Experiment 2 and as consumers rated the 
experienced and expected tastes of the soft drinks more, they were more likely to bid 
more for the soft drinks.  Throughout all soft drinks except the HFCS and 250 calorie soft 
drink, if participants were white, they bid significantly less for the soft drinks.  
Interestingly, also significant in the models was the acceptability ratings of the different 
sweeteners in the soft drinks.  For example, as consumers increased their acceptability 
scores for HFCS, consumers, on average, bid more for the soft drink sweetened with 
HFCS.  Slightly significant in the unlabeled soft drink model was the Sweetener Dummy.  
If consumers saw sweetener information in the Bidding Round 1, they bid nearly 15 cents 
less for the soft drinks in Bidding Round 2 (p<0.10).  
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Table 52 
Pooled Data, Bidding Round 2: Sweetener and Calorie Information by Soft Drink (n=226)  
 HFCS &  Sugar & Aspartame Aspartame and HFCS Control 
 250 Calories 260 Calories & 0 Calories & 100 Calories  
Variable Coefficient  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Experiment 1 Dummy1 -45.36*** -40.19*** -25.95*** -31.06*** -33.77*** 
Sweetener Dummy2 -3.22 -4.97 10.01 0.14 -14.96* 
Taste Test 9.64*** 14.53*** 10.33*** 11.86*** 13.99*** 
Income  -0.01 -0.04 0.04 -0.10 -0.13 
Age  0.13 -0.06 0.42 0.23 0.46 
Gender -1.30 -2.27 1.21 -10.88 -8.55 
White -12.31 -26.12*** -17.56** -18.27** -28.03*** 
BMI 0.56 -0.41 -0.83 0.49 -0.22 
Body Attractiveness 3.47 3.74 -1.47 2.89 0.89 
Cons. Throwback  5.59    
Cons. Pepsi 3.81     
Cons. Diet Pepsi   1.72   
Cons. Next    2.16  
Acceptability Sugar  0.30*    
Acceptability HFCS 0.42***   0.29**  
Acceptability Aspartame   0.40*** 0.06  
Constant -33.27 -36.16 8.41 -33.18 5.51 
1Equal to 1 if the data was from Experiment 1 (real taste test).  2Equal to 1 if participants saw only sweetener information in Round 1 
compared to seeing only calorie information in Round 1.  Note:  *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. 
 
 192 
 
Conclusion 
When consumers make the decision to purchase food products, they utilize information to 
determine what they would be willing to pay for the food product.  In terms of food 
product purchases, taste of the food product, calorie information and ingredient 
information are assumed to be the primary sources of information used to determine 
consumers’ WTP for the for the food product.  Accordingly, this research determined 
exactly what consumers were willing to pay for soft drinks labeled with various calorie 
and sweetener ingredient information while also determining the role of experienced soft 
drink taste versus expected soft drink taste in consumers’ bidding behavior. 
 Importantly, results of this research contribute to experimental auction literature 
by determining how taste panels impact consumers’ bidding behavior.  Throughout all 
models, subjects who participated in taste panels prior to bidding on the soft drinks, bid 
substantially less for the soft drinks in the auction than participants who only rated their 
expected taste of the soft drinks prior to bidding on the soft drinks.  This is a critical 
result given few research articles have previously isolated the impact of taste panels on 
consumers’ bidding behavior.  In a real market place setting, consumers typically are 
familiar with the real taste of the product they are going to consume; thus, including taste 
panels in an experimental auction simulates the most realistic market place setting.  This 
research provides evidence that experimental auctions which do not include taste panels 
in their auction design may produce biased results where consumers’ WTP for the food 
product are inflated; a phenomenon similar to hypothetical bias.    
This research highlights several important results regarding consumers’ responses 
to calorie and sweetener labeling as well as the importance of taste in food product 
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choice.  This research confirmed previous literature which indicates that the most 
important driver of soft drink consumption is the taste of the soft drink (e.g., Bollinger et 
al. 2011; Elbel et al. 2011).  In all models throughout this chapter, taste (both experienced 
and expected) was consistently significant and positive indicating that as consumers’ 
taste ratings (experienced and expected) increased, consumers were willing to pay more 
for the soft drinks.   
Results also confirm previous studies (e.g., Krieger & Saelens, 2013; Swartz, 
Braxton, & Viera, 2011) which indicate that calorie labeling does not have a strong 
influence on consumers purchasing decisions.  In only two instances throughout all 
models, consumers bid slightly more for a 0 calorie option compared to the unlabeled soft 
drink (Table 48 and Table 49).  Furthermore, model results suggest that consumers were 
actually willing to pay more for the highest calorie soft drink options (250 calories and 
260 calories) compared to the unlabeled soft drink (Table 48 and Table 49).  These 
results suggest that policy initiatives focused on increased front of packaging calorie 
labeling as well as menu calorie labeling, may not be successful at nudging consumers to 
choose healthier food products.   
Interestingly, in Experiment 1, participants bid nearly 16 cents less for the soft 
drink sweetened with HFCS compared to the unlabeled soft drink (Table 48) and 
participants in Experiment 1 also bid 8 cents less for the soft drink sweetened with HFCS 
with 250 calories (Table 49).  This provides evidence that consumers have negative 
perceptions of the sweetener HFCS. 
In Experiment 2, consumers were willing to pay nearly 13 cents more for the 260 
calorie, sweetened with sugar soft drink compared to the unlabeled soft drink (Table 49). 
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When Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 were pooled, consumers were willing to pay 15 
cents more for the 260 calorie, sweetened with sugar soft drink compared to the 
unlabeled soft drink (Table 48).  This provides evidence that the 260 calorie, sweetened 
with sugar soft drink was the most preferred soft drink in the auction.  In terms of 
sweeteners, this suggests that sugar is consumers most preferred sweetener, and in terms 
of calories, consumers prefer the most calorie intensive option. 
From examining the individual Tobit models for the individual soft drinks, it is 
apparent in many cases that if a person was white, they bid substantially less for the soft 
drinks.  Compared to other races, white people bid the least for the soft drinks.  In a few 
instances, as consumers were wealthier, they also tended to bid less for the soft drinks; 
thus, apparently people with lower incomes preferred soft drinks more.  Overall, BMI 
was never correlated with any type of bidding behavior; meanwhile, as participants’ self-
reported body attractiveness increased, in some cases, this resulted in higher bids for the 
soft drinks.  Overall this suggests there were no health related correlations with bidding 
behavior other than the fact that as people viewed themselves as better looking, they were 
willing to pay more for calorie intensive soft drinks.  In a few instances, increased 
consumer acceptability of the primary sweetener used in the particular soft drink was 
associated with higher bids for the soft drink.  This indicates that consumers’ perceptions 
of sweeteners does contribute to consumers’ purchasing intent for soft drinks. 
Ultimately, this research determines that food product taste is the most critical 
food product attribute that determines consumers’ purchasing decisions.  This research 
provides evidence that calorie labeling has an ambiguous impact on consumers’ 
purchasing decisions; for example, in some instances when presented with only soft drink 
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calorie information, consumers were willing to pay the most for the highest calorie 
options.  Results of this research also indicate that consumers most preferred soft drink 
has 260 calories and is sweetened with sugar; meanwhile, consumers have negative 
perceptions of HFCS as a sweetener.  This research is also critical to experimental 
auction literature when considering whether taste panels should be included in the design 
of experimental auctions in the future.  This chapter illustrates how experimental auctions 
that include taste panels produce WTP estimates that are statistically lower than 
experimental auctions that do not include taste panels.  Future research should determine 
if this result exists for food products other than soft drinks. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusions and Future Challenges 
This dissertation effectively analyzed the primary issues confronting the U.S. sugar 
industry.  The U.S. sugar industry outlined its main priorities in its 2014 agenda as the 
following: addressing the Mexican import problem, defending sugar provisions of the 
2014 Farm Bill, minimizing the impact of proposed trade agreements, and observing the 
mandatory genetically modified (GM) labeling debate (Markwart, 2014a).  Furthermore, 
issues surrounding sugar’s role in obesity and the differences between sugar and high 
fructose corn syrup (HFCS) are ever-present controversial issues in the news (Sugar 
Association, 2014e).  Weismeyer (2014) also cited sugar substitutes as a long term key 
issue facing the U.S. sugar industry in his address to the American Sugarbeet Grower’s 
Association at their February 2014 Annual Meeting.  Throughout this dissertation, all of 
these issues were addressed and comprehensively analyzed.     
Mexican exports of sugar into the U.S. are considered the most imminent issue 
facing the U.S. sugar industry and future trade agreements (e.g., Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP)) are among the most critical future concerns of the U.S. sugar industry 
(Wiesemeyer, 2014; Marwkart, 2014a; American Sugar Alliance 2013a).  Thus, Chapters 
3 through 6 developed a partial equilibrium model of trade between the U.S., Mexico and 
other countries which export sugar into the U.S.  These models were used to analyze 
many aspects of trade between Mexico and the U.S. and in the future could be extended 
to analyze the impact of trade agreements such as the TPP.   
In particular, Chapter 4 analyzed the impact of NAFTA on U.S. producer surplus 
and Mexican welfare.  It was discovered that full implementation of NAFTA cost U.S. 
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producers $8.66 billion (short-run) and $3.34 billion (long-run) over FY 2008 through FY 
2013.  If Mexico was still restricted by the TRQ, Mexican consumer surplus would be 
increased by an annual average of $1.87 billion (short-run) and $1.01 billion (long-run).  
Meanwhile, Mexican producer surplus would be decreased by an annual average of $2.03 
billion (short-run) and $1.09 billion (long-run) if Mexico was restricted by the TRQ.  If 
NAFTA was not fully implemented Mexican total welfare would have decreased by an 
annual average of $914 million (short-run) and $481 million (long-run).  However, in FY 
2008, total welfare in Mexico would have actually increased if Mexico was still restricted 
by the TRQ and this situation could also occur again in the future.  As demonstrated by 
Figure 16, under certain conditions, Mexican total welfare can be improved when 
restricted by the TRQ as opposed to having unrestricted access to the U.S. sugar market 
under NAFTA.   
Chapter 5 determined how USDA sugar forecasting errors in FY 2012 impacted 
U.S. producer surplus and Mexican welfare.  In FY 2012 the USDA U.S. sugar 
production forecast was inefficient and also inaccurate by underestimating U.S. sugar 
production by 297,000 MTRV.  Furthermore, the FY 2012 USDA forecast of Mexican 
exports to the U.S. was also underestimated by 310,000 MTRV.  This caused the USDA 
to increase the TRQ by 408,233 MTRV in FY 2012.  Over the annual average of FY 
2012 and FY 2013, the TRQ increase caused U.S. producer surplus to decrease by $442 
million (short-run) and $160 million (long-run).  This also caused Mexican producer 
surplus to decrease by $374 million (short-run) and $135 million (long-run).  Meanwhile, 
the TRQ increase caused consumer surplus in Mexico to increase by $290 million (short-
run) and $105 million (long-run).  Thus, total welfare in Mexico decreased by $84 
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million (short-run) and $30 million (long-run) due to the TRQ being increased.  
Ultimately, both U.S. producer surplus and Mexican total welfare was decreased by the 
TRQ being increased in FY 2012.  This demonstrates that it is in Mexico’s best interest to 
provide the USDA with accurate information regarding their expectations of the quantity 
of sugar they will export into the U.S. 
Chapter 6 determined how the Mexican government ownership of twenty percent 
of Mexican sugar production impacted U.S. producer surplus and Mexican welfare.  If 
the Mexican government did not own twenty percent of the Mexican sugar industry, 
during the average of FY 2012 and FY 2013, Mexican total welfare would decrease by 
$2.68 billion (short-run) and $658 million (long-run).  However, this does not take into 
consideration how much taxpayer money the Mexican government uses to operate twenty 
percent of its sugar industry; if this were taken into consideration, Mexican total welfare 
would not be as significantly decreased.  If the Mexican government did not own twenty 
percent of the Mexican sugar industry, U.S. producers would gain an average of $1.28 
billion (short-run) and $568 million (long-run) annually.   
 Chapter 7 of the dissertation utilized an online choice experiment to determine 
consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for imported and genetically modified (GM) sugar 
and sugar in soft drinks.  To control for possible hypothetical bias in the online choice 
experiment, the role of consequentiality in an online choice experiment was examined.  
Determining consumers’ WTP for imported and GM sugar essentially examined all four 
of the pressing issues facing the U.S. sugar industry in 2014 (i.e., Mexican imports of 
sugar, 2014 Farm Bill, GM sugar, international trade) as outlined by Markwart (2014a).   
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In terms of GM labeling, it was discovered that consumers prefer sugar and sugar 
in soft drinks that is not GM over sugar that is unlabeled and sugar that is labeled as GM. 
This result has large implications to the U.S. sugar industry given sugar produced in the 
U.S. originates from non-GM sugarcane seeds and GM sugarbeet seeds (USDA 
Economic Research Service, 2013b; USDA Economic Research Service, 2013c).  Results 
demonstrate that mandatory GM labeling laws would have major consequences for 
sugarbeet growers in the U.S. given nearly 100% of sugarbeets grown in the U.S. are 
GM. (USDA Economic Research Service, 2013b).  
Examining consumers’ WTP for imported sugar provides insight into the 
remaining three primary issues outlined by Markwart (2014a) which are Mexican imports 
of sugar, international trade and the 2014 Farm Bill sugar provisions.  The online choice 
experiment results determined that consumers prefer sugar from Canada and the U.S. 
over sugar from Mexico, Brazil and the Philippines.  This suggests that consumers do not 
prefer sugar and sugar in soft drinks which originate from Mexico; however, Mexico is 
currently responsible for nearly half of the foreign sugar which enters into the U.S.  
In terms of international trade, Chapter 7 determined what consumers are willing 
to pay for sugar which originates in the countries which export the most sugar into the 
U.S. (e.g., Mexico, Brazil, Philippines).  In terms of U.S. sugar policy, a controversial 
subject regarding the 2014 Farm Bill negotiations was whether to continue current 2008 
Farm Bill sugar program provisions which regulate foreign imports of sugar into the U.S. 
(e.g., Coalition for Sugar Reform, 2013a; Nixon, 2013; Farm Futures, 2013; USDA 
Economic Research Service, 2013a).  In defense of U.S. sugar policy, as outlined in the 
2008 Farm Bill, sugar lobbyist groups claim that U.S. consumers prefer sugar produced 
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in the U.S. (American Sugar Alliance, 2013b).  Results of the online experiment confirm 
that U.S. consumers do, in fact, prefer U.S. sugar the most while preferring sugar from 
Mexico, Brazil and the Philippines the least. 
Chapter 8 focused attention on the discussion surrounding sugar’s role in obesity 
and consumers’ preferences for sugar and sugar substitutes (e.g., HFCS, aspartame).  
Using a non-hypothetical experimental auction, Chapter 8 determined consumers’ WTP 
for soft drinks labeled with different sweetener and calorie information.  Chapter 8 also 
determined how the inclusion of taste panels in an experimental auction impacts 
consumers’ bidding behavior.  Results established that consumers have negative 
preferences for HFCS and prefer sugar.  Chapter 8 also identified calorie labeling to be 
ineffective at influencing consumers to choose healthier soft drinks.  Chapter 8 also 
determined that the inclusion of taste panels in an experimental auction caused 
participants to bid substantially less for all auctioned products. 
Future Challenges and Future Research of the U.S. Sugar Industry 
There are many future challenges facing the U.S. industry.  The U.S. sugar industry is 
heavily reliant on U.S. sugar policy to protect its industry by regulating which countries 
are allowed to export sugar into the U.S. and in what quantities.  Therefore, preserving 
current U.S. sugar policy legislation is always the single most vital concern of the U.S. 
sugar industry.  The 2014 Farm Bill extended 2008 Farm Bill sugar policy for another 
five years (American Sugar Alliance, 2014d); therefore, for the next five years, current 
sugar policy will be preserved.  Even with sugar policy being preserved for the next five 
years, several issues still exist which could impact the U.S. sugar market within the next 
five years.  Trade agreements, competition from sugar substitutes, and execution of 
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current U.S. sugar policy by the USDA are issues which can still have a large impact on 
the U.S. sugar industry (Wiesemeyer, 2014; Marwkart, 2014a). 
 In terms of trade agreements, the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations have 
been underway for several years and are scheduled to conclude sometime in 2014 
(Markwart, 2014b).  The TTP would have a large impact on the U.S. sugar market given 
the TPP includes countries (e.g., Australia) which produce a large amount of sugar.  To 
analyze the impact of the TPP on the U.S. sugar market, the international trade model 
developed in Chapters 3 through 6 could be extended. 
 There are thirty-one different sweeteners either approved or pending approval by 
the Food and Drug Administration in the U.S. (Sugar Association, 2014b).  Furthermore, 
some researchers have recently started declaring sugar as toxic and a leading contributor 
to obesity (Lustig, Schmidt, & Brandis, 2012).  Thus, many demand side issues regarding 
sugar are ever-present and could impact the U.S. sugar industry.  Chapter 8 of this 
dissertation comprehensively analyzed how consumers perceive sugar as a sweetener in 
soft drinks compared to HFCS and aspartame.  Methods utilized in Chapter 8 could easily 
be extended to research how sugar compares to other sweeteners besides HFCS and 
aspartame. 
 Markwart (2014b) stated that the execution of sugar policy by the USDA is one 
future issue that could impact the U.S. sugar industry.  Chapters 3 through 6 of this 
dissertation quantified how USDA execution of U.S. sugar policy affected U.S. producer 
surplus.  Future research can continue to use the models developed in Chapters 3 through 
6 to estimate how USDA execution of U.S. sugar policy impacts the U.S. producer 
surplus and the U.S. sugar industry. 
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Survey Instrument of Online Consumer Survey 
 
This study is being conducted by researchers from Arizona State University. The purpose 
is to identify how consumers make purchasing decisions with respect to soft drinks and 
sugar. It is hoped that by studying factors that are related to consumers’ purchase 
decisions, knowledge can be gained on the public perception on and status of such 
products. Results from the study will inform policy-makers on views related to soft 
drinks, which may ultimately benefit consumers, such as yourself. 
 
You are being asked, as a consumer of sugar and soft drinks, to participate in a research 
project through taking an online survey. We expect the online survey might take about 20 
minutes of your time. You can be assured that your answers are confidential and will only 
be released as summaries. Your name will not be collected as part of your survey 
response and thus can never be associated with the data. Your responses will not be 
individually identified or publicized. Your answers are strictly voluntary. You are free to 
withdraw from the survey at any time or leave any questions unanswered. You must be 
18 or older to participate.  
 
The submitted data will be used for statistical purposes only and statistical results will be 
reported in research papers, technical reports and academic journals. In the future, the 
statistical data may be used for subsequent research in the area of consumer preferences, 
as a basis for comparison to future results, and as an example in teaching. There are no 
anticipated risks to participating in this study. Benefits include a broader understanding 
of consumer preferences of soft drinks that can contribute to the formation of public 
policy.  
 
If you have any questions, comments, or suggestions about the survey or the study, please 
feel free to contact the investigators Dr. Carola Grebitus at Carola.Grebitus@asu.edu or 
Karen Lewis at kelewis4@asu.edu.  If you have any questions about your rights as a 
subject/participant in this research, or if you feel you have been placed at risk, you can 
contact the Chair of the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board, through the ASU 
Office of Research Integrity and Assurance, at (480) 965-6788. 
 
Filling out the questionnaire will be considered your consent to participate.  
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NOW, PLEASE TAKE THE TIME TO CAREFULLY READ THE FOLLOWING 
INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE PROCEEDING 
 
Imagine you are in your usual grocery store and considering the purchase of sugar and 
soft drinks. Following are 12 choice scenarios (decision situations); 6 for each of these 
products. Each decision situation includes a description of different product features. All 
features of the products in each decision situation are identical except that they vary in 
their price, country of origin and are produced from genetically modified seeds or are not 
produced with genetically modified seeds.  
 
In each decision situation, please indicate the decision you would make based on your 
own preferences. Specifically, you are asked which product you would CHOOSE to 
purchase, compared to other products that will be visible to you on the screen. 
Alternatively, you may choose NOT TO PURCHASE either product. Please carefully 
examine each option before you make a decision and select the decision that you would 
make based on your own preferences.  
 
IMPORTANT       
o CHOOSE one of the options on each page. Or you may choose NOT TO PURCHASE  
   either product. 
o Assume that the options for each page are the only ones available. 
o Do not compare options from different pages. 
 
You might see a few options that may seem counter-intuitive (e.g., a lower price but a 
higher quality in your personal opinion). Be assured that this is not an error but part of the 
design of the survey. Simply choose the option that you prefer most, based on its 
characteristics.  
 
Note: Only participants in the Consequentiality Information Treatment saw this 
information 
 
IMPORTANT: 
  
 Your responses will be used to assist policy makers in determining genetically 
modified labeling practices and in determining how much foreign sugar should 
enter into the U.S. 
 Based on your preferences, policy makers will determine whether foreign sugar 
should be able to enter into the United States and at what rate. 
 Your decisions will also help policy makers determine if genetically modified foods 
should be labeled. 
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NOTE: Following are examples of choice sets presented to participants. The order was 
randomized between participants. Each participant made 6 choices in total. A blocked 
design with 12 choice sets and 2 blocks was used. 
 
Imagine you are in a grocery store and you would like to purchase a 4 pound bag of 
sugar. Please select which bag of sugar you prefer: 
                                            
Sugar originated in Brazil     Sugar originated in Canada                                                                        
Sugar is genetically modified           
Price: $2.71                                 Price: $3.17                                    None of these 
 
         __________                                  __________                               __________ 
 
 
 
Imagine you are in a grocery store and you would like to purchase a 4 pound bag of 
sugar. Please select which bag of sugar you prefer: 
                                            
Sugar originated in the U.S.            Sugar originated in Phillipines                                                              
Not genetically modified                 Sugar is genetically modified  
Price: $3.17                                      Price: $2.24                                    None of these 
 
         __________                                  __________                               __________ 
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NOTE: Following are examples of choice sets presented to participants. The order was 
randomized between participants. Each participant made 6 choices in total. A blocked 
design with 12 choice sets and 2 blocks was used. 
 
Imagine you are in a grocery store and you would like to purchase a 20 ounce soft drink. 
Please select which soft drink you prefer: 
 
                                                                                           
 
Sugar orginated in Brazil    Sugar originated in Canada                                                                       
Sugar is genetically modified           
Price: $1.67                                      Price: $1.80                                    None of these 
 
         __________                                  __________                               __________ 
 
Imagine you are in a grocery store and you would like to purchase a 20 ounce soft drink. 
Please select which soft drink you prefer: 
 
                                                                                           
                                                                       
Sugar is genetically modified          Sugar originated in Canada  
Price: $1.67                                      Price: $1.67                                    None of these 
 
         __________                                  __________                               __________ 
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This is the last part of the survey.  We would like to ask you for some background 
information about you, as it is a critical part of our analysis.  This is an anonymous 
survey and your name is not linked to the responses.  In addition, all of this information 
will be treated as confidential.  Results of this survey will only be used in aggregate form 
and only for research purposes. 
 
1. To what extent do you believe that your answers will… (check one box per question) 
 
(a) be taken into consideration by public authorities? 
 
Not at all Very little Little Somewhat Much Very 
Much 
      
 
(b) be used to analyze alternative sugar policies? 
Not at all Very little Little Somewhat Much Very 
Much 
      
 
(c) be used to analyze alternative genetically modified labeling policies? 
Not at all Very little Little Somewhat Much Very 
Much 
      
 
(d) be used to analyze alternative sugar import policies? 
Not at all Very little Little Somewhat Much Very 
Much 
      
 
(e) have a direct impact on the policies of the United States government? 
Not at all Very little Little Somewhat Much Very 
Much 
      
 
2. When making your choices for the bagged sugar, which of the attributes did factor 
into your decision?   
 
Price YES ______ NO ______ 
 
Genetically modified labeling YES ______ NO ______ 
 
Country of origin YES ______ NO ______ 
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3. When making your choices for the soft drinks, which of the attributes did factor into 
your decision?   
 
Price YES ______ NO ______ 
 
Genetically modified labeling YES ______ NO ______ 
 
Country of origin YES ______ NO ______ 
 
 
 
For the following questions, check or fill in the answers which best describe you. 
 
1. Are you responsible for food shopping in your household?  
 
Always ______      Sometimes ______   Never ______ 
 
2. How old are you?  ______years 
 
3. What is your gender?    Female ______ Male ______  
 
4.  What is your preference for sweet taste?   
 
Strong preference for sweet taste______  
 
Moderate liking for sweet taste  ______ 
 
Dislike of sweet taste     ______ 
 
5. What is your educational background? (Mark the box next to the highest level of 
education you have completed.) 
High School Diploma    ______       Bachelor’s Degree ______        
Some college     ______       Master’s Degree ______        
Technical School Diploma  ______       Doctorate  ______        
Associate’s Degree   ______      Other:    ______       
 
6. Are you a U.S. citizen?   YES  ______     NO ______     
 
If not, what country are you a citizen of? _______________________ 
 
7. What is the primary language you speak at home?     
___________________________ 
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8. What is your race?  
White   ______            African American  ______      
Hispanic   ______ Asian/Pacific Islander ______ 
Native American ______ Other    ______ 
 
9. How many individuals live in your household, including yourself? If you are a 
student, do not include your parents or roommates? #  ______  
 
10. Are children under the age of 12 present in the household?  YES _____ NO _____ 
 
11. Are you a student?    YES, undergraduate _____     YES, graduate _____   NO _____ 
 
12. How often do you usually consume the following products? (Check boxes that apply) 
 
 Daily One or more  
times a week 
Every  
two weeks 
Once  
a month 
A few times 
a year 
Never 
Soft 
Drinks  
      
Sugar       
 
13. How much do you usually pay for a 4 pound bag of sugar? $________ 
 
14. How much do you usually pay for a 20 ounce bottle of soda? $________ 
 
15. Please indicate your approximate annual household income before taxes: 
Less than $10,000             ______  $60,000 to $69,999   ______ 
$10,000 to $19,999 ______ $70,000 to $79,999   ______ 
$20,000 to $29,999 ______  $80,000 to $89,999   ______ 
$30,000 to $39,999 ______ $90,000 to $99,999   ______ 
$40,000 to $49,999 ______ $100, 000 to $149,999 ______ 
$50,000 to $59,999  ______ $150,000 or more   ______ 
 
Thank you for your participation! 
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APPENDIX B 
 
EXPERIMENT: CONSUMERS’ VALUATION OF SOFT DRINKS LABELED WITH  
 
CALORIE AND SWEETENER INFORMATION: THE IMPACT OF TASTE 
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Script to be ‘read’ by a monitor at the beginning of all sessions41: 
 
Hi, my name is Karen and I am going to run this study. First, I would like to thank 
you all for agreeing to participate in today’s study on market decision making. The 
purpose of the study is to examine consumers’ decision making regarding purchases of 
soft drinks and energy drinks. The entire session will last approximately 45 minutes. 
As you entered the room, you should have been given $30.00 and a folder. On the 
top right hand side of all the papers in your folder, you will find your ID number.  You 
will use this ID number to identify yourself during this research session. We have used 
random numbers in order to ensure confidentiality. 
Before we begin, I want to emphasize that your participation in this session is 
completely voluntary. If you do not wish to participate in the study, please say so at any 
time. Non-participants will not be penalized in any way. I want to assure you that the 
information you provide will be kept strictly confidential and used only for the purposes 
of this research. You should now read the consent form found inside your package. If you 
consent to participate in the study, please sign the consent form. 
 
  
                                                 
41 Experimental instructions and procedures for the candy bar auction, soft drink auction, and 
energy drink auction follow directly from Grebitus, Lusk, and Nayga (2013). 
 227 
 
Candy Bar Practice Auction Monitor:  
 
All right, now we want to play another game with you. 
Here in the front of the room, we have two chocolate bars: a Hershey’s chocolate bar and 
Lindt chocolate bar.  We are interested in your preferences for each of these candy bars.   
We will now conduct an auction for each of the candy bars, where you will have the 
opportunity to win one of the candy bars.  In a moment, you will be asked to indicate the 
most you are willing to pay (if anything) to purchase each of the candy bars by writing bids 
on the enclosed bid sheets.  Let me explain how the auction will proceed: 
 
Auction Procedures 
1. First, each of you has been given a bid sheet in your folder.  On this sheet you will, in a 
moment, write the most you are willing to pay to for each of the following: a) the Hershey’s 
chocolate bar, and b) the Lindt chocolate bar.  Note: you will write two bids, one for each 
candy bar.  Your bids are private information and should not be shared with anyone.   
 
2. After you’ve finished writing your bids, the monitor will go around the room and collect 
the bid sheets. 
 
3. The bids will be ranked from highest to lowest for each chocolate bar. 
 
4. The person with the highest bid for each chocolate bar will win the auction and pay the 
2nd highest bid amount for the chocolate bar.  All other participants will leave with no 
chocolate bar.  
 
Important Notes 
• You will only have the opportunity to win an auction for one chocolate bar.  Because 
we will randomly draw a binding chocolate bar, you cannot win more than one 
chocolate bar.  That is, under no bidding scenario will you take home more than one 
chocolate bar from this experiment. 
 
• The winning bidder will actually pay money to obtain the winning chocolate bar.  This 
procedure is not hypothetical. 
 
• In this auction, the best strategy is to bid exactly what it is worth to you to obtain each 
of the two chocolate bars.  Consider the following: if you bid more than the chocolate 
bar is worth to you, you may end up having to buy a chocolate bar for more than what 
you really want to pay.  Conversely, if you bid less than the chocolate bar is really 
worth to you, you may end up not winning the auction even though you could have 
bought a chocolate bar at a price you were actually willing to pay.  Thus, your best 
strategy is to bid exactly what each chocolate bar is worth to you. 
 
 
• It is acceptable to bid $ 0.00 for any chocolate bar. 
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Auction Example 
 
Suppose there were 5 people participating in an auction just like the one you are about to 
participate in.  Suppose that these individuals participated in the auction round, and, assume 
that the Hershey’s chocolate bar was randomly selected to be the binding chocolate bar.  
Now, suppose for the Hershey’s chocolate bar participant #1 bid $0.00, participant #2 bid 
10 cents, participant #3 bid 20 cents, participant #4 bid 30 cents, and participant #5 bid 40 
cents.   
 
Who would win the auction?   
 
Participant #5 would win the auction because he/she bid the highest amount.  How much 
would participant #5 have to pay for the Hershey’s chocolate bar?  Participant #5 would 
pay the 2nd highest bid amount, which was 30 cents.  Thus, participant #5 would come to 
the front of the room, pay 30 cents and obtain the Hershey’s chocolate bar.  Participants 
#1, #2, #3, and #4 would pay nothing and would leave with no chocolate bar.   
 
Note: these dollar amounts were used for illustrative purposes only and should not in any 
way reflect what the chocolate bars may be worth to you         
 
Do you have any questions before we begin? 
 
You may now proceed to fill out your Chocolate Bar Bid Sheet. 
 
Please be aware that this is the practice round and you will not have to buy anything right 
now. 
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Chocolate Bar Bid Sheet                
 
 
Chocolate bar #  I bid 
1 $  
2 $  
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 Soft Drink and Energy Drink Auctions 
 
Now that you have had the chance to learn how the auction works, we are interested in 
your preferences for soft drinks and energy drinks. On the shelf over there you will see soft 
drinks and energy drinks that differ in their sweetener.  
 
We would like to know how much you like these soft drinks and energy drinks. 
 
We will have three rounds of auctions for the soft drinks and one round of auctions for the 
energy drinks.  Thus, there will be a total of four auction rounds.  In each of the three soft 
drink auction rounds, five different soft drinks will be auctioned off.  In the energy drink 
auction, five different energy drinks will be auctioned off.  After the fourth auction round, 
one of the rounds will be selected as a “binding” round.  For the “binding” round, the soft 
drinks, or energy drinks, will be purchased by the participant who bid the highest amount 
in the auction for the soft drink or energy drink. The winner will then pay the second highest 
price.  
 
To select which round is the “binding round,” four cards with the numbers 1, 2, 3 and 4 
will be shuffled and placed faced down.  For example, If card number 2 is selected, then 
auction round #2 will be selected for the “binding” round and soft drinks from that auction 
will really be purchased by the winner of the auction. 
 
Now, we will explain how round #1 of the auction will work and how winners of the 
auction will be determined.  In round #1, we will conduct 5 auctions with the soft drinks 
and you will have the opportunity to win 1 of the soft drinks if round #1 is selected as the 
“binding” round. In a moment, you will be asked to indicate the most you are willing to 
pay (if anything) for each of the soft drinks by writing bids on the enclosed “soft drink bid 
sheet #1”.  To refresh your memory as to how the auction works, I will go through the 
instructions again. 
 
Auction Procedures 
 
1) First, each of you has been given “soft drink bid sheet #1” in your folder.  On this sheet 
you will, in a moment, write the most you are willing to pay to for each of the different soft 
drinks.  Note: you will write five bids, one for each of the soft drinks.  Note: your bids are 
private information and should not be shared with anyone. 
 
2) After you’ve finished writing your bids, the monitor will go around the room and collect 
the bid sheets. 
 
3) Each of your bids will be ranked from highest to lowest for each of the soft drinks 1 
through 5. 
 
4) The person with the highest bid for each of the soft drinks will win the auction and pay 
the 2nd highest bid amount for the soft drinks, if round # 1 is selected as the “binding” 
round.   
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5) If two persons bid the same amount we will roll the dice to determine the winner. 
 
6) If you win more than once we will also roll the dice to determine which auction is 
binding for you. 
 
7) If you win, you will really have to pay for your soft drink, if round #1 is selected as the 
“binding” round. However, under no circumstances will you go home with more than 1 
soft drink. 
 
8) The winners of the auctions will be named after round #4. 
 
9) The winners will purchase the soft drinks for the 2nd highest bid amount and obtain the 
soft drink, if round #1 is selected as the “binding” round. 
 
Important Notes 
• Each winner for each soft drink will pay the second highest price for the specific soft 
drink, if round #1 is selected as the “binding” round. If round #1 is selected as the 
“binding” round, you will only have the opportunity to win one auction for one soft 
drink even though you submit a bid for each of the five soft drinks. Under no 
circumstances, can you win more than one soft drink.  That is, under no bidding 
scenario will you take home more than one soft drink in total from this experiment. 
 
• If round #1 is selected as the “binding” round, the winning bidder will actually pay 
money to obtain the winning soft drink.  This procedure is not hypothetical. 
 
• In this auction, the best strategy is to bid exactly what each of the soft drinks is worth 
to you.  Consider the following: if you bid more than the soft drinks are worth to you, 
you may end up having to buy a soft drink for more than you really want to pay.  
Conversely, if you bid less than the soft drinks are really worth to you, you may end up 
not winning the auction even though you could have bought a soft drink at a price you 
were actually willing to pay.  Thus, your best strategy is to bid exactly what the soft 
drinks are worth to you. 
 
• It is acceptable to bid $0.00 for any soft drinks. 
 
OK, now we start. Please take the soft drink bidding sheet #1 out of your folder. We give 
you the opportunity to participate in an auction where you can purchase soft drinks that are 
sweetened with different sweeteners.  
 
On that shelf over there we have 5 different soft drinks. Four soft drinks are labeled with 
the sweetener they were sweetened with. One soft drink has no label. You have the 
opportunity to buy 1 soft drink if round #1 is selected as the “binding” round.   Use your 
soft drink bidding sheet #1 to indicate the highest amount of money that you are willing to 
pay for each of the soft drinks. This means you will write down five bids. The procedure 
is the same as for the chocolate bars. 
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We would like to inform you again that all your information will be kept strictly 
confidential. Once you have made your five bids please hand me your bidding sheet. 
Do you have any questions? 
 
You may begin. 
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Experiment 1- Taste experiment 1  
 
Monitor:  
 
Now, I would like you to taste the five different soft drinks in these cups. The soft drinks 
are what you would buy in your usual grocery store. Please take a sip of each and rate the 
soft drinks from cup 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 on the green sheet of paper. 
(Participants consume 5 sips of soft drinks. Unsalted crackers are offered to clear the 
pallet.)  
How much do you like the soft drinks 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5? Please rank the soft drinks on a 
scale from 1=Greatest imaginable dislike to 11=Greatest imaginable like. (Check one 
option per soft drink). 
 (Not labeled  Pepsi Pepsi Pepsi Diet Pepsi 
 for participants)  Throwback  Pepsi Next 
 Label for participants 1 2 3 4 5 
1 Greatest imaginable dislike     
2 Dislike extremely      
3 Dislike very much      
4 Dislike moderately      
5 Dislike slightly      
6 Neither like nor dislike      
7 Like slightly      
8 Like moderately      
9 Like very much      
10 Like extremely      
11 Greatest imaginable like      
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Experiment 2-Soft Drink Expected Taste Experiment #1 
Monitor:  Please attach this piece of paper to your clipboard and go over to the soft drinks 
on the shelf.  The soft drinks are what you would buy in your usual grocery store. Please 
look at each soft drink on the shelf and rate your overall expectation of much you would 
like the taste of each soft drink if you were able to drink it. 
Without being able to taste the soft drinks, what is your overall expectation of the taste of 
Soft Drinks #1, 2, 3, 4, and 5? Please rank the Soft Drinks on a scale from 1=Greatest 
imaginable dislike to 11=Greatest imaginable like. (Check one option per soft drink). 
 
 (Not labeled  Pepsi Pepsi Pepsi Diet Pepsi 
 for participants)  Throwback  Pepsi Next 
 Label for participants 1 2 3 4 5 
1 Greatest imaginable dislike     
2 Dislike extremely      
3 Dislike very much      
4 Dislike moderately      
5 Dislike slightly      
6 Neither like nor dislike      
7 Like slightly      
8 Like moderately      
9 Like very much      
10 Like extremely      
11 Greatest imaginable like      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 235 
 
Round 1A Auction Product List: 
 
Bottle #1 (corresponds to cup 1):  
 Left blank 
 
Bottle #2 (corresponds to cup 2):  
 Sweetened with Sugar 
 
Bottle #3 (corresponds to cup 3):  
 Sweetened with High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) 
 
Bottle #4 (corresponds to cup 4):  
 Sweetened with Aspartame 
 
Bottle #5 (corresponds to cup 5):  
 Sweetened with High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) and Aspartame 
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Soft Drink Bid Sheet #1A 
                                       
 
 
  
Soft Drink #  I bid 
1 $  
2 $  
3 $  
4 $  
5 $  
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Round 1B Auction Product List 
Bottle #1 (corresponds to cup 1):  
 Left blank 
 
Bottle #2 (corresponds to cup 2):  
 260 Calories 
 
Bottle #3 (corresponds to cup 3):  
 250 Calories 
 
Bottle #4 (corresponds to cup 4):  
 0 Calories 
 
Bottle #5 (corresponds to cup 5):  
 100 Calories 
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Soft Drink Bid Sheet #1B 
                                       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Soft Drink #  I bid 
1 $  
2 $  
3 $  
4 $  
5 $  
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Experiment 1- Taste experiment 2.  
Monitor: 
Now, I would like you to taste the five different soft drinks in these cups. The soft drinks 
are what you would buy in your usual grocery store. Please take a sip of each and rate the 
soft drinks from cup 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 on the green sheet of paper. 
(Participants consume 5 sips of soft drinks. Unsalted crackers are offered to clear the 
pallet.)    
How much do you like the soft drinks 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10? Please rank the soft drinks on a 
scale from 1=Greatest imaginable dislike to 11=Greatest imaginable like. (Check one 
option per soft drink). 
 (Not labeled  Pepsi Pepsi Pepsi Diet Pepsi 
 for participants)  Throwback  Pepsi Next 
 Label for participants 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Greatest imaginable dislike     
2 Dislike extremely      
3 Dislike very much      
4 Dislike moderately      
5 Dislike slightly      
6 Neither like nor dislike      
7 Like slightly      
8 Like moderately      
9 Like very much      
10 Like extremely      
11 Greatest imaginable like      
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Experiment 2- Soft Drink Expected Taste Experiment #2 
Monitor:  Please attach this piece of paper to your clipboard and go over to the soft drinks 
on the shelf.  The soft drinks are what you would buy in your usual grocery store. Please 
look at each soft drink on the shelf and rate your overall expectation of much you would 
like the taste of each soft drink if you were able to drink it. 
Without being able to taste the soft drinks, what is your overall expectation of the taste of 
Soft Drinks #6, 7, 8, 9, and 10? Please rank the Soft Drinks on a scale from 1=Greatest 
imaginable dislike to 11=Greatest imaginable like. (Check one option per soft drink). 
 
 (Not labeled  Pepsi Pepsi Pepsi Diet Pepsi 
 for participants)  Throwback  Pepsi Next 
 Label for participants 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Greatest imaginable dislike     
2 Dislike extremely      
3 Dislike very much      
4 Dislike moderately      
5 Dislike slightly      
6 Neither like nor dislike      
7 Like slightly      
8 Like moderately      
9 Like very much      
10 Like extremely      
11 Greatest imaginable like      
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Round 2 Auction Product List 
 
Bottle #6 (corresponds to cup 6):  
 Left blank 
 
Bottle #7 (corresponds to cup 7):  
 Sweetened with Sugar 
 260 calories per bottle 
 
Bottle #8 (corresponds to cup 8):  
 Sweetened with High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) 
 250 calories per bottle 
 
Bottle #9 (corresponds to cup 9):  
 Sweetened with Aspartame 
 0 calories per bottle 
 
Bottle #10 (corresponds to cup 10):  
 Sweetened with High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) and Aspartame 
  100 calories 
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Monitor:  
Now we will proceed in the same way as before. The same conditions hold. Please take 
your bid sheet #2.  We have five soft drinks.  The soft drinks are labeled with sweeteners 
and calories, one of the bottles carries no labels.  
Please indicate the highest price that you are willing to pay for each soft drink. Each 
winner for each soft drink will again pay the second highest price for the specific soft 
drink if round #2 is selected as the “binding” round.  If two persons bid the same amount 
we will also roll the dice to determine the winner. If you are the winner for more than one 
of the soft drinks we will again roll the dice to determine which auction is binding for 
you. If you win, you will really have to pay for the soft drink if round #2 is selected as the 
“binding” round. However, under no circumstance will you go home with more than one 
soft drink. 
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Soft Drink Bid Sheet #2 
                                       
  
 Soft Drink #  I bid 
6 $  
7 $  
8 $  
9 $  
10 $  
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Experiment 1- Taste experiment 3  
Monitor: 
Now, I would like you to taste the five different soft drinks in these cups. The soft drinks 
are what you would buy in your usual grocery store. Please take a sip of each and rate the 
soft drinks from cup 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 on the green sheet of paper. 
(Participants consume 5 sips of soft drinks. Unsalted crackers are offered to clear the 
pallet.)  
How much do you like the soft drinks 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15? Please rank the soft drinks 
on a scale from 1=Greatest imaginable dislike to 11=Greatest imaginable like. (Check 
one option per soft drink). 
 (Not labeled  Pepsi Pepsi Pepsi Diet Pepsi 
 for participants)  Throwback  Pepsi Next 
 Label for participants 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Greatest imaginable dislike     
2 Dislike extremely      
3 Dislike very much      
4 Dislike moderately      
5 Dislike slightly      
6 Neither like nor dislike      
7 Like slightly      
8 Like moderately      
9 Like very much      
10 Like extremely      
11 Greatest imaginable like      
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Experiment 2- Soft Drink Expected Taste Experiment #3 
Monitor:  Please attach this piece of paper to your clipboard and go over to the soft drinks 
on the shelf.  The soft drinks are what you would buy in your usual grocery store. Please 
look at each soft drink on the shelf and rate your overall expectation of much you would 
like the taste of each soft drink if you were able to drink it. 
Without being able to taste the soft drinks, what is your overall expectation of the taste of 
Soft Drinks #11, 12, 13, 14, and 15? Please rank the Soft Drinks on a scale from 
1=Greatest imaginable dislike to 11=Greatest imaginable like. (Check one option per soft 
drink). 
 (Not labeled  Pepsi Pepsi Pepsi Diet Pepsi 
 for participants)  Throwback  Pepsi Next 
 Label for participants 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Greatest imaginable dislike     
2 Dislike extremely      
3 Dislike very much      
4 Dislike moderately      
5 Dislike slightly      
6 Neither like nor dislike      
7 Like slightly      
8 Like moderately      
9 Like very much      
10 Like extremely      
11 Greatest imaginable like      
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Round 3 Auction Product List 
 
 Bottle #11 (corresponds to cup 11):  
 Left blank 
 
Bottle #12 (corresponds to cup 12):  
 Sweetened with Sugar 
 260 calories per bottle 
 sweetened with an all natural sweetener 
 
Bottle #13 (corresponds to cup 13):  
 Sweetened with High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) 
 250 calories per bottle 
 sweetened with an all natural sweetener 
 
Bottle #14 (corresponds to cup 14):  
 Sweetened with Aspartame 
 0 calories per bottle 
 Diet 
 
Bottle #15 (corresponds to cup 15):  
 Sweetened with High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) and Aspartame 
 100 calories 
 made with 60% less sugar 
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Monitor:  
Now we will proceed in the same way as before. The same conditions hold. Please take 
your bid sheet #3. 
We have five soft drinks. The soft drinks are labeled with sweeteners and calories, one 
bottle is left blank. Please indicate the highest price that you are willing to pay for each 
soft drink. Each winner for each soft drink will again pay the second highest price for the 
specific soft drink, if round #3 is selected as the “binding” auction.  If two persons bid the 
same amount we will also roll the dice to determine the winner. If you are the winner for 
more than one of the soft drinks we will again roll the dice to determine which auction is 
binding for you. If you win, you will really have to pay for the soft drink, if round #3 I 
selected as the “binding” auction. However, under no circumstance will you go home 
with more than one soft drink. 
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Soft Drink Bid Sheet #3 
                      
 
  
Soft Drink #  I bid 
11 $  
12 $  
13 $  
14 $  
15 $  
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Experiment 1- Taste experiment 4  
Monitor: 
Now, I would like you to taste the five different energy drinks in these cups. The energy 
drinks are what you would buy in your usual grocery store. Please take a sip of each and 
rate the energy drinks from cup E1, E2, E3, E4 and E5 on the green sheet of paper. 
(Participants consume 5 sips of energy drinks. Unsalted crackers are offered to clear the 
pallet.)  
How much do you like the energy drinks E1, E2, E3, E4, and E5? Please rank the soft 
drinks on a scale from 1=Greatest imaginable dislike to 11=Greatest imaginable like. 
(Check one option per energy drink). 
 (Not labeled  NOS NOS Cocaine Cocaine Red Bull 
 for participants)     Total Zero 
 Label for participants ED1 ED2 ED3 ED4 ED5 
1 Greatest imaginable dislike     
2 Dislike extremely      
3 Dislike very much      
4 Dislike moderately      
5 Dislike slightly      
6 Neither like nor dislike      
7 Like slightly      
8 Like moderately      
9 Like very much      
10 Like extremely      
11 Greatest imaginable like      
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Experiment 2- Energy Drink Expected Taste Experiment #1 
Monitor:  Please attach this piece of paper to your clipboard and go over to the energy 
drinks on the shelf.  The energy drinks are what you would buy in your usual grocery 
store. Please look at each energy drink on the shelf and rate your overall expectation of 
much you would like the taste of each energy drink if you were able to drink it. 
Without being able to taste the energy drinks, what is your overall expectation of the taste 
of Energy Drinks #1, 2, 3, 4, and 5? Please rank the Energy Drinks on a scale from 
1=Greatest imaginable dislike to 11=Greatest imaginable like. (Check one option per 
energy drink). 
 (Not labeled  NOS NOS Cocaine Cocaine Red Bull 
 for participants)     Total Zero 
 Label for participants ED1 ED2 ED3 ED4 ED5 
1 Greatest imaginable dislike     
2 Dislike extremely      
3 Dislike very much      
4 Dislike moderately      
5 Dislike slightly      
6 Neither like nor dislike      
7 Like slightly      
8 Like moderately      
9 Like very much      
10 Like extremely      
11 Greatest imaginable like      
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Monitor:  
Now we will proceed in the same way as before. The same conditions hold. Please take 
your energy drink bid sheet. 
We have five energy drinks. One energy drink has no label. Four energy drinks are 
labeled with sweeteners. Please indicate the highest price that you are willing to pay for 
each energy drink. Each winner for each energy drink will again pay the second highest 
price for the specific drink, if round #4 is selected as the binding round. If two persons 
bid the same amount we will also roll the dice to determine the winner. If you are the 
winner for more than one of the energy drinks we will again roll the dice to determine 
which auction is binding for you. If you win, you will really have to pay for the energy 
drink, if round #4 is selected as the “binding” round. However, under no circumstance 
will you go home with more than one energy drink. 
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Energy Drink Product List 
Energy Drink #1 (corresponds to cup 1E):  
 Left Blank 
 
Energy Drink #2 (Corresponds to cup 2E):  
 Sweetened with High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) 
  
Energy Drink #3 (Corresponds to cup 3E):  
 Sweetened with Dextrose 
 
Energy Drink #4 (Corresponds to cup 4E):  
 Sweetened with Corn Sugar 
 
Energy Drink #5 (Corresponds to cup 5E)  
 Sweetened with Aspartame 
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Energy Drink Bid Sheet  
                           
 
 
Energy Drink #  I bid 
1 $  
2 $  
3 $  
4 $  
5 $  
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Monitor: 
Now please complete the Questionnaire. 
Questionnaire: 
We are almost done. In this part of the survey most of the questions ask about your attitudes 
and opinions. There are no right or wrong answers and your responses are confidential. 
Please think carefully about each question and give your best answers. Your completion of 
the survey is extremely important for the results of this study. As mentioned in the 
beginning this is an anonymous survey and your name is not linked to the responses. In 
addition, all of this information will be treated as confidential. Results of the survey will 
only be used in aggregate form and only for research purposes. 
 
1. Consider that different types of sweeteners exist. Please rate how acceptable the 
following sweeteners are on a scale from 0 = not acceptable under any conditions to 
100 = completely acceptable. 
 
Sweetener Please write down a number between 
0=not acceptable at all and 
100=completely acceptable. 
Aspartame  
Corn Sugar  
Dextrose  
High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS)  
Sugar  
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2. What is your preference for sweet taste?   
 
Strong preference for sweet taste______  
Moderate liking for sweet taste  ______ 
Dislike of sweet taste     ______ 
 
3. What is your height? ______feet and inches   
 
 
4. What is your weight? ______lb  
 
5. How often do you usually consume the following products? (Check box that applies) 
 
 Daily One or more  
times a week 
Every  
two weeks 
Once  
a month 
A few times 
a year 
Never 
Pepsi  
      
Pepsi 
Throwback 
      
Diet Pepsi 
      
Pepsi Max 
      
Pepsi Next 
      
Energy 
Drinks 
      
Sugar free 
energy 
drinks 
      
 
 
6. Overall I would rate the attractiveness of my body as…  
 
1  
Well below 
average  
2 3 4 
Average  
5 6 7 
Well above 
average  
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This is the final part of our survey. It is a critical part of our analysis. Please remember, 
this is an anonymous survey and your name is not linked to the responses. In addition, all 
of this information will be treated as confidential. Results of the survey will only be used 
in aggregate form and only for research purposes.  
For the following questions, check or fill in the answers which best describe you. 
 
1. How old are you?  ______years 
 
2. What is your gender?    Female ______ Male ______  
 
3. What is your educational background? (Mark the box next to the highest level of 
education you have completed.) 
High School Diploma    ______       Bachelor’s Degree ______        
Some college     ______       Master’s Degree ______        
Technical School Diploma  ______       Doctorate  ______        
Associate’s Degree   ______      Other:    ______       
 
4. Are you a U.S. citizen?   YES  ______     NO, I am a citizen 
of_______________________ 
 
5. What is the primary language you speak at home?     
___________________________ 
 
6. What is your race?  
White   ______            African American  ______      
Hispanic   ______ Asian/Pacific Islander ______ 
Native American ______ Other   ______ 
 
7. How many individuals live in your household, including yourself? If you are a student, 
do not include your parents or roommates? #  ______  
 
8. Are children under the age of 12 present in the household?  YES _____ NO _____ 
 
9. Are you a student?    YES, undergraduate _____     YES, graduate _____   NO _____ 
 
10. Are you responsible for food shopping in your household?  
 
Always ______      Sometimes ______   Never ______ 
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11. Please indicate your approximate annual household income before taxes: 
 
Less than $10,000 ______   $60,000 to $69,999   ______ 
$10,000 to $19,999 ______ $70,000 to $79,999   ______ 
$20,000 to $29,999 ______  $80,000 to $89,999   ______ 
$30,000 to $39,999 ______ $90,000 to $99,999   ______ 
$40,000 to $49,999 ______ $100, 000 to $149,999 ______ 
$50,000 to $59,999  ______ $150,000 or more   ______ 
  
Thank you very much for your participation!  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
